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PREFACE 
 
Over the course of my doctoral studies, my late grandfather forgot me. In February 2015 he 
began losing interest in reading the Sing Tao Daily—my father, who cared for him, would find them 
untouched on his desk more often than not, which was unusual given his love for the newspaper. 
He was diagnosed with senile dementia in June of that year. It did not occur to me that by the end 
of the next year I would never hear him call me by name again. By the time I began working on this 
dissertation in 2017, he ceased to recognize me, something I often blamed on my absence from 
home. It felt ironic that my grandfather was most proud of me for pursing higher education, but that 
was also what perhaps led him to so readily forget me.  
Like the several narrators I encountered while researching for this project, I struggled with a 
sense of inadequacy in knowing how best to remain connected to him and to our family history, 
though our communication had always been strained due to language differences and his becoming 
deaf in 2012. As in many of the texts this dissertation explores, my grandfather’s dementia occluded 
my family’s routine access to stories: stories he once told of living through the Second Sino-Japanese 
War, of travails he faced living in Suriname before its independence, and of immigrating to the U.S. 
Unlike some of the figures with dementia in this study, my grandfather did not return to these 
memories of his past and was often quiet. Yet what did emerge, and what I observed dramatized in 
many texts, were enriching ways of being social differently; connections that I relished when they 
did occur, such as the joyous moments that arose whenever he mistook the plastic cockatiel figurine 
as a real incarnation of my deceased pet bird, and the contentment with which we’d sit during our 
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silent, unhurried meals at the dinner table together. Thus, as I was composing this project, I felt 
pressed to explore how literature helps imagine what new meanings and possibilities for connection 
and communication can surface from the changing and aging body’s forgetting. 
At the same time, my personal experiences as an occasional caregiver and witness to the 
processes of dementia in my grandfather (and less severely in my late grandmother) coupled with the 
sensibility I’ve cultivated through disability studies, have made me cognizant of the dangers of 
romanticization, appropriation, and essentialism. Entangled Stories explores how writers (many with 
loved ones with dementia) deploy dementia as a narrative, ethical, and aesthetic resource, as well as a 
vantage point through which to explore personal and collective histories of traumatic events. I 
approach this corpus of literature cautiously, with the caveat that the voices and viewpoints of real 
people are not necessarily being reflected in it. As integral as dementia is in these narratives, one 
cannot take them as definitively representative of the complex lived experience of dementia and the 
equally complex, often difficult, intimate work of caregiving. As impossible as it is to do justice to all 
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This dissertation examines cultural and literary responses to dementia in narratives dealing 
with the personal and historical memory of trauma and violence. Rather than use dementia to signify 
a crisis of forgetting or the erasure of history, the texts in this dissertation deploy dementia as a 
formal and ethical resource; they offer revisionary narratives that recuperate negative discourses 
surrounding aging and cognitive impairment, as well as enable readers’ reflections on issues across 
geopolitical borders, historical contexts, and different marginalized life experiences. Bringing a 
disability studies analytic to the examination of the politics and narrative aesthetics of dementia, 
Entangled Stories argues for a nuanced understanding of how dementia operates formally and 
thematically in contemporary writing as a site in which the intimate and global collide. 
Each chapter centers on authors’ concomitant personal encounters with dementia and their 
explorations of the historical memory of major 20th- and 21st-century catastrophes. As such, I probe 
into the corresponding tropes and metaphors of dementia appearing strategically alongside the 
representation of those events. Chapter 1 interrogates the discourse of environmental disaster and 
memory loss in Ruth Ozeki’s narration of the aftermath of Fukushima. Chapter 2 examines the 
contemporaneous rhetorics of the “War on Alzheimer’s” and the War on Terror in Susan M. 
Schultz’s experimental writing. Chapter 3 focuses on two authors’ graphic renditions of dementia 
and traumatic history: Dana Walrath challenges dementia as a popular metaphor for political 
amnesia and denial in the context of the Armenian Genocide, while Stuart Campbell visualizes the 
interrelations of dementia and the social traumas of World War II. Chapter 4 turns to the popular 
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fictions of Emma Healey and Jo Walton, which take up the trope of dementia’s “alternative realities” 
to narrate histories of gendered postwar violence and aging differently. Together, these chapters 
reveal how dementia operates as a heuristic for understanding the past and connecting to others 
differently, thus reimagining life with dementia as one of agency and social value. For readers of 
these texts, the subject of dementia becomes an opportunity for thinking about transformative 
approaches to care, community, and conceptions of what it means to be human in time and history.  
Traversing the intergenerational memory of injustices surrounding environmental 
degradation, war, occupation, and genocide, the works featured in Entangled Stories generate 
discussions relevant to fields of literary studies bordering trauma theory, memory studies, and 
postcolonialism. This dissertation’s focus on Alzheimer’s and senile dementia also emphasizes age is 
an important intersectional identity category, bringing disability studies into conversation with work 
in feminist aging studies, dementia studies, and the medical humanities. The interdisciplinary nature 
of this project attests to how contemporary re-imaginings of dementia go beyond personal stories of 
loss and the pathological discourse of plaques and tangles—they are imbricated in broader 
representational concerns over how to remember and respond to extreme events and political 
conflict. Through writing about intimate encounters with dementia, these authors grapple with the 
increasing fear of Alzheimer’s and dementia in the 21st century—a fear bolstered by the post-9/11 
injunction to “never forget.” Indeed, one of the tensions authors negotiate is the need to protect 
historical memory—as a form of enlightenment and intervention to preclude future tragedies—and 
the necessity of holding space for personal forgetting and caring for/about the experiences of aging, 












Dementia and the Historical Memory of Trauma 
 
 
In May 2017, Salena Zito’s interview with U.S. President Donald Trump generated a number 
of headlines due to a question asked by President Trump: “Why was there the Civil War?” Media 
outlets were quick to criticize Trump’s chronologically inaccurate reference to Andrew Jackson and 
his overall “deeply confusing” response as a lack of historical understanding, temporal grounding, 
and outright manifestation of mental illness (Graham). In a segment of MSNBC’s Morning Joe that 
aired the next day, former GOP congressman and host Joe Scarborough told audiences, “my mother 
had dementia for ten years,” likening Trump’s question to “the sort of thing my mother would say.” 
Continuing the cascade of conjectures six months later, Late Show host Stephen Colbert asked his 
audiences if it was “okay to use the ‘D’ word” to describe Trump yet. Colbert wielded the 
euphemistic “d-word” as a censored slur in service of comedic effect. But in using it to delineate just 
how “crazy” Trump is, Colbert also spoke to the way dementia currently exists in the public 
imagination as a humiliating, malignant mental condition to be feared.1 The recurring debates around 
Trump’s dementia as a campaign issue are also profoundly illustrative of the way in which the 
metaphors accruing around dementia take on political urgency, as the malignancy here signals a 
particular ideological orientation or political act. For instance, Historian David Andress’ critique of 
right and far-right political actors’ “abandonment of political attention to history” (1) are drawn 
                                               
1 On Trump and the rhetoric of ableism and neurological difference see Byrd McDaniel and Paul M Renfro who 
elaborate on how “ableist claims of Trump’s exceptional depravity have often leveraged language used to stigmatize the 
very groups Trump's presidency stands to harm the most.” See “This is Not Normal: Ability, Gender, and Age in the 
Resistance to Trumpism,” Disability Studies Quarterly 39.2 (2019). 
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from his own disparaging perceptions of his father’s Alzheimer’s: “They make no more sense than a 
dementia sufferer demanding that his carers let him get the train to work in his pajamas. Just as a 
confused eighty-year-old cannot bend the world to his perception, so a Brexiting Britain or ‘Great 
Again’ America cannot return old prosperity to their rustbelts by willing it to happen” (3). 
 Susan Sontag’s oeuvre on the damaging cultural fantasies concocted around cancer, 
tuberculosis, and AIDS continues to be relevant today when considering the plethora of myths and 
metaphors that have accrued around Alzheimer’s and the general diagnostic category of dementia.2 
“A death sentence without a timeline,” “the silver tsunami of the 21st century,” “an apocalypse on 
the horizon,” and “an unrecognized killer”—such are the metaphors of Alzheimer’s readily found 
across news media and health communication headlines, as well as filmic and literary productions. In 
“Dementia as a Cultural Metaphor,” Hannah Zeilig puts it formulaically:  
dementia, which is so persistently associated with crisis, war, uncontrollable natural disaster, 
and death, has become synonymous with a general sense of calamity. In linguistic terms, 
dementia can almost be considered a metonym…A rather simplistic equation has developed: 
Dementia = a complex, unknowable world of doom, aging, and a fate worse than death. 
(261-62) 
 
The imaginary of calamity surrounding dementia in the 21st century is deeply imbricated in the fact 
that genocides, wars, and collective catastrophes have multiplied from the end of the 20th century 
and into the present day (Hirsch 2). The crisis over aging populations is thus entangled in a 
representational crisis over how to remember and respond to extreme events and geopolitical 
conflict. As renown American gerontologist and theater artist Anne Davis Basting points out, “the 
trope of memory loss imagery in US culture began with WWII in which films especially were 
concerned with how we would forget brutal memories of war and move on individually and 
nationally” (Forget Memory 51).  
                                               
2 See Susan Sontag, Illness as a Metaphor and AIDS and Its Metaphors (New York: Picador, 1990); on the emergence of 
Alzheimer’s meanings in the 70s and 80s see Jesse F. Ballenger, Self, Senility, and Alzheimer's Disease in Modern America 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2006). 
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If, as Sontag has argued, metaphor shapes the ways we think about, experience, and respond 
to illness, then these popular metaphors undoubtedly continue to sensationalize and stigmatize not 
just the experiences of Alzheimer’s, but those of aging, cognitive change and difference, and 
memory loss intrinsic to the diversity and complexity of human experience. In the spirit of Sontag, 
Entangled Stories: Reimagining Dementia, History, and Narrative in Contemporary Literature and Life Writing 
pursues three goals: to “reveal the metaphorical trappings” (Sontag 102) of the conditions of 
dementia; to highlight works that interrogate established metaphors, especially those pertaining to 
the traumas of war/militarization, environmental disaster, and foreign threat; and to de-mythologize 
dementia, centering new tropes and iconographies that are productive and just. I do not aim to offer 
a comprehensive catalogue of all the problematic metaphors circulating around Alzheimer’s and 
dementia in the 21st century; many cultural critics and historians and have already done so. Instead, I 
focus on excavating complex narratives, often with experimental features, that interrogate these 
metaphors and deploy them differently. 
Entangled Stories offers a more nuanced reading of Alzheimer’s and dementia in narratives 
dealing with the personal and historical memory of trauma and violence. Each chapter explores how 
dementia operates as a site in which the “entangled stories” of the intimate and global collide. Rather 
than use dementia to signify forgetting or an absence of history, authors deploy dementia to 
orchestrate the “multidirectional” meeting of different traumatic memories.3 Doing so, these authors 
offer revisionary narratives that recuperate negative cultural discourses surrounding dementia. Using 
dementia as a source of formal innovation, these narratives also cross genre and subject matter, 
                                               
3 My use of the term “multidirectional” draws from Michael Rothberg’s term “multidirectional memory,” which defines 
how traumatic and global histories of issues such as racism, slavery, and colonialism can be articulated and compared 
together without equating them. Rothberg writes, “memory’s anachronistic quality—its bringing together of now and 
then, here and there—is actually the source of its powerful creativity, its ability to build new worlds out of the materials 
of older ones” (7). I argue in these works it is the impaired memory of dementia that functions to bring together “now 
and then.” See Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2009). 
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offering fluid spaces for readers’ potential empathic connection with issues across geopolitical 
borders, historical contexts, and other marginalized life experiences. 
 
Representational Ethics and Stories of Dementia 
“It can hardly be coincidental,” Lisa Appignanesi writes in the introduction to Losing the 
Dead: A Family Memoir (1999), “that I want to remember, to uncover, to know, at the moment when 
my last gateway to family memory—my mother—is losing hers” (7). Grappling with the progression 
of her mother Hena’s Alzheimer’s, Appignanesi undertakes a project to excavate the past of her 
parents, Polish Jews who survived the Nazi occupation and resettled in Canada in the 1950s. While 
Hena’s Alzheimer’s-related dementia is not the focal point of Losing the Dead, it is the text’s key 
motive. As the narrator of Losing the Dead  explains, Hena’s increasingly fragmented and repetitive 
articulation of memories (“She can only return and return again to what she has already told me, 
scraps of unruly experience which refuse the consecutive shape of story” [7]) impel her to “put these 
fragments into some kind of sequence…to set her memories now side by side with the fuller 
versions I remember from childhood and my own youth” (91). Piecing together Hena’s “scraps of 
unruly experience,” Appignanesi creates a correspondingly formal patchwork of auto/biography, 
traumatic bildungsroman, travelogue, fiction, and collective history of wartime Poland (Pellicer-Ortín). 
Over the course of writing the book, she importantly points out that talking about the war “cease[d] 
to be one of [Hena’s] preoccupations”; the narrator reflects, “I don’t know whether this is because 
she feels I have stolen it from her or that she has given it to me. In any case, the onus has been 
transferred” (247). In the process of intimately witnessing the progression of Alzheimer’s, 
Appignanesi acquires not only an interest in her mother’s wartime memories but also exhibits a 
fraught sense of power and responsibility over their representation. 
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The equivocality Appignanesi feels as to whether or not she has appropriated her mother’s 
war memories raises some of Entangled Stories’ guiding questions. How do authors leverage the 
representation and lived experience of people with dementia—as characters, tropes, metaphors, 
narrative resources—in writing about the memory of historical trauma? How do texts reinforce or 
challenge the stigmas associated with age- and dementia-related forgetting and to what ends? 
Broadly, how does dementia, formally and thematically, enable authors to explore questions of 
identity, relationality, history, and narrative itself from new vantage points? What ethics of 
representation and care emerge? 
In what is now popularly known as the “Age of Alzheimer’s,” it is not coincidental that 
contemporary writers like Appignanesi invoke an aging parent’s dementia in their works as a starting 
point to explore the anxieties surrounding the impending loss of a generation of eyewitnesses to 
major traumatic events such as the Holocaust, a loss marking the end of what Eva Hoffman calls 
“the era of memory” (203). Indeed, Losing the Dead exemplifies the preoccupations of the “post” 
generation (“the generation that comes immediately after the event” [Hoffman 4]) and their 
relationship to the past. Marianne Hirsch, building on Hoffman, terms this particular 
intergenerational structure “postmemory,” or “the relationship that the ‘generation after’ bears to 
the personal, collective, and cultural trauma of those who came before—to experiences they 
‘remember’ only by means of the stories, images, and behaviors among which they grew up” (5). 
Hirsch argues that what is at stake in expressions of postmemory like Losing the Dead is “the 
‘guardianship’ of a traumatic personal and generational past with which some of us have a ‘living 
connection’ and that past’s passing into history or myth” (1). However, Losing the Dead is not just 
motivated by stories and experiences Appignanesi “grew up” with—it is about the longing arising 
from her adult experience of stories that emerge distorted, fragmented, and anew in light of Hena’s 
dementia. As Katarzyna Kawapisz Williams has similarly observed of the war documentary film Once 
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My Mother (2013), dementia functions as a “catalyst for restoration of generational memory, 
connection to people and places” (131). 
There is something else besides postmemory characterizing texts like Losing the Dead that this 
project aims to explore as a critical site of inquiry: that is, the specific mode and formation of 
relational memory and knowing that emerges through relationships with a parent (or grandparent) with 
dementia and that drives the desire to recover that family member’s past. The concept of 
postmemory has been influential in literary criticism bordering memory studies and trauma theory 
(particularly in relation to post-Holocaust literature), but these critical conversations almost always 
unproblematically equate dementia with trauma or leave such analogies unquestioned. This failure 
leads to an oversight that leaves subjects with dementia underexamined, despite being “significant 
others, those whose stories are deeply implicated in the narrator’s and through whom the narrator 
understands her or his own self-formation” (Smith and Watson 86).  
Indeed, little critical attention is directed to figures with dementia in works of life writing like 
Losing the Dead; their loss of self and forgetting is taken as a convenient metaphor for cultural 
amnesia (another cognitive disability metaphor). As another example consider the conversation 
around Caterina Edwards’ creative nonfiction memoir, Finding Rosa: A Mother with Alzheimer’s, a 
Daughter in Search of the Past (2008), which bears similarities to Losing the Dead in that Edward’s 
mother’s Alzheimer’s serves as motive for her excavation of traumatic histories. In Finding Rosa, 
Edwards’ uncovering of her mother’s past from World War I onward to her immigration to Canada 
leads the author to reconstruct a broader history of ethnic Italian refugees exiled from Istria during 
World War II. In the text, the foiba—sinkholes in which ethnic Italians living in Yugoslavia-occupied 
territories during World War II were killed en masse—becomes a symbol for the violence in Istria 
during the 1950s but also for Rosa’s Alzheimer’s (the “foiba of forgetfulness” [Edwards 76]). Here 
the meaning of dementia as a lived experience is depersonalized—it is the foiba, a place of trauma 
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and killing—an ontology defined in terms of suffering, violence, and horror. Thus, the force of the 
narrative’s conveyance of historical trauma is inextricable from its reproduction of dominant cultural 
perceptions of dementia as a form of trauma itself or “biosocial death” (Leibing 248). Critic Jennifer 
Bowering Delisle’s reading of Finding Rosa goes along with this analogy; writing that the loss of 
Rosa’s memory to “the foiba of Alzheimer’s” “would be to perpetuate traumatic repression, and to 
become complicit with the willful erasure of ethnic Italian people from the Istrian landscape” (135). 
Delisle’s reading places stigmatizing onus on Rosa, in that her personal forgetting comes to 
symbolize the perpetration of collective violence.4 
Memoirs such as those of Edwards and Appignanesi signal a trending use of dementia in 
contemporary life writing, as well as literary fiction, to narrate history and trauma on personal and 
collective levels. Furthermore, they register how critical conversations around this trending corpus 
reveal a common analogical move that obfuscates the relationship between dementia and histories of 
trauma rather than illuminating them. These critical interpretations take the presentation of dementia 
as an ultimate negative signifier for the evacuation of personhood. Further, they equate trauma and 
dementia, an abstraction that flattens the contours of actual history and the complex processes and 
sources of violence. These abstractions thus damagingly dislocate the person with dementia from the 
concrete particularities of their history and lived experience, as well as the value of their social and 
emotional bonds with others that can still persist. 
Scholar Lucy Burke’s recent article makes a similar observation of Annie Ernaux’s memoir I 
Remain in the Darkness (1999) in its critique of Ernaux’s reliance on analogies between Holocaust 
death camps and her mother’s experience in a long-term care home.5 Burke observes a tendency in 
                                               
4 Similarly, another critic writes, “Rosa Pagan’s Alzheimer’s disease becomes a metaphor for the amnesia of national 
leaders of our own day who seem to have forgotten the evils of war” (Pivato 62). 
5 As Burke elaborates, “Since the Holocaust has been repeatedly configured as the most unspeakable form of 
suffering… then something more significant is arguably taking place when it is evoked in narrative accounts of living 
with dementia. Indeed, the symbolic power of this analogy resides in its extreme encapsulation of the perceived impact 
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auto/biographical works like Ernaux’s, in which the analogy “used by the writer/observer 
symbolically reinscribes the very impersonal and debased effects that the self-same writer or 
observer laments as attributes of the neurological impairments associated with dementia” (198). For 
Burke, this symbolic displacement of the subject of dementia from the performative center of the 
work of life writing is ethically problematic; what emerges is  
a representational modality that effaces the contours of the person in order to communicate 
something about the emotional impact of dementia on the writer/observer…these 
descriptions construe the lived experience of dementia as opaque and unrepresentable, 
characterized by a fundamental rupture of intersubjectivity in that the gaze of the observer is 
never returned or acknowledged. This paradigm precludes recognition of the diverse ways in 
which individuals might live with particular impairments as well as any notion of the person 
with dementia as someone capable of meaningful interaction, of expressing a preference or 
exercising choice or agency. (199) 
 
The erasure Burke observes occurs through “analogical mediation” (198) but also at the level of 
narrative structure. Arguably, Appignanesi and Edwards reify the opacity and unrepresentability of 
dementia by approaching the narration of their mothers’ unruly memories as needing order and 
policing. Thus, we might ask if Appignanesi’s “systematic” (90) approach to eliciting and writing her 
mother’s stories comes at the expense of allowing Hena’s “montage of disparate fragments” (91) and 
memories that “elude the system” (90) to speak for themselves. Indeed, we get very little of Hena’s 
own words in the narrative. Might Appignanesi’s ordering and need to “fix” the “scraps” (7) of her 
mother’s memories be a violence to Hena’s own subjectivity? The same question of self-interest 
arises in Finding Rosa, as the narrative Edwards creates “attempts to repair, if only for [the author] herself, 
the fragmentation and disorientation that Rosa’s trauma and dementia have both caused” (Delisle 
135; emphasis mine). In both these narratives, dementia operates as “narrative prosthesis,” 
                                               
of dementia upon personhood. Its enunciation enacts the near absolute dissolution of the unique, concrete, and 
particular features of the individual into a generic category of suffering marked by a type of death in life, thus reducing 
dementia to an expression of the abyssal point of humanity and the terminus of hope” (197). Burke also extends this 
critique to Catherine Malabou’s theorization of psychic trauma which relies on autobiographical accounts of her 
mother’s Alzheimer’s and similar analogies to war trauma. See “Dementia and the Paradigm of the Camp: Thinking 
Beyond Giorgio Agamben’s Concept of ‘Bare Life’,” Bioethical Inquiry 16.2 (2019): 195-205. 
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something in the story to be fixed or rehabilitated (Mitchell and Snyder).6 Furthermore, 
Appignanesi’s drive to undo Hena’s “diminishment” (90) also reinforces the notion that people with 
dementia are lost to themselves: “Now that she had all the necessary identity papers that had so 
preoccupied her during the war years, it seemed she didn’t really have herself” (256). Indeed, this 
view of dementia as loss, a kind of perpetrator of personal and communal atrocity, is reinforced by 
Appignanesi’s description of the Nazis as a “demented racist regime” (242). Part of what is at stake 
here, then, is how narrative “does a disservice to actual people with disabilities, insofar as ‘while 
stories rely upon the potency of disability as a symbolic figure, they rarely take up disability as an 
experience of social or political dimensions’” (Mitchell and Snyder qtd. in Bérubé 44). In order to 
offer insight into the social and political dimensions of dementia more fully in literature, Entangled 
Stories offers a sustained engagement between disability theory and dementia studies. 
 
The Conjunction of Disability and Dementia Studies 
I join a chorus of scholars in disability studies and dementia studies whose work aims to 
open up a space to “defamiliarize and trouble dominant representational modalities of dementia and 
assumptions about the challenges with which it presents us” (Burke, “Dementia,” 195). My analysis 
brings a dedicatedly disability studies analytic to the examination of the politics and narrative 
aesthetics of dementia in contemporary narratives written by “post” generation authors, 
predominately women writing about their mothers and addressing the memory of events such as the 
Fukushima nuclear disaster, the Iraq War, World War II, and the Armenian Genocide. Through 
                                               
6 “Mitchell and Snyder’s theory of “narrative prosthesis” refers to the dependency literary narratives have upon disability 
as a stock feature of characterization or an “opportunistic metaphorical device” (2). Narrative prosthesis assumes that 
narratives “operate out of desire to compensate for a limitation or to reign in excess,” so for example, a narrative may 
work toward doing away with a deviant character by seeking to resolve or repair a character’s impairment, or push the 
focus of that impairment into the margins of the text (53). In short, the “narration of the disabled body enables the 
textual body to have meaning through its “long-standing historical representation as an overdetermined symbolic 
surface” (64) See Narrative Prosthesis: Disability and the Dependencies of Discourse (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
2000). 
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writing about intimate encounters with dementia, these writers grapple with the increasing fear of 
Alzheimer’s and dementia in the 21st century—a fear bolstered by the post-9/11 injunction to 
“never forget.” Indeed, one of the representational quandaries authors address is the need to protect 
historical memory—as a form of enlightenment and intervention to preclude future tragedies—
while holding space for personal forgetting and different embodied experiences. This need to 
disentangle the myths and metaphors of memory loss from the crosshairs of reality and 
performative public language is ever pressing amid the regressive political agendas and policies of 
the Trump Era, where explanations of dementia (and cognitive impairment more broadly) frequently 
assume liability for actual political manipulation and the tactical distortion of history. A disability 
studies analytic lays bare and is accountable to the material realities and current political and 
historical conditions responsible for the oppressive representation and exclusion of actual lives.7 
Disability studies encompasses “theory, research and practice that are antagonistic to the 
popular view that disability equates with personal tragedy” (Goodley xii); and it holds that “there is 
no neutral or objective position from which to regard the human body and its differences” (Adams 
et al. 4). As disability scholars have shown, shifting away from medical and toward social, political, 
and relational models of disability reveals how bodies are intimately tied to political ideologies, 
economic systems, and other material, cultural, and environmental formations.8 Feminist disability 
studies scholar and bioethicist Rosemarie Garland-Thomson argues that integrating disability into 
                                               
7 My use of “accountable” borrows from Nirmala Erevelles on doing disability justice: “Why be accountable? Because a 
transnational materialist critical disability studies is not only about ‘theorizing life’ but also about ‘living theory.’…To 
think with disability studies and hold it accountable to the lives it purports to represent.” See “Thinking with Disability 
Studies” Disability Studies Quarterly 32.4 (2014). 
8 For example, Burke has shown how “contemporary debates about ageing and dementia are increasingly bound up with 
the promissory discourses of bio-gerontology and neuroscientific epistemologies that facilitate an imaginative investment 
in the idea that ageing and age-related conditions such as dementia might be ‘defeated’. At the heart of these claims is a 
model of health and wellbeing that extols the virtues of the independent, economically active and implicitly able-bodied 
person and repudiates physical frailty, dependence and need in later life…the rhetoric of crisis regarding ageing and 
dementia is increasingly bound up with the neoliberal reduction of human value to economic productivity and the logic 
of neoliberal marketization.” See “Imagining a Future Imagining Without Dementia: Fictions of Regeneration and the 
Crises of Work and Sustainability” Palgrave Communications 3.52 (2017). 
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“critical intellectual work facilitates a fuller integration of the sociopolitical world—for the benefit of 
everyone. As with gender, race, sexuality, and class: to understand how disability operates is to 
understand what it is to be fully human” (“Integrating” 28). My focus on Alzheimer’s and senile 
dementia also emphasizes that age is an important intersectional identity category, bringing disability 
studies into conversation with work being done in aging studies, dementia studies, and the medical 
humanities.  
Moreover, exploring texts that engage with the memory of injustices such as war, genocide, 
and environmental degradation, Entangled Stories generates discussion relevant to fields of literary 
studies bordering trauma theory, memory studies, and postcolonialism. Entangled Stories showcases 
how dementia becomes a locus for authors’ articulations of intersectional politics that are typically 
anti-imperialist, anti-war, anti-ageist, and often feminist. That is not to say all of the texts herein are 
liberatory or that they do not use dementia instrumentally; many reinforce negative stereotypes even 
as they challenge others. They are nevertheless fraught with productive tensions, echoing Tobin 
Siebers’s call that “disability studies needs to account for both the negative and positive valences of 
disability, to resist the negative by advocating the positive and to resist the positive by 
acknowledging the negative” (Disability Theory 5). Entangled Stories thus highlights writers exploring 
the tensions between the positive and negative valences of dementia on personal and collective 
levels in generative ways. 
In this sense, I consider these works as revisionary narratives of dementia: counternarratives to 
mainstream discourses that accept dementia as a cultural metaphor for “crisis, war, uncontrollable 
natural disaster, and death” (Zeilig 261). Thus, I approach dementia as a heuristic for understanding 
and writing about history, personhood, and relationships. These works self-reflexively deploy 
dementia as an imaginative, narrative, and ethical resource to address the stories of actual historical 
violence while asserting the agency and value of people with dementia. As such they also explore the 
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value of the particular kind of imperfect, non-normative “remembering” that dementia engenders. 
Within these texts there is a dual sense of obligation to doing justice to dementia’s representation 
and to the recuperative narration of traumatic histories. Emerging from a shared search for the most 
adequate way to formally represent the experiences and subjectivity of dementia, and forms of 
relationality that arise, these texts also prompt reflection on conventions of literary form and genre. 
Additionally, they raise questions of how and for whom one remembers; whose trauma is 
remembered; and how letting go of compulsory demands to remember might be conducive to 
personal and collective healing.  
What might it mean to focus less on individual forgetting as deficit, and focus more on 
relational and supportive modes of remembering? Returning briefly to Appignanesi, Losing the Dead 
provocatively asks, in its epigraph from Jewish historian Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi: “Is it possible 
that the antonym of ‘forgetting’ is not ‘remembering,’ but justice?” Over the course of writing this 
dissertation, I found myself circling back to the ethics of memory implicit in this question. Read 
alongside the context of Hena’s Alzheimer’s, I find it instructive for placing the importance of 
pursuing justice collectively in front of the demand for remembering individually. The narratives I 
examine engage questions of justice on multiple levels: how to do justice to histories of those lost to 
violence; to the diverse experiences of historical trauma; and to the complexity of dementia 
experience and dementia care that emerges.  
As members of the postmemory generation come to bear the weight of historical trauma, 
translational literature scholar Y-Dang Troeung asks, “Is there a space left for forgetting in our 
endeavours to develop a politics of loss?...[A] politics of loss should function not as an either/or 
prescription to remember or to forget, but rather as a mode of interrogation that seeks to maintain a 
careful, ethical balance in between” (1, 5). For Troeung, what is at stake in allowing a space for 
forgetting is “not only the psychic survival of those who have suffered atrocity first-hand, but also 
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of those in the postmemorial generation who perhaps feel most acutely that it would be a failure to 
forget” (9). As contemporary authors more frequently turn to dementia, they too dramatize a 
longing to remember and know more than their parent(s), a desire that fuels personal and cultural 
fears of forgetting, aging, and dementia. What is at stake in a politics of (memory) loss is also 
holding space for the human value and meaning of those living with dementia being represented, 
which necessarily shapes the visions and possibilities of our own aging futures. 
 There have been a number of works on dementia and literature: Sarah Falcus and Katsura 
Sako’s Contemporary Narratives of Dementia: Ethics, Ageing, Politics (2019) and Rebecca Bitenc’s 
Reconsidering Dementia Narratives: Empathy, Identity and Care (2019) are the first broad surveys of 
dementia’s representation across genres, focusing on the politics of care, interdependence, and 
vulnerability. Martina Zimmermann’s inaugural monograph, The Poetics and Politics of Alzheimer’s 
Disease Life-Writing (2017) centers first-person patient accounts, while Marlene Goldman’s Forgotten: 
Narratives of Age-Related Dementia and Alzheimer’s Disease in Canada (2017) more specifically 
foregrounds dementia’s representation in literary fiction alongside conventions of gothic horror. 
Tess Maginess’ edited collection, Dementia and Literature: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (2018) offers 
perspectives largely situated in the medical humanities, a more specific approach to Aagje Swinnen 
and Mark Schweda’s earlier broad overview, Popularizing Dementia: Public Expressions and Representations 
of Forgetfulness (2015). Entangled Stories joins these efforts to interrogate the ways literary narrative 
shapes the discourse of dementia and aims to show how “life with dementia does have stories, 
stories that literary narratives can strive to tell” (Falcus and Sako 7).  
More specifically, Entangled Stories is a foray into the politics and ethics of representing 
dementia at the nexus of historical memories pertaining to trauma and violence in both fictional and 
nonfictional narratives (many works I address blur this distinction). I offer a more sustained 
engagement with insights from disability studies, which the works above have gestured toward the 
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importance of but have not fully taken up. What has resulted from this critical oversight are readings 
concerned with “diagnosing” texts as “about” dementia, interpretations that are inadvertently 
apolitical, ahistorical, and overly focused on the text’s ability to foster empathy rather than a 
nuanced political, historical, social understanding of dementia and the historical contexts in which its 
representation and stories appear. 
 
Relationality, Revisionary Narratives, and Crip Time 
 My inclusion of Alzheimer’s and the general category of dementia under the rubric of 
disability are in line with other disability studies scholars and activists who approach dementia, like 
other disabilities, as a socio-political phenomenon. Following a social model of disability, I join 
efforts “to expand understandings of dementia beyond an individual biomedical condition, toward 
recognition of dementia as a social and political identity shaped by disabling processes and social 
orders” (Aubrecht and Keefe 2).9 With Tom Shakespeare et al., I refute the medical model and 
pursue an alternative advocacy for a relational model of dementia that 
would take an adequate and nuanced approach to dementia whereby there was both medical 
research into deficits and treatments, and action to remove social, attitudinal and 
architectural barriers. Similarly, empowering people with dementia as far as possible is clearly 
an important goal, but policy should also recognize that people with dementia will require 
support and protection when their disease makes it impossible for them to be active. (8)10 
 
                                               
9 To be clear, Alzheimer’s refers to a specific disease, while dementia is a ‘symptom’ of a group of over 100 conditions 
that impairs memory, behavior, and thinking. Dementia is characterized as progressive decline of cognition that 
interferes with the activities of daily living. It is an umbrella term covering other forms of dementia that go with 
Parkinson’s, Alzheimer’s, Lewy Body dementia, and vascular dementia, fronto-temporal dementia. Dementia has many 
causes (stroke, tumors, disease, etc.). Dementia, as much as is focused on memory loss, encompasses a host of other 
experiences (such as different ways of perceiving time, hallucination, changes in relational identification) that the texts I 
examine also address as vital to recognize. 
10 Tom Shakespeare et al. have thoroughly critiqued the medical model of dementia arguing that it “maintains 
oppression, exclusive and passive dependency of the person” and is a “simplification of a very complex process whereby 
a person with dementia ends up being treated as dependent and denied a voice…when someone has dementia… she is 
viewed in terms of her inabilities, whether these are cognitive, relational or functional, and in comparison to an expected 
norm of personhood…On top of her diagnosis, a heavy weight of negative cultural representation…clouds the 
collective vision of this person living with dementia” (8). 
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This shift to considering dementia a social identity and set of corporeal conditions resonates in 
solidarity with several disability studies theorists’ expansions of the social model.11 It insists on 
accessibility and valuing aging with dementia as a part of the spectrum of human variation. I also 
acknowledge that there are many kinds of dementia with their own politics, sets of experiences, and 
degrees of social stigma.12 My use of the terms Alzheimer’s, dementia, and disability interchangeably 
when appropriate is not meant to elide these differences, but to highlight the shared politics and 
potentials for thinking them together.13 
Despite the growth of the disability rights movement, dementia still predominantly remains 
under the purview of medical discourse (Shakespeare et al. 4). Only in recent years have the general 
public, health professionals, and other disabled people begun to consider people with dementia as 
part of the disability rights community (ibid. 9).14 With that said, Basting argues that the dementia 
advocacy movement can contribute to the disability rights movement by challenging it “to more 
fully consider the complexity and value of interdependency as well as show the movement how to insist 
                                               
11 E.g. Tobin Siebers’ concept of “complex embodiment”: “The theory of complex embodiment raises awareness of the 
effects of disabling environments on people’s lived experience of the body, but it emphasizes as well that some factors 
affecting disability, such as chronic pain, secondary health effects, and aging, derive from the body. These last disabilities 
are neither less significant than disabilities caused by the environment nor to be considered defects or deviations merely 
because they are resistant to change. Rather, they belong to the spectrum of human variation, conceived both as 
variability between individuals and as variability within an individual’s life cycle, and they need to be considered in 
tandem with social forces affecting disability. The theory of complex embodiment views the economy between social 
representations and the body not as unidirectional as in the social model, or nonexistent as in the medical model, but as 
reciprocal” (Disability Theory 25). Also see Alison Kafer’s political/relational model in Feminist, Queer, Crip (Bloomington: 
Indiana UP, 2013). 
12 Writer/activist/self-advocate Floyd Skloot points to this in In the Shadow of Memory when he admits his “form of 
dementia is not as grave as in Alzheimer’s disease” (24). Even as Skloot lays claim to memory impairments as potentially 
“having positive connotations,” conceiving of his “new, demented state” (22) as a more emotionally freeing, even joyful, 
way of living in and sensing the world, he contrastingly writes about his mother with Alzheimer’s as “incarcerated by the 
enfolding dementia, and it’s a life sentence” (243). 
13 On the affordances and challenges of building coalitional conceptual frameworks across cognitive impairments in 
disability studies see Journal of Cultural & Literary Disability Studies’ special issue 2.1 (2008) guest-edited by Lucy Burke. 
14 It’s important also to acknowledge the disability rights call “nothing about us without us.” Because “self-advocacy is 
not straightforward in the case of dementia,” Shakespeare et al. importantly note, “whether people with dementia think 
of themselves as disabled, will always be provisional…some people living with early-stage dementia have strongly 
articulated a disability identification; some are reluctant to do so; others are silent … Many will reject what they may 
perceive as another stigmatising label” (3). Also see Carol Thomas and Christine Milligan, “Dementia, Disability Rights 
and Disablism: Understanding the Social Position of People Living with Dementia” Disability & Society 33 (2018). 
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on person-centered care in nursing homes rather than simply allow them to be emptied out and shut 
down” (Forget Memory 159). Further, as Kafer argues: “To eliminate disability is to eliminate the 
possibility of discovering alternative ways of being in the world, to foreclose the possibility of 
recognizing and valuing our interdependence” (83). Entangled Stories contributes to Basting’s call, 
foregrounding revisionary narratives of dementia, literary works that illuminate the intergenerational and 
social dynamics of dementia’s interdependency and relationality. It also recognizes Kafer’s caution, 
focusing not on narratives of “cure” or the future elimination of dementia, but on narratives 
asserting that dementia is a way of being in the world with particular interpersonal value.  
The forms of dementing relationalities that these narratives dramatize project what Rayna Rapp 
and Faye Ginsberg call a “new kinship imaginary”: 
disability is reconfigured around what we call the new kinship imaginary that takes shape 
when a family member – often a child – is diagnosed with a cognitive, emotional, or 
behavioral disability. The innovations in intimate daily life worlds that we have been 
chronicling are often the basis for what we think of as the “accidental activism” that results 
when loved ones “bring the disability rights movement into our home” as one parent 
phrased it. (“Cripping the Infrastructure” 1) 
 
Rapp and Ginsberg primarily address the experiences of parents caring for disabled children, their 
insight that “families are both flesh-and-blood collaborations and always acts of cultural 
imagination” requiring “continual reinvention, from the rearrangement of caretaking responsibilities 
in the household to the production of family narratives embracing rather than excluding the fact of 
disability” (“Family” 82). The relational care and memory work of the revisionary narratives in 
Entangled Stories depict the changing relational roles between mother-daughter; the shifting 
temporalities of dementia experience; and the rhythms of the “alternate realities” that may manifest 
in loved ones’ hallucinations. Collectively, they attest to the fact that “a new kinship imaginary that 
positively embraces family members with disabilities is emerging—even if unevenly” (Rapp and 
Ginsberg “Reverberations” 405).  
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As Rapp and Ginsberg argue, the new kinship imaginary has temporal and social 
implications: “Not only does this new imaginary map an emergent terrain that encompasses a 
broader range of humanity; it also reframes implicit norms and expectations of the life course as the 
‘difference of disability’ reverberates through the domestic cycle, changing its rhythms in 
unanticipated ways” (ibid. 383). With attention to the way authors engage with dementia’s effect on 
the changing rhythms of personal and family life, Entangled Stories also engages with (and brings to 
dementia studies) the increasingly important term disability scholars and activists call crip time—the 
temporality of non-normative embodiments.15 A multivalent term, crip time denotes different, 
shifting embodied experiences of temporality; “a reorientation to time” which “requires reimagining 
our notions of what can and should happen in time…[and challenging] normative and normalizing 
expectations of pace and scheduling” (Kafer 27). Crip time might, for example, take the form of 
slowing down social norms around conversation and meals or approaching everyday routines with 
flexibility. The politics and practices of crip time are germane to thinking about relationality and 
dementia, as Raquel Medina suggests: “dementia’s temporality is fluid. Its fluidity is not based on 
chronological temporality, or on a perpetual present, but on the principles of new and constantly 
regenerating temporalities which are defined by interpersonal relationships” (32). Observing this 
fluidity of time as a prominent motif in each revisionary narrative, Entangled Stories probes what it 
means to apply the frameworks of crip time as a metaphor in literary criticism and to dementia. 
                                               
15 Since the disability rights movement in the 1970s the shorthand ‘crip’ from ‘cripple’ has gained usage in activist and 
academic circles as a reclaimed, subversive, contestatory term charged with political, social, and aesthetic connotations, 
and borrows its framework from queer studies. Both Carrie Sandahl’s essay, “Queering the Crip or Cripping the Queer? 
Intersections of Queer and Crip Identities in Solo Autobiographical Performance” and Robert McRuer’s Crip Theory: 
Cultural Signs of Queerness and Disability (2006) are foundational texts that established the term ‘crip’ as interchangeably 
noun and verb, a theoretical term for critique and disruption that, like queer, “is fluid and ever-changing, claimed by 
those whom it did not originally define…extended to include not only those with physical impairments but those with 
sensory or mental impairments as well” (Sandahl 27). For Kafer, “crip theory” allows one’s work to stake “claim 
alongside activists and cultural workers engaged in…multiple sites of radical politics” (15). Basting similarly asks, if 
‘demented’ can be reclaimed in the same way: “Rather than run from the deepest stereotypes, the disability movement 
successfully turned them on their heads by embracing them. ‘Crips’ and ‘freaks’ are now terms used within the 
movement with pride, much in the same way that ‘queer’ has been emptied as a pejorative. Could the worst words we 
can imagine to describe the experience of dementia be appropriated in a similar way?” (Forget Memory 158) 
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Entangled Stories theorizes how authors negotiate the representation of bodies that experience 
relationality and temporality differently. On one level, their narratives offer representations of the 
fluid temporalities of dementia in a number of ways, from capturing the joys of returning to a 
childhood state to the trauma of reliving the experiences of war, the latter dramatizing the exclusion 
and social estrangement that can arise in time.16 On another level, they deploy dementia to play with 
narrative structure, form, and genre to enrich understandings of time, relationships, and the memory 
of (traumatic) history. Through dementia as formal and thematic resource, authors disable ordinary 
functions of narrative—causing time to slow or create feelings of temporal dissonance—forcing 
readers to slow down and consider what dementia has to teach about personhood, interdependence, 
and communication. Through modes of experimental life writing and fiction, they engage the 
embodied temporalities of dementia in order to take readers to previously unimaginable 
juxtapositions of time and space, looking productively at unjust pasts to alternative and inclusive 
futures.  
Of course, revisionary narratives of dementia are not substitutes for the actual voices of 
people living with dementia, and I consider these narratives of complementary importance to the 
kinds that have emerged out of the creative care movement (which aims to infuse aging-care systems 
with community-engaged art practices).17 Both of Basting’s major collaborative storytelling projects 
(TimeSlips and The Penelope Project, for example, place people with dementia at the center of 
                                               
16 Importantly, Petra Kuppers reminds us these “time experiences might be born out of pain and frustration, and these 
moments shouldn’t be romanticized” (“Crip Time” n.p.). Kuppers’s article references/responds to Australian author and 
activist Anne McDonald’s writing on her perception of time living with cerebral palsy. McDonald asserts one’s 
perception of time is dependent on one’s dependency: “People will not enter my time to talk to me. Slow the 
conversation down to my speed, and everybody else wanders away; carry on talking while I finish my sentence, and the 
conversation has moved on. Too long sentences twenty times slowed try the patience and require better memories than 
my listeners posess.”  
17 As Basting argues, “The ultimate promise of the creative community-building approach is that people living with 
dementia are consistently invited to become culture-makers in meaningful projects, and that care systems turn outward 
to rigorously engage with their communities to form partnerships to end the isolation and over-medicalization of the 
citizens in their care. Culture-making will not create a world without Alzheimer’s. But it can radically transform the way 
we experience it” (753). See “Building Creative Communities of Care: Arts, Dementia, and Hope in the United States” 
Dementia 17.6 (2017): 744-754. 
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meaning/culture-making and stress performances of the self that do not depend on memory).18 
Shifting from the pressure to remember toward the freedom of shared imagination, the stories and 
interdependencies engendered by creative care methods produce alternative, positive narratives of 
aging as possibility, not just challenges. These methods honor and work with “dementia time,” 
embracing improvisation, non-linear narrative, and being in the present moment.19  
Together, revisionary narratives and new creative forms of personal expression encourage 
critical reflection on the norms around social belonging, how/whose lives are represented, and the 
productive possibilities of storytelling. These emergent kinds of cultural expressions and critiques of 
dementia care that consider dementia “in time”20 also provide new foundations for the possibilities 
of democracy—for which inclusion and participation are fundamental—by fostering social change 
for marginalized peoples within and beyond disabled and aging communities.  
 
Dementia and Formal Experimentation  
Examining the formal and narrative significance of dementia alongside the concepts of 
dementing relationalities and crip time laid out above requires moving beyond critiquing negative 
portrayals of characters with dementia in literature.21 As mentioned previously, criticism surrounding 
dementia in literature tends toward diagnostic interpretation and readings that view dementia as a 
                                               
18 See Robin Mello and Anne Basting, “’The Sublime, the Unsettling, and the Exhuberant’: Changing Students’ Attitudes 
Toward Aging Through TimeSlips Creative Storytelling,” Creative Writing in the Community, ed. Terry Ann Thaxton (New 
York: Bloomsbury, 2013). Also see Basting et al., The Penelope Project: An Arts-Based Odyssey to Change Elder Care (Iowa City: 
University of Iowa Press, 2016). 
19 This is important to Jill Hayes’ argument that “as witnesses to memory loss, we need to cultivate a different 
relationship with time in order to stay in contact with people with dementia…By quietly attending to our own body 
rhythms and those of the person with dementia, we are meeting them in a different place beyond the stories of this life.” 
See The Creative Arts in Dementia Care (London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2010). 
20 Echoing Kafer’s call to “explore disability in time” (46) and Hailee Yoshizaki-Gibbon’s effort to bring crip time to 
bear on “dementia time” within care settings. See “The (Im)Persistence of Memory: Crip Time and the Politics of 
Dementia” (unpublished article). 
21 See Martina Zimmermann, “Alzheimer’s Disease Metaphors as Mirror and Lens to the Stigma of Dementia” Literature 
and Medicine 35.1 (2017): 71-97; and Aagje Swinnen and Mark Schweda, eds. Popularizing Dementia Public Expressions and 
Representations of Forgetfulness (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2015). 
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simple plot device rather than having wider social and political meaning. Entangled Stories is 
influenced by the shift in literary disability studies criticism from the late-1990s and early-2000s, 
which began with an intensity of examining positive and negative characterizations, toward 
examining disability at the level of content alongside narrative form and reading practices. I take 
heed of Ato Quayson’s cross-cultural approach to examining how thematic and textual disturbances 
can be hidden in literary representation, or how disability in a text can give rise to oscillations 
between domains of the aesthetic, ethical, and sociocultural—what he terms “aesthetic nervousness” 
(24).22 I draw significantly from Michael Bérubé’s recent work (building on Quayson) on 
“deployments of disability,” which continues to move the trajectory of literary disability studies 
toward how disability operates as a narrative strategy. As Bérubé argues in The Secret Life of Stories: 
From Don Quixote to Harry Potter, How Understanding Intellectual Disability Transforms the Way We Read 
(2016), “narrative deployments of disability do not confine themselves to representation. They can also 
be narrative strategies, devices for exploring vast domains of human thought, experience, and 
action” (2). Importantly, Bérubé points out “disability and ideas about disability can be and have 
been put to use in fictional narratives in ways that go far beyond any specific rendering of any 
disabled character or characters,” showing that a text can be haunted by the social stigma of 
disability even without the presence of a character with a disability (44).  
Bérubé’s notion of deployment helps me center the formal and ethical importance of 
dementia in texts in which the figure with dementia seems only ancillary. Bérubé’s framework for 
reading literary fiction is usefully applied to works of life writing. Most criticism on dementia in life 
                                               
22 As Quayson defines it, “Aesthetic nervousness is seen when the dominant protocols of representation within the 
literary text are short-circuited in relation to disability” (15). He suggests literary texts are often “undergirded not by the 
binary opposition of normal/abnormal, but by the dialectical interplay between unacknowledged social assumptions and 
the reminders of contingency as reflected in the body of the person with a disability” (21). For Quayson this “dialectical 
interplay” affects all levels of the literary texts: from the perspective of the narrator and characters to the temporal 
sequencing of and discourses that structure the plot (22). 
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writing and literature is read from analytical perspectives from the medical and health humanities, 
which predominantly operate on the assumption “literature brings us closer to reality by reflecting it, 
mimetically” (Maginess 10). This emphasis on how well a text gives insight to the “felt reality” (ibid.) 
of individual experiences of patients and caregivers has limited the interpretation of 
auto/biographical works dealing with dementia (and disability in general) to the logic of diagnosis 
and how well a text’s “authentic” representation gives rise to empathetic identification. Broadening 
the scope of these localized interpretations, Entangled Stories unveils that contemporary authors 
frequently deploy dementia in their narratives as loci for addressing a range of social issues and 
relationships beyond the clinic (Bérubé 24).  
Additionally, like Bérubé and Quayson (who each build on the influential work of Siebers’ 
Disability Aesthetic), I emphasize how dementia operates in the aesthetic domain as a source of formal 
innovation and how that opens up space for social criticism.23 To each their own degree, what is 
characteristic of revisionary narratives of dementia is their propensity for formal and generic 
experimentation with the intent to challenge readers’ perspectives of temporality, reality, 
relationality, and historicity.  
Finally, moving beyond representation, my analyses acknowledges and contends with how 
narrative often “does a disservice to actual people with disabilities, insofar as ‘while stories rely upon 
the potency of disability as a symbolic figure, they rarely take up disability as an experience of social 
or political dimensions’” (Mitchell and Snyder qtd. in Bérubé 44).24 Tracing the significance of both 
                                               
23 “Disability aesthetics” is Siebers’ critical concept emphasizing the presence of disability as a resource in modern artistic 
representation: “Disability aesthetics refuses to recognize the representation of the healthy body–and its definition of 
harmony, integrity, and beauty–as the sole determination of the aesthetic. Rather, disability aesthetics embraces beauty 
that seems by traditional standards to be broken, and yet it is not less beautiful, but more so as a result…[D]isability 
enriches and complicates notion of aesthetic…[it] does not express defect but enlarges our vision of human variation 
and difference” (3). See Disability Aesthetics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2010). 
24 Bérubé is referring to the process Mitchell and Snyder describe as “narrative prosthesis” by which “disability 
inaugurates narrative, but narrative inevitably punishes its own prurient interests by overseeing the extermination of the 
object of its fascination” (56-57). 
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fictional characters and rendered lives of actual people with dementia in the context of authors’ 
representations of historical violence and trauma, I pay particular attention to the environmental, 
historical and material conditions that circumscribe these narrated experiences.25 Many of the 
narratives I examine raise an underexplored connection between dementia and the experience of 
historical trauma and the lived experiences of war. Without equating dementia as a “symptom” of 
these phenomena, these texts nevertheless demand us to account for how historical and material 
circumstances and relationship construct, mediate, and effect the experience of dementia. 
 
Chapter Overview 
Exploring how dementia operates as a formal, ethical, and narrative resource in 
contemporary literature and life writing about the memory of historical trauma and violence, each 
chapter loosely focuses on different major catastrophes of the 20th and 21st centuries. Since authors 
deploy dementia as a kind of connective narrative tissue between personal and collective stories 
across disparate locations and times, there is some overlap of events between chapters. Each chapter 
correspondingly interrogates the different tropes and metaphors of dementia that appear alongside 
the representation of those events: environmental disaster and memory loss in Chapter 1; war and 
borders in Chapter 2; national forgetting and trauma in Chapter 3; and alternate realities in Chapter 
4. 
Instead of moving chronologically across the histories being narrated, the chapters 
circumnavigate time disjointedly, embracing a praxis that reflects a similar flexible approach to 
                                               
25 As scholars suggest, criticism guided by the early social model of disability has limited its ability to account for the 
historical and material conditions that shape it. For elaborations and critiques of the social model see: Kafer’s 
“political/relational model” in Feminist Queer Crip; Nirmala Erevelles’ “historical materialist framework” in Disability and 
Difference in Global Contexts: Enabling a Transformative Body Politic (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); and Jasbir 
Puar’s theory of capacity/debility in The Right to Maim: Debility, Capacity, Disability (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2017). 
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temporality and form that the authors of this study thematize through their engagements with 
dementia and employ to create knowledge from spaces of disjuncture. This structure also reflects the 
dissertation’s thematic concern with time, as each chapter also focuses on how the embodied 
temporalities of dementia serve as loci for formal experimentation and means of reflecting on 
history and relationality differently. Finally, it is important to note how Entangled Stories is structured 
fluidly by genre, beginning with semi-autobiographical imaginative fiction, experimental poetic 
memoir, and graphic life writing in Chapters 1-3 and ending with first-person detective fiction and 
speculative biography in Chapter 4. While the dissertation emphasizes works of life writing by 
postgeneration authors, fictional narratives written by those impacted by their family member’s 
dementia are also included. Conversely, some of the authors writing in the mode of auto/biography 
use the conventions of fictive modes. Collectively, authors’ deployments of dementia, in thinking 
through history differently, necessitate experimentations with form and drive generic hybridity. 
Chapter 1, “Writing Dementia and Disaster in Ruth Ozeki’s A Tale for the Time Being” 
examines the deployment of dementia in the context of the Fukushima nuclear disaster, legacies of 
war and occupation, and teachings of Zen Buddhism. I look at how dementia as narrative strategy 
plays with boundaries of auto/biographical genres alongside Ozeki’s use of the diaristic mode. The 
chapter sets up the embodied temporality of dementia under the framework of crip time by 
theorizing how it operates as a narrative aesthetic and resource for thinking about the political 
inclusion of cognitively disabled and aging populations. Taking up the concept of dementia’s “now” 
time, the text opens readers up to both the complex cognitive realities of dementia and the 
imaginative possibilities for relating to others and history when normative experiences of time and 
space have become deranged. Offering counternarratives to mainstream discursive constructions of 
dementia as natural disaster and disappearance, A Tale asks how readers might welcome fraught, 
natural processes of forgetting as moments that challenge normative expectations of narrative 
  
  24 
 
closure and certainty, linear temporality, cognition, and personhood. Furthermore, the text considers 
the meaningful forms of interpersonal and intergenerational connection and communication that 
dementia and other forms of “not-knowing” can offer. 
Chapter 2, “The Poetics and Politics of Alzheimer’s Dementia in Susan M. Schultz,” 
elaborates on dementia’s potential border-breaking temporal aesthetics through an examination of 
Hawai’i-based poet Susan Schultz’s multi-genre writings about her mother’s dementia, which are 
entangled with fragmented histories of imperialist and colonial violence. Written during the Bush 
administration, Dementia Blog is in part a pointed criticism of the U.S. invasion of Iraq and bricolage 
catalogue of seemingly disparate yet interlinked legacies of war and occupation across the globe. 
Challenging the both the War on Terror and “War on Alzheimer’s,” Schultz moves beyond typical 
metaphoric uses of dementia as a warning against the perils of forgetting histories of oppression and 
the notion that dementia is itself the battle to be fought. Instead, dementia operates as a formal, 
poetic resource that enables Schultz to draw empathetic connections between historical contexts and 
life experiences that are fundamentally distinct yet similar in their struggles for justice and self-
determination. Dementia Blog is thus a meditation on how thinking-with-dementia helps re-envision 
our practices of reading and writing private and national history. Instead of constructing dementia as 
a detrimentally illogical way of thinking or a failure to remember, Schultz insists on dementia’s value 
for alternate understandings of historicity, truth, and relationality. Resisting tropes of enemy 
infiltration and militarized violence, dementia in Schultz’s work gives presence to oft-untold stories 
that live in temporalities our grammar struggles to convey. 
Chapter 3, “Drawn to History: Dementia and Trauma in Graphic Life Narrative” examines 
what happens with dementia enters the realm of the visual. I look at the artistic juxtaposition of 
personal memory and public narrative in two graphic life writing texts, Dana Walrath’s Aliceheimer’s: 
Alzheimer’s Through the Looking Glass and Stuart Campbell’s web comic These Memories Won’t Last. This 
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section elaborates on the intersection of dementia and trauma as Aliceheimer’s is also a text that skirts 
the authors’ family history in the Armenian Genocide, and Campbell’s text represents his 
grandfather’s experience as a Hungarian veteran in World War II. Walrath’s exploration of her 
family’s past in the Armenian Genocide challenges dementia as a popular metaphor for political 
amnesia, trauma, and denial, while Campbell traces the complex intersections of dementia and post-
traumatic stress while pushing the limits of the comics in a digital environment. Overall, this chapter 
is concerned with how graphic form can reframe the experience of dementia and violence 
temporally and spatially on the page, render bodies visible, and materialize witnessing to history 
through the embodied labor of drawing and image-making. 
Chapter 4 hinges on literary explorations of the relationship between temporality and reality, 
or the perception of one’s reality of time. “Reorienting Realities: Gender, Aging, and Care in the 
Genre Fictions of Emma Healey and Jo Walton” turns to popular novels that deliberately deploy, if 
not exaggerate, the notion of dementia’s “alternative realities” as essential to their narrative forms, 
and to elaborate on what I identify to be an important trend to note in contemporary 
representations of dementia; that is, the engagement with values lying at the heart of person-
centered dementia care. These works simultaneously take up the trope of dementia’s “alternative 
realities” to narrate histories of gendered postwar violence and aging differently. Healey’s text plays 
with the generic form of the detective and cozy mysteries, exposing how gender, ableism, and 
ageism and intertwined, while also dealing with the excavation of postwar traumatic memory. 
Walton’s text offers a way to think about the validity of dementia’s multiple realities through a 
speculative framework, while also insisting on the importance of attending to the actual material 
needs accompanying the realities of aging. Through fiction these texts reimagine life with dementia 
as a site of agency and opportunity for thinking about transformative approaches to care, 
community, and “and non-instrumentalist conceptions of human value” (Burke, “Dementia,” 195). 
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At the same time, these authors deploy dementia as a means of challenging readers to conceive of 
the geographic reach and temporal duration of these histories as distant or “past” differently. 
Together, these chapters demonstrate recurrent narrative patterns and themes paradigmatic 
of the way contemporary writers grapple with the boundaries between public and private history; 
remembering and forgetting; self and other. These texts also remind us that the body in this moment 
in time is richly implicated in broader cultural phenomenon. The multiplication of catastrophes in 
our lifetime—war, genocide, the sweeping reach of environmental degradation and nuclear 
disaster—are just a few of the prescient contemporary issues bringing the social and economic value 
and place of the (disabled) body into the forefront of American consciousness. Thus, the narrative 
and rhetorical patterns employed in these texts not only explore ethical issues involved in writing 
dementia and disability more broadly, but also how intimate and intertwined personal and public 



























Writing Dementia and Disaster in Ruth Ozeki’s A Tale for the Time Being 
 
Within minutes following the Tōhoku earthquake, the onslaught of tsunamis that struck the 
northeast coast of Japan on March 11, 2011 destroyed 300 miles of coastline and swallowed entire 
towns. The cataclysm killed over 16,000 people and left nearly 3,000 missing, many of whom, 
alongside five million tons of debris, vanished into the ocean (NOAA). Subsequent meltdowns at 
the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant further exacerbated the disaster. To this day, radiation 
has rendered adjacent towns uninhabitable, and contaminants continue to migrate through air, soil, 
and water across the Pacific Ocean.  
Setting in motion the narrative of Ruth Ozeki’s A Tale for the Time Being is the drift, and 
arrival on the shore of British Columbia, of a “large scarred freezer bag,” housing a Hello Kitty 
lunchbox.26 Escaping the gyres of the Great Pacific Garbage Patch, the lunchbox is a piece of 
flotsam “from people’s homes in Japan that the tsunami swept out to sea,” washing up “sooner than 
anyone expected” (14). Ruth, a writer who discovers and initially mistakes the parcel for trash, 
becomes consumed by the task of uncovering the mysterious origins of its contents: an antique 
wristwatch, a bundle of letters, and a diary of teenager Nao Yatsutani.27 As the stories of these items 
unfold, readers are shuttled across collapsed geographies and temporalities—from transpacific 
                                               
26 Ruth Ozeki, A Tale for the Time Being, 9. Subsequent citations appear in parentheses. 
27 I refer to “Ruth” as the novel’s narrator and character and use “Ozeki” when referring to the author. However, 
because of the deliberate use of autobiographical modes, I do consider there is fluidity between these two distinctions. 
As Mojca Krevel suggests, “The implicit autobiographicality contributes to a greater stability of Ruth’s identity, and 
ensures the fluidity, compatibility and interchangeability of the author, narrator and literary character as an infinite 
internal differentiation of the same – fractal – self” (117).  
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aftereffects of the Fukushima nuclear disaster back to intergenerational histories of World War II 
and colonial dispossession in pre-modern Japan. The novel’s chapters alternate between Nao’s diary 
and Ruth’s account of reading it, as well as her attempt to find out if Nao is still alive. Interleaved, 
these dual narratives explore the challenges of witnessing the legacy of disasters still unfolding and 
of knowing the stories of others gone and still missing.  
The two narrators, Nao and Ruth, are invested in written projects of cross-generational 
remembering. Nao’s intent is to reconstruct the life of her aging great-grandmother Jiko, while Ruth 
is failing to complete a memoir about caring for her mother, Masako, who has Alzheimer’s disease: 
“During the long period of decline, Ruth had recorded the gradual erosion of her mother’s 
mind…The tone of the writing bugged her—cloying, elegiac. It made her cringe. She was a novelist. 
She was interested in the lives of others. What had gotten into her, to think she could write a 
memoir?” (64). By the end of the novel, readers do not know if the course of Nao’s life has led her 
to successfully compose Jiko’s stories. The large-scale events—the earthquake and tsunami—that 
intrude on the intimate space of the diary are presumably what bring the writing to an end. What the 
reader does know, however, is that Ruth reads Nao’s diary as distraction from her own struggle to 
finish writing about her mother. 
The connection between acts of life writing, Alzheimer’s, and disaster may seem 
inconsequential to readers by the very virtue of Ruth’s inability to write about her mother. Critics 
and reviewers often gloss over Masako’s dementia, framing Masako as simply an autobiographical 
index of Ozeki’s experiences caring for her own mother with Alzheimer’s.28 Such a reading ignores 
the novel’s formal and thematic reliance on the somatic orientations of dementia, relegating the 
                                               
28 Ozeki’s works regularly invite and refuse autobiographical readings. Slippages between fiction and reality are abetted 
by Ozeki use of her own name as the narrating protagonist and the novel’s dedication page, “For Masako, for now and 
forever,” referring to her late mother Masako Yokoyama Lounsbury, who died in 2004, among other details. In the 
official book trailer, Ozeki also appears as Ruth picking up Nao’s diary on a shore.  
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representational stakes of disability as it intersects with memory, history, and care to the margins. 
Using a disability studies lens, I counter this shortfall by foregrounding the novel’s formal and 
thematic reliance on the somatic orientations of dementia. Through the discourse and formal 
disruptions of dementia—and disability more broadly—A Tale’s central concerns surrounding social, 
historical, and environmental loss and disaster become legible. 
The lack of critical attention to dementia in A Tale may be in part a symptom of the 
prevalent discursive mapping of “natural” disaster onto disability. Since the “ravages” of memory 
loss and cognitive impairment often forecast irrevocable tragedy in popular and biomedical 
imaginaries, disability lends itself to the language of environmental catastrophe.29 Exemplifying this 
is the 2017 PBS documentary, Alzheimer’s: Every Minute Counts, rife with metaphors of environmental 
disaster that insist the “tsunami of Alzheimer’s disease in America…will be the financial sinkhole of 
the 21st century.” The language of disaster frames disability as loss and a maligned state of 
dependency; dementia marking a slow yet violent dissolution of self, straining economic and social 
resources, threatening to inundate those around it. At its surface, A Tale refracts anxieties 
surrounding the threat and aftermath of natural disaster through its representation of dementia and 
appears to stigmatize dementia as a social and bodily disaster in its own right. But interpreted 
through a disability studies analytic, dementia in the novel becomes an important locus for critique, 
knowledge, and formal experimentation. Thus, A Tale illuminates complex relationships among 
embodied conditions, environmental disasters, and the effects of the experience and trope of 
dementia on imaginative literature. 
Attending to dementia as it intersects with the novel’s preoccupation with post-Fukushima, 
waste-filled ocean ecologies requires a cripped ecocritical reading practice, one that recognizes the 
                                               
29 The rhetoric of natural disaster—especially tsunami—is commonplace in popular news media, scientific, and scholarly 
discourse about growing demographics of people living with conditions such as HIV/AIDS, cancer, and most frequently 
in recent years, dementia and autism. 
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generative possibilities of thinking with disability as “an agential, material, and affective 
embodiment” (Mitchell and Snyder 554). “Cripping,” Carrie Sandahl writes, is about interpreting 
from the margins, “illuminat[ing] new meanings by attending to the marginalized perspectives of 
disabled people. Cripping spins mainstream representations or practices to reveal their able-bodied 
assumptions and exclusionary effects” (46). Dominant approaches in the environmental humanities 
generally focus on the disabled body as a dystopic sign of failure in or alienation from nature, a 
tragic symbol for or evidence of environmental injustice and degradation. Cognitive disability in 
particular is also often a negative signifier, such as in Rob Nixon’s formulation of “slow violence,” in 
which he uses the popular metaphor of “amnesia” to describe the violence of social neglect 
accompanying “attritional catastrophes that overspill clear boundaries in time and space” (7). This 
notion of amnesia invokes a complex and longstanding tradition of critique that encompasses the 
cultivation of forgetting in the service of reproducing ideology and forms of power, but it is 
nevertheless a damaging metaphor. As Sarah Gibbons points out, “amnesia” implies “disability itself 
might be a form of violence against the body,” and this ableist logic, she argues, deserves its own 
disability studies critique (8). Following Gibbons, I ask how we might conceptualize states of 
forgetting—such as amnesia and dementia—beyond the framework of catastrophe, violence, and 
burden. Cripping must also engage with experiences of aging, to interrogate the state of disaster and 
fear associated with aging bodies and memory loss in cultural discourse. The presumed disaster or 
“living death” of dementia constructs forgetting as an individual failure and problem both in medical 
and political spheres, feeding ideologies warranting the disabled and elderly alike further 
marginalization, neglect, and institutional violence. 
A Tale engages a disability studies agenda, not directly or polemically, but in its investments 
in dementia and the aging body as sites of knowledge about time and narrative as they appear 
alongside the ecological and social damages wrought by disasters such as Fukushima. In some ways, 
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A Tale relies on the entrenched narratives of tragedy and crisis linked to the cognitive changes of 
dementia and aging as characters grapple with the imperative yet impossible task of knowing, telling, 
and remembering the uncertain stories accompanying disaster. But rather than read A Tale’s 
engagement with dementia, and its main association with forgetting, as solely a variation of Nixon’s 
metaphoric use of amnesia, I consider processes of dementing as productive of formal 
experimentation and reflection on embodied states of difference. In the sections that follow, I 
explore how Ozeki engages with dementia in ways that position and resist disability as an 
undesirable symbol for cultural amnesia and environmental degradation. A Tale’s narrative strategies 
require us to consider how we might welcome fraught, natural processes of forgetting as moments 
to challenge normative expectations of narrative closure and certainty, linear temporality, cognition, 
and personhood. The novel also offers an opportunity to think about the meaningful forms of 
interpersonal and intergenerational connection and communication dementia can offer. 
To highlight the overlooked representational stakes of dementia as it intersects with history 
and politics in A Tale, I first examine how forgetting and remembering play out along environmental 
and human axes through the novel’s engagement with images of “dementing” oceanic gyres. 
Bringing together entangled locations and temporalities in unaccustomed ways, the novel’s 
dementing gyres assemble surprising empathetic links between different interconnected forgotten 
and remembered histories. The latter sections turn to ways Masako, Nao (a homophone of ‘now’), 
and Jiko embody alternate frameworks for thinking about and valuing forgetting by focusing 
readers’ attention on the importance of the “now” time of dementia, Zen Buddhist meditation, and 
Nao’s diary. Furthermore, I examine the novel’s formal and generic features alongside dementia and 
disability’s temporalities, tracing the moments in which the narrative relies on disability as an 




Throughout the novel, the importance of autobiographical forms, such as Nao’s diary and 
Ruth’s account of her simulated, paced reading “of the girl’s life and its unfolding,” not only provide 
the text with a sense of authenticity but also sense of urgency (38). At the heart of A Tale’s telling of 
disaster and dementia is the sense of connectedness through present time, one returning readers to 
the importance of the deictic ‘now’ on several occasions. If Nao’s diary, written in the blank pages of 
a gutted copy of Marcel Proust’s À la recherché du temps perdu, is an exercise “in search of lost time,” its 
discovery by Ruth and readers such as ourselves marks its retrieval of what was once lost to the 
immediate, empathetic present (23). 
 
Memory’s Half Life: The Archive of the Gyre 
Ruminating over the lunchbox containing Nao’s diary, Ruth and her husband Oliver 
postulate its origins as tsunami flotsam. Oliver’s subsequent tangents on the polluted ocean 
articulate the enduring yet transient temporality of ocean gyres and their archive of detritus: 
 “The flotsam that rides the gyres is called drift. Drift that stays in the orbit of the gyre is 
considered to be part of the gyre memory. The rate of escape from the gyre determines the 
half-life of drift…” He picked up the Hello Kitty lunchbox and turned it over in his hands. 
(14) 
 
“Plastic is like that,” Oliver was saying. “It never biodegrades. It gets churned around in the 
gyre and ground down into particles. Oceanographers call it confetti. In a granular state, it 
hangs around forever.” (93) 
 
Gyres such as the Great Pacific Garbage Patch are systems of circulating water currents in which 
debris amasses and moves along surface patterns of the Earth’s global oceans. In the gyre, the refuse 
of human life comingles with the very substance of the oceans. Oliver’s explanations of the oceanic 
ecosystem’s “gyre memory” and the “half-life of drift” refer to the natural process by which a gyre, 
with every orbit, in theory expels half of its contents, in effect dispersing former memories and 
histories embodied in debris. Much like the mind, the material reality of the archive of the gyre is 
subject to change. And while the analogy to the temporality of half-life decay invokes the invisible 
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persistence of radioactive fallout after Fukushima, it also resonates with the impermanency of 
organic memory as the gyre loses its artifacts—it “forgets” its contents. But as this section explores, 
the gyre’s process of ejecting permanent plastic pollutants and transient debris, such as the 
lunchbox, also functions in the narrative to opens up space for the stories of those objects to be 
narrated and remembered across unexpected spatial and temporal locales.  
The gyre’s memory loss is A Tale’s recurrent image, an expression of what I call a dementing 
ecology: a mapping of dementia onto the environment as a natural process gravid with meaning rather 
than merely a sign of pathology and environmental degradation. The insistent link between 
neurological and oceanic ecosystems recurs throughout the novel on a suggestive etymological level 
in every invocation of the word ‘gyre.’ Lingering on the word, a thematic convergence between 
biomedical understandings and cultural imaginations of dementia surfaces. By the end of the 19th 
century, the etiological characterization of dementia was solidified as an impairment marked 
simultaneously by vascular degeneration, demyelination, and the enlargement of ventricles, creating 
widening gaps between folds of the brain known as “gyre formations.” Neurologist Samuel Wilks 
referred to these as “wasted convolutions” in which “water…has taken their place” (383). A Tale 
takes up Wilks’s conception of dementia as an inundation of the brain: like the Great Pacific 
Garbage Patch Oliver imagines, the atrophying gyres of dementia, too, have their own watery 
currents with drifts dislodging memories on a synaptic scale. Initiating the movement of the 
narrative between past and present, human and environment, and coupled with the subsequent 
appearance of Ruth’s mother, the gyre cues readers into the wider importance of dementia to the 
novel. 
In particular, the structure of A Tale’s telling of would-be forgotten memories and histories 
relies on narrating the gyre’s dementing—the process of its artifacts escaping its center. The history 
of the lunchbox, for example, can only surface once it is expelled from the gyre and makes its 
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telluric way from coast to coast to be discovered. The artifacts of histories jettisoned from the 
dementing gyre function to foster curiosity in readers while forging a sense of intimate responsibility 
for recovering the past. The gyre thus mimics an important understanding about dementia to keep in 
mind: dementia entails not only memory loss but also the resurfacing of remote and long-term 
memories. Rather than dismiss these rogue memories as extraneous, senseless, or trivial, the text 
posits the promise of important stories behind them.   
 The gyre warrants critical attention as a site of the narrative’s unfolding concerns considering 
that it resonates strongly with, and reworks, William Butler Yeats’s popular theory of gyres as a 
model of time and history. The displacement of memories, the ebb and flow of forgetting and 
remembering, closely recalls the incessant gyre pattern of history’s making and unmaking described 
in Yeats’s A Vision (1925). Yeats uses the figure of two interpenetrating gyres to conceptualize the 
course of history in which all moments in time move through opposing spirals, with one historical 
moment subsuming the other in cycles of precisely 2,000 years. As Claire Nally points out, Yeats’s 
occult gyres of time were his attempt to understand cycles of social strife and violence, such as “the 
colonial legacy of Ireland’s relationship to England, and the conflict inherent in that relationship” 
(76). For Yeats, the movement between these antithetical gyres of oppression and resistance shapes 
personal lives and understandings of time as cyclical. Evocative of Yeats’s project, A Tale’s gyre 
memory—and the process of its dementing—drives the narrative, circulating anxieties surrounding 
the volatile temporal patterns of documenting and witnessing disastrous events related to, but not 
limited by, the Fukushima disaster. But while Yeats’s gyres operate with a strict adherence to time, 
the dementing gyres of A Tale are not cyclical but random and spontaneous, disabling temporal 
predictability. The narrative function of the gyre’s memory loss ironically enables the haphazard, if 
not serendipitous, shoring up of remembered stories of natural disaster as well as colonial and 
imperialist violence.  
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Like Yeats, Ruth (the character and narrator) is concerned with the ephemerality of historical 
temporalities, particularly in the digital age. In the wake of March 11, Ruth is inundated by “the 
images pouring in from Japan…aware that while these moments were captured online, so many 
other moments simply vanished”: 
[T]he global bandwidth was flooded with images and reports from Japan…But then the 
uprising in Libya and the tornado in Joplin superseded the quake, and the keyword cloud 
shifted to revolution and drought and unstable air masses as the tide of information from Japan 
receded. (113) 
 
Ruth’s reference to the word cloud (a visual representation of weighted text data) recalls the “cloud” 
of radioactive air-bound emissions crossing North America nine days after the Fukushima disaster 
that media headlines sensationalized and then quickly abandoned (Thakur et al.). The ephemeral 
record and memory of news events prompts Ruth to question how we engage with history, and in 
doing so she turns us back to the language of half-life decay and dementing gyres: 
What is the half-life of information? Does its rate of decay correlate with the medium that 
conveys it?…Does the half-life of information correlate with the decay of our attention? Is 
the Internet a kind of temporal gyre, sucking up stories, like geodrift, into its orbit? What is 
its gyre memory? How do we measure the half-life of its drift?  
The tidal wave, observed, collapses into tiny particles, each one containing a story: 
                     • a mobile phone, ringing deep inside a mountain of sludge and debris;  
                     • a ring of soldiers, bowing to a body they’ve flagged;  
• a medical worker clad in full radiation hazmat, wanding a bare-faced baby who is 
squirming in his mother’s arms;  
                     • a line of toddlers, waiting quietly for their turn to be tested. 
These images, a minuscule few representing the inconceivable many, eddy and grow old, 
degrading with each orbit around the gyre, slowing breaking down into razor-sharp 
fragments and brightly colored shards. Like plastic confetti, they’re drawn into the gyre’s 
becalmed center, the garbage patch of history and time. The gyre’s memory is all the stuff 
that we’ve forgotten. (114) 
 
As the language of radioactive decay turns from ocean gyres to forms of “information” and 
“attention” span, Ruth recycles and lands on the same turns of phrase as Oliver, relying on the 
notion of a dementing ecology to convey the natural contingency of memory, history, and their 
embodiment in material and digital forms. The half-life of memory or forgetting is invoked in the 
“gyre’s memory” and the drift of oceanic forgetting becomes mapped onto human losses and 
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radioactive exposure from the tsunami.30 Ruth’s bullet points attempt to compartmentalize lost lives 
and histories lodged in the “tiny particles” of the literal tsunami’s “tidal wave,” as well as the 
figurative currents within historical gyres. Her invocation of social media and the debris of endless 
ephemera of fragmented Internet storytelling also speak to orphaned sites and stories facing 
obscurity. Thus, collective and historical forgetting in the digital age and the permanent damage 
wrought by ecological disaster are drawn together as one interconnected concern in the “gyre’s 
becalmed center,” in which memories are always subject to becoming lost to time but also regained. 
Additionally, it is worth addressing that the diary in the lunchbox is written in a blank copy of 
Proust’s À la recherché du temps perdu. To some extent the diary’s infrastructural reliance on Proust 
conditions these views of memory and memory as process. One might argue Ruth’s encounters with 
the textures and smells of the barnacle-crusted lunchbox stage a Proustian experience of memory: 
one of involuntary remembering, surfacing when she least expects it throughout the novel. But as I 
will explore, what Ruth remembers or comes to know are pasts that are not her own, which carries 
ethical implications for witnessing to lives lost to disasters across time. 
 Ruth’s recognition “[t]he gyre’s memory is all the stuff that we’ve forgotten” is an urgent 
call for remembering disaster and its interminable effects. But the novel also points to the limits of 
remembering, and how the (re)discovery of histories is a process of unpredictable unfolding. In A 
Tale, the gyre’s memory loss is imbricated in the person with dementia’s forgetting, not as a process 
of erasure but one of reassembling—an opening for empathetic speculation and the co-production 
                                               
30 The fear of radiation from Fukushima and its floating debris is entangled with Ruth’s “biggest fear” of Alzheimer’s, 
which she describes in terms of “swelling” waters of a tsunami (92). Yet the language of radiation is also a reminder of 
the legacy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This conjoining of fears requires us to think more on the specific cultural and 
historical meanings of both those who’ve survived radioactive exposure (hibakusha) and the cognitive changes of those 
with dementia. As Clare Barker and Stuart Murray have suggested, “Caught between a general fear of radiation sickness 
and responses generated from the cultural memory of the bombings, the experiences of hibakusha are continually 
conditioned by their implication within the ongoing resonance of a collective trauma” (231). Likewise, how Ruth, as a 
Japanese-American, initially engages with and narrates her mother’s dementia is predicated on deeply complicated 
relationships between violent histories and environmental factors. 
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of stories. The presumably inconsequential objects eddying in the periphery of the gyre embody the 
serendipitous stories of histories continually lost and found; they remind us remembering is 
relational, imaginative, and in fluid interaction with the present. We might say that Ozeki crips 
Yeats’s gyres, as she figures a dementing ecology that defies expectations of cyclical or linear 
progression. Histories embodied in the lunchbox’s contents emerge through the narrative out of 
time and pattern. Unstable and unpredictable in its temporal decay, the gyre’s memory loss is the 
force driving the narrative and the comprehension of the difficult to represent Fukushima disaster. 
Remembering disaster in the novel is not limited to Fukushima; disaster is also attached to 
legacies of war, imperialism, and colonialism. The diary washes up on a beach “below Jap Ranch,” 
named after a homestead that “had once belonged to a Japanese family, who were forced to sell 
when they were interned during the war” (32). Michelle N. Huang’s reading of this passage 
highlights “the stuff we’ve forgotten” as a site for the material effects of forgetting the transpacific 
histories of racial violence—the Garbage Patch being “just one archive of [Asian American politics’] 
forgotten, but not dead, waste” (105). There are also more violent gyres of history that overlap and 
obscure each other: Ruth and Oliver live on an island “named for a famous Spanish conquistador 
who overthrew the Aztec empire…which is why the inlets and sounds of coastal British Columbia 
are scattered with the names of famous Spanish mass murderers” (139). Jiko lives on “one of the last 
pieces of tribal land to be taken from the indigenous Emishi…until they were defeated by the 
Japanese Imperial Army in the eighth century” (141)—land also devastated on 3/11. These colonial 
violences surface like debris from the gyre as the narrative’s flotsam: easily overlooked details not 
integral to the plot but crucial in their accumulative presence in the margins of the narrative.  
The narratives that emerge from dementing ecologies makes visible patterns of overlapping 
histories that recall Yeats’s gyres as expressions of (post)colonial conflict. In A Tale, it seems that 
every artifact that escapes the gyre, and every place touched by its transpacific flows, is an 
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unexpected glimpse into those layered histories of injustice.31 As Guy Beauregard observes, Ozeki’s 
text does not simply promise dialogue “in the novel’s narrative present” regarding these histories, it 
points to  
the limits of which lives we, as variously positioned readers, can presume to know. By 
representing spaces marked by commercial and militarized violence and by the forced 
removal of Indigenous and other racialized subjects, it underlines overlapping forms of 
violence and exclusion that have enabled the novel’s “community of engagement” to come 
into being. (102)  
 
Beauregard draws our attention to the community of characters in the novel that have “differential 
access to Nao’s narrative and the other texts found on the beach, as each of these figures provides 
(variously) questions, insights, counter-positions, background information, and invaluable 
translations into English of texts written in French and Japanese” (100). Deciphering the texts that 
emerge from the archive of the gyre is a communal effort; making visible and re-remembering those 
histories becomes an act of stewardship. The logic of the dementing ecology is not only founded on 
forgetting, but the resurfacing of long-term memories of histories embodied in debris. Seen in this 
way, the Great Pacific Garbage Patch is more than a figure of overwhelming environmental disaster, 
it is also a figurative diary or keeper of autobiographical artifacts (like the lunchbox) that, when 
discovered, tells its stories to patient listeners. The next section turns to how readers must also listen 
to Ruth’s mother Masako. With her dementia, Masako is the source of a potent and provocative 
non-normative mode of communication that contributes to the text’s exploration of the workings of 
historical memory of violence and colonialisms. 
My concept of dementing ecologies has hoped to show that what Huang calls the “humans in 
the gyre and the gyre in the humans,” requires us to attend critically to the narrative’s overlooked 
engagement with disability (104; emphasis in original). “Getting caught up in the gyre’s oscillating 
                                               
31 As Burke similarly points out, “at the level of the cultural imaginary, a character with Alzheimer’s often becomes a 




vortex,” Huang writes, “necessitates a willingness to contravene established boundaries, to allow for 
surprising juxtapositions to emerge, and to seek rapprochement with links that have been erased or 
disconnected” (104). An eco-crip reading enables a more capacious view of the “surprising 
juxtapositions” between bodies and environments the novel churns up. The gyre is at once a figure 
of neurological dementia, a site of the dementing environment, and a representational figure for the 
historical processes of the “memory loss” of various disasters and their afterlives. Through the 
backdrop of dementing ecologies, Ozeki highlights temporalities of unfolding stories to honor 
memory’s half-life—one involving forgetting, unpredictability, and the persistence of the past in the 
differentiating present. Dementia thus emerges as the novel’s key narrative and epistemic resource as 
the gyre’s memory loss of colonialisms and their afterlives require readers to think these histories 
anew. 
 
Masako, Forgetting, and The Politics of Now 
In an interview about the impact her mother had on A Tale, Ozeki explains how “the now” 
of Alzheimer’s helped reframe her relationship with time: 
You are slowing watching somebody drop out of time. She was moving backward but she 
was also rewinding…I think I loosened my grip on time…if I got too attached to time and 
measuring time as we measure it…she would get upset because she couldn’t remember…so 
finally I realized there was no point. That actually, she was right, it didn’t really matter 
whether it’s Monday or Thursday or Saturday—it’s now. (OPB Arts and Life) 
 
Ozeki’s loosened “grip on time” honors her mother’s temporal reorientation as a useful, valid 
perception to be empathized with rather than mourned as absolute loss. Sidestepping the clench of 
calendar time, Alzheimer’s calls attention to temporal regimes that marginalize both aging and 
disabled bodies in its demand for standardized routine, predictability, and remembering. As Anne 
Davis Basting stresses, focused labor on remembering “for ourselves and for future 
generations…exacerbate[s] the shame and fear surrounding forgetting and the human frailty, 
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dependency, and morality with which forgetting is linked” (Forget Memory 23). Likewise, the novel 
takes up the value of “demented time,” which Hailee Yoshizaki-Gibbons, drawing from Petra 
Kuppers and Alison Kafer’s notion of “crip time,” calls “individual moments [that] may be self-
contained, nonlinear, intermittent, irrational, and idiosyncratic - yet they are no less meaningful or 
valuable…Due to its focus on being in the moment, demented time asks us to suspend our ideas 
about memory and the assumption memory is an essential aspect of building and maintaining 
relationships with others” (9). Through dialogue between Ruth and Masako, A Tale foregrounds the 
importance of living in the present, interrogating the norm of what constitutes a meaningful 
relationship to time and its connection to personhood. More provocatively, Ozeki uses this notion 
of “demented time” to critique the normative, linear mode of conceiving catastrophic historical 
events as past. 
What are the significances of—and other meanings possible for—dementia in a narrative 
that stresses the very necessary task of remembering histories such as the ones explored in the 
previous section? In the “now” time of dementia things are discovered anew, such as during Ruth 
and Masako’s ritual trips to the community thrift store: “When her closets got full and her dresser 
drawers no longer closed, Ruth slipped things out from the bottom of her piles and returned them 
to the Free Store, where her mother could discover them all over again” (222). Huang likens 
Masako’s recurrent rediscovery of clothing to Ruth’s happenstance discovery of the diary as the 
recuperation of garbage into personal responsibility: “Although Alzheimer’s is a condition defined 
by forgetting,” writes Huang (with an all too generic definition of forgetting), “Masako is continually 
attracted to the same objects, intimating the extent to which unconscious patterns and desires 
animate us…Masako’s recovery of the sweater manifests responsibility; the sweater’s affective pull 
allows for it to become legible as not-trash” (104). Huang’s reflection on Masako centers the 
phenomenology of “the sweater’s affective pull” (104) rather the particular embodied way of 
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thinking and living with Alzheimer’s itself. But it is precisely Masako’s particular orientation to 
objects in “now” time that enable her to experience the pull of the sweater in the first place. As 
Masako’s other appearances in the novel show, the now helps Ruth question and redefine for herself 
and readers what constitutes a meaningful relationship to time.  
 Masako’s voice appears in two key parallel scenes of dialogue several chapters apart. In these 
moments Masako and Ruth discuss significant public events mediated through television: New 
Year’s Eve and 9/11. The former sets up the novel’s tenor of anxiety in relation to dementia early in 
the narrative: 
Every time a new burst of fireworks lit up the television screen, her mother would lean 
forward.  
“My, isn’t that pretty! What are we celebrating?” 
“It’s the New Year, Mom.” 
“Really? What year is it?”  
“It’s the year 2000. It’s the new millennium.” 
“No!” her mother would exclaim…And then she would close her eyes and doze off 
again until the next burst of fireworks woke her… 
“My, isn’t that pretty! What are we celebrating?” (83) 
 
The New Year, close of presidential elections, and this exchange with her mother lead Ruth to feel 
anxious about the future. It’s not just Masako’s incomprehension of a new year that alarms Ruth—it 
is her undoing of relations through the authority of her blanket resistance (“No!”) to expectations of 
normative sociality (celebration). Masako’s brusque discursive production isn’t indicative of her 
‘irrationality,’ but an expression of the agency she possesses to expose the constraining expectations 
of (predominantly verbal) social participation and rationality imposed on people with dementia.32  
The scene draws attention to a futurity Masako, denied political agency or rhetoricity, cannot 
normatively grasp or participate in. Masako’s incomprehension of the year and the protracted 
conversation it engenders marks a reorientation in and to time that “reimagine[s] what public time 
                                               
32 As I elaborate on later, communicative aspects of dementia can be productively aligned with Joshua St. Pierre’s work 




and social relations can look like,” a defining feature of “crip time” (Kafer 40). As crip time can be 
“liberatory” and “a time of loss” (Samuels, “Six Ways”), a source of “disability culture politics” but 
also “born out of pain and frustration” (Kuppers 29), Alzheimer’s temporality shifts across complex 
terrain. A Tale’s conundrum is holding space for forgetting and the now in a narrative about 
remembering individual lives and major historical events in a century defined by the injunction to 
“never forget.” 
  The second dialogue takes place on 9/11, after Ruth and Oliver rush home in fear Masako 
has panicked from watching the news alone. Anticlimactically, they arrive to Masako’s fleeting 
understanding of the event’s gravity:  
 “What program is this?” her mother asked. 
 It’s the news, Mom,” she answered. 
 “I don’t understand,” her mother said. “It looks like a war. Are we at war?” 
 “Yes, Mom,” she said. “We’re at war.” 
 “Oh that’s terrible!” her mother exclaimed. “Who are we at war with?” 
 “Afghanistan, Mom.” 
They watched together in silence, until the commercial break. Her mother got up 
and shuffled to the bathroom. When she came back, she stopped and looked at the 
screen. “What program is this?” 
 “It’s the news, Mom.” 
 “Looks like a war. Are we at war?” 
 “Yes Mom. We’re at war.” 
 “Oh that’s terrible! Who are we at war with?” 
 “Iraq, Mom.” 
 “Really? But I thought that war was over.” 
 “No, Mom. It’s never over. America has always been at war with Iraq.” 
 “Oh, that’s terrible!” … Days pass, and weeks. Months pass, and then years. 
 “Now who did you say we were at war with?” (273) 
 
Masako’s questions read as hallmark symptoms of Alzheimer’s, but they are also “repetitions of 
questionabilities,” which Michael Schillmeier argues, “enforces an on-going questioning of the humans, 
things and related practices experienced” (78). For Schillmeier, these questions are one of many 
events arising from illness and disability with the power to interrogate social reality and “disrupt, 
question, alter and even endanger the normativities of ‘healthy’ bodies, their practices and relations” 
(2). Masako’s relation to war denaturalizes the normative conception of war as having a discreet 
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beginning and end. Masako’s questions elicit a cynical response from Ruth, reflecting reality through 
the hyperbole, “America has always been at war with Iraq.” This scene is not only important because 
it highlights anxieties about one’s alienation from the past due to forgetting. Tasking readers to 
question the finality implied in conceiving of violent histories and disasters as past, Masako’s 
questions likewise impel Ruth to iterate, “It’s never over.” Masako’s questioning deconstructs the 
temporal and spatial boundaries news media and dominant discourses impose on events such as war. 
If the images, sounds, and stories televised in homes are “electronic monuments” that give viewers 
“an enduring frame for organizing their personal recollection of events,” Masako’s forgetting 
exposes the inadequacy of such tropes of national remembering and narrative frames that script 
disaster as discreet progressions of past, present, and future (Mihelj 119). Here Masako’s dementia is 
not merely a negative signifier for cultural amnesia, but an interrogation of how histories are always 
at risk of oppression or effacement in their mediation. Readers also are forced aware of the present 
absence of Masako’s family history of internment during World War II, which Ruth mentions only 
briefly in conjunction with Jap Ranch. Masako tasks us to ask, how do we urge commemoration and 
remembrance for tragic and disastrous events that broach the impossibility of redress without 
perpetuating the fear and shame associated with individual forgetting? How do we include people 
with dementia in our desired futures, and as participants in—not enemies to—cultural and national 
memory?33  
 Whether it is the scripted cultural rituals of celebrating New Years, recognizing war or 
imperialist histories on news media, these events make demands on Masako’s memory, articulation, 
and reason. Yet the narrative does not cast forgetting as individual loss or failure, instead implying 
                                               
33 I extend Ellen Samuels’ definition of crip time as “time travel” through individual “normative life stages” to 
collectively experienced historical junctures. If dementia reorients a person’s relationship to history— abandoning claims 
to completeness and accuracy—it is imperative to broaden our understanding of what kinds of subjective experiences of 
history are possible and recognize them as valid realities, even if beyond normative bounds of rational understanding. 
See “Six Ways of Looking at Crip Time” Disability Studies Quarterly 37.3 (2017). 
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histories are always already distorted and in progress of being forgotten in national memory, a 
reminder of the interdependency required in all acts of remembering. In these dialogues, Masako’s 
memory loss is not non-meaningful or a hindrance to communication. Masako’s questions are not 
literal inquires and failures to remember; they are indexes of a particular way of being social. Her 
questions are less about content and more about form and gesture—gestures that without a 
receptive listener often go overlooked as simply forgetting. Masako’s nonlinear relationship to time 
and place asks readers to read anew, to suspend expectations of memory, and to think about the 
politics of forgetting when pulled into “the now.” Considering forms of cognitive difference and 
their temporalities can thus serve to reframe normative constructions of memory-based identity but 
also deepen our ethical consciousness, radically challenging our perception of history and time. 
 
“Temporal Stuttering” 
The most idiosyncratic moment of A Tale’s formal experimentation with representing time 
relies on disability to achieve its most dramatic moment of narrative and textual rupture. It is the 
culminating moment in which Ruth feels she has lost all potential material for confirming Nao’s 
existence. The disappearance of an online article, “The Instability of the Female ‘I’” (a clue to Nao’s 
existence, potentially authored by Jiko), as well a Stanford professor’s non-response to her inquiries 
regarding his connection to Nao’s father, drives Ruth and the narrative to a breaking point of 
impatience. Like Masako asking questions over and over again, throughout the narrative Ruth keeps 
asking herself, who and where is Nao? Struggling to describe her agitation, Ruth falls onto the language 
of disability: 
How to describe it? A temporal stuttering, an urgent lassitude, a feeling of simultaneous 
rushing and lagging behind. It reminded her of the peculiar arrhythmic gait of Parkinson’s 
patients in the hospice where her mother spent the last months of her life, the way they 
lurched and stalled as they made their way down the hallways to the dining room and 
eventually to their death. It was a horrible, stilted, panicky sensation, hard to put into words, 
but which, if she were trying to represent it typographically, would look something like:  
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this is what temporal stuttering feels like stut stut stuttery rushing forward in time 
without a moment of an instant distinguishing one instance from the next growing 
ever louder and louder without punctuation until suddenly without warning it… 
[page break] stops. (227-229)  
 
Attempting to narrate her anxiety of not knowing through the “temporal stuttering” and 
“arrhythmic gait” of Parkinson’s patients prompts Ruth to create a textual gap by experimenting 
with typography (fig. 1.1): her sentence is italicized, words run together and are capitalized and 
bolded in a semi-predictable pattern of differential size. 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Page spread of “temporal stuttering” in Ruth Ozeki’s A Tale for the Time Being 
 
As the sentence size grows exponentially larger, it halts at ellipses inaugurating an abundance of 
white space, until the next page, where the word “stops” appears at the bottom, virtually 
imperceptible to hasty readers. The next page begins with Ruth asking, “am I crazy?” (230), a query 
that extends the metaphor of the dementia to herself through its Latin meaning of being ‘out of 
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one’s mind.’34 Readers are also reminded Alzheimer’s is her “biggest fear” (92). These juxtapositions 
of mental illness, Parkinson’s disease, and the stuttering body play on associations of disability as 
states of crisis, fright, and frustration in which the breakdown of meaning and relationships is 
ostensibly imminent. Yet this moment also plays on readers’ expectations of form and readability 
predicated on the predicable interplay between text, font, and spacing—and their collapse generates 
new possibilities for meaning. 
A cursory reading might suggest Ruth’s invocation of Parkinson’s dementia is simply a visual 
strategy to invoke discomfort in the reader, a form conveying her anxieties surrounding uncertainty 
and losing one’s memory while mimetically attempting to represent an experience of living with 
Parkinson’s. Inviting another reading, I argue that dementia operates as an aesthetic and rhetorical 
resource. In this graphic rupture of narrative continuity, the word becomes body as it lurches, 
challenging readers to pause—in fact, interrupt—their usual pace of engagement with the text and 
the state of not knowing. As Tobin Siebers argues, when words become bodies, they produce a 
“seizure of meaning, interrupting the ordinary transparency of the page, and expose the materiality 
of language…The word becomes image…It represents a form of behavior in which we direct 
ourselves toward a body, bringing it to our knowledge and making it exist in a more intimate sense” 
(Disability Aesthetics 124). Siebers’s use of “seizure” is fitting in this context—invoking the image of 
both meanings of ‘ictus’ as a rhythmical stress and a fit associated with epilepsy, redolent of the 
Parkinsonian body’s spasticity Ruth tries to capture here. This accrual of disability representations 
exudes formal excess that forces the narrative open, demanding it be expressed multimodally (i.e. the 
kinetic expression of font; the auditory rehearsal the line invites from the reader; the illusion of 
tactility in the arrangement of lines and sizes, etc.). Such multimodality foregrounds the materiality 
                                               
34 As Schillmeier, drawing from Foucault, also insists “[t]he history of dementia cannot be thought without the history of 
madness” (15).  
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of the body and readers’ own prolonged, embodied participation in the literary aesthetic experience, 
bringing the text a sense of immediacy. Readers’ senses are deictically involved in the here and now 
of the page—focused and present—with Ruth experiencing and trying to understand, visually and 
kinetically, her stuttering. Stuttering emerges as a “meaningful rhetorical ‘device’” that Jay Dolmage 
argues, embodies all struggle to find and make meaning (235). Seizing readers by erupting white 
space, “temporal stuttering” is a site of reflection on reading, writing, and narrative form. Ruth’s 
thinking-with-“temporal stuttering” engenders a productive use of white space as a site of 
meaning—readers are literally seized—challenging the reader’s desire for continuity or certainty, 
highlighting the artificiality of linear narrative structures that lead to closure or knowing, or by 
extension, a sense of wholeness that the dementing and disabled body resists as it stutters.35 
 “Temporal stuttering” on the page is a representational conflation of the physical (gait) and 
vocal (speech), illustrating the correlation that disability rights activist and scholar Joshua St. Pierre 
draws between the spastic and stuttering body: “both fail to move within fluid and calculable 
temporalities and thus both resist clear/stable meanings” (“Becoming” 345). Similar to Masako’s 
function, the narrative’s textual embodiment of stuttering productively arrests and resists normative 
temporal scripts to offer “a heuristic of instability and indeterminacy that generates multiple 
meanings and relations” (St. Pierre, “Cripping,” 339). Ruth’s deepest fear, perhaps more than 
Alzheimer’s, is the inability to access the words for histories she wishes to write—a fear also 
dramatized by the writer’s block barring her from finishing the memoir of Masako. It is a fear of 
being out of time (not having enough time to write) but also dropping out of time (failing to leave 
behind as well as find a written trace of a life, i.e. Nao’s story). Her fear as a writer of stuttering 
                                               
35 In medical discourse, “stuttering” invokes the clinical late stages of Alzheimer’s and is associated with progressive 
aphasia characterized by slowed or halting speech, hesitation with or abnormal word finding, a forgetting of names or 
objects, as well as effortful or reduced speech. These all give the impression of stammering or stuttering; it’s also 
important to distinguish Parkinson’s dementia as different from Alzheimer’s—but disability becomes conflated here. 
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before words is magnified by the felt necessity to produce a timely coherent narrative in the 
aftermath of the Fukushima disaster, which may or may not have killed Nao. The cultural 
expectation to construct a continuous and certain narrative, which stigmatizes forgetfulness and 
cognitive differences associated with disability and aging, is met by the inadequacy of linear narrative 
structures that impose closure.  
In Ruth’s textual imitation of the disabled body, the typographic stuttering rises and marches 
asynchronously as a body. Fittingly, Siebers insists the materiality of words have a corporeal 
presence that “rises to the surface of the page and moves into the emotional consciousness of the 
reader” (125). In this moment of Ruth’s textual imitation of the dementing or disabled body, the 
typographic stuttering rises and marches asynchronously as a body, a body that encourages us to ask 
what meanings might emerge from gaps and elisions of memory. The textual lacuna emerging from 
the power of the disabled body represented illustrates the imaginative possibilities for narrative 
expression. Temporal stuttering halts readers in a moment of reflection alongside Ruth to consider: 
what happens when we embrace not knowing, look for meaning between the elisions and distortions 
of memory, and listen to what arises when memory, speech, and time are choreographed differently? 
Jay Dolmage has argued stuttering can be a powerful rhetorical form that dismantles logocentric 
paradigms and rigid conceptions of language, moving away from disability as deficit: “Instead 
disability is the very possibility (and concurrently the uncertainty) of human communication and 
knowledge. Disability then also resituates rhetoric, not as the flawless delivery of pure ideas, but the 
embodied struggle for meaning” (136). The textual moment of “temporal stuttering” employs 
disability as an aesthetic and rhetorical resource to illustrate the challenges of remembering and 





Old Jiko, Forgetting, and the Politics of Nao/Now 
 Essential to the dramatic structure of the narrative, temporal stutterings become the 
moments in which objective time is suspended, histories are co-constituted, and lost stories are 
reconstructed through the imaginative present. The above scene of temporal stuttering connects to 
the next moment of narrative rupture: a pivotal scene in which a storm threatens to wipe out Ruth 
and Oliver’s home island. With a turn of magical realism, the pages of Nao’s diary go blank in front 
of Ruth’s eyes, mirroring the indeterminacy of Nao’s experience with the tsunami. Ruth again feels 
the anxiety of impending loss, taking readers back to images of the drifts and gyres that brought the 
diary to Ruth to begin with. With Nao’s story erased, Ruth dreams herself into what appears to be 
Nao’s past:  
She [Nao] is cold and swimming, and the sea is black and thick and filled with 
debris…We sleeptogether in onelargeroom laid outing rowslike smallfishhungtodry…But something’s 
gone wrong with the words in time—syllables linger, refusing to dissipate or fall into 
silence—so that now there’s a pileup of sounds, like cars colliding on a highway, turning 
meaning into cacophony, and before she knows it, she is adding to the din…Time swells. 
(347-8) 
 
As in the previous episode of temporal stuttering, words rear end each other “like cars,” embodying 
the collision of time. The dream bridges past and present, enabling Ruth to communicate with Nao 
and the dead. In her dream time travel, Ruth saves Nao’s father from suicide and together they find 
the “Secret French Diary” of Haruki #1 (Jiko’s son and kamikaze pilot). Placing the secret diary in 
Jiko’s altar box for Nao to find, Ruth effectively alters the course of history. Subsequently, Ruth 
enables the re-writing of Nao’s blank diary, so when she awakens, the pages are all there again.  
 This moment of magical realism springs from the temporal stuttering that Ozeki has 
thematized. These stutters in time and place account for the changing endings of Nao’s diary, which 
perform the instability of its meanings. The script of each ending, readers learn, depends on the 
positionality of the reader. As a close friend, Muriel, suggests, the pages are blank because Ruth 
hasn’t caught up to her own sense of the “now”:  
  
 50 
“It’s not about Nao’s now. It’s about yours. You haven’t caught up with yourself yet, the 
now of your story, and you can’t reach the ending until you do.”  
 Ruth thought about this…“I don’t like it. I don’t like having that much agency over 
 someone else’s narrative.” 
 Muriel laughed. “That’s a fine way for a novelist to talk!” (377) 
 
Nao’s changing diary, interleaved with Ruth’s life that alters it, is not only a form of the present, 
intimate now. It is a form of the now predicated on recording the search for and ethical 
responsibility of bringing another’s life story into being, and an intimate awareness of one’s own 
interconnected life in time. In this way, temporal stutterings are moments of transformation in 
which time is suspended, in which histories are co-constituted and lost stories reconstructed anew 
through the imaginative present.  
It is also important to highlight that Ruth’s comment about her discomfort over having too 
“much agency over someone else’s narrative” is a moment in which the text prompts readers to 
consider the ethics of telling others’ stories, particularly in narratives of disaster and dementia (both 
of which Ruth is struggling to write). The untellability of the stories of what happened to the 
tsunami victims and details of Masako’s life history (including the internment of her family) are 
reproduced at the level of narrative in their absence from it. It seems that Ruth’s inability to finish 
her memoir about Masako and reach the end of her own story (which is entangled with Nao’s, as 
Muriel suggests), insists on an ethics of unknowability, or rather, a not-knowing that aligns with 
Buddhist practice and that must also be read alongside the trope of dementia. 
 
Dementia, Buddhism, and Not-Knowing 
My reading of A Tale so far has considered how Ozeki’s immersion in living with a mother 
with dementia has illuminated for her new perspectives on time and memory, and that these 
perspectives make their way into what deliberately reads simultaneously as a semi-autobiographical 
and imaginative novel. Additionally, it is important to consider Ozeki’s position as an ordained Zen 
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Buddhist priest, and how Zen Buddhism enters the novel alongside dementia. As I’ve explored, 
Ruth realizes the value of “the now” through her interactions with Masako as well as her 
imaginative, readerly kinship with Nao. By extension, Ruth also learns more about the value of now-
time through the other matrilineal figure in the text: Nao’s great-grandmother—an anarchist, 
feminist, Zen Buddhist nun affectionately known as “Old Jiko.”  
As the novel unfolds, Ruth dreams herself into both Nao and Jiko’s life. In these occasions 
of temporal stuttering, Ruth alters history and rewrites the course of the diary, bringing disparate life 
histories into the now. What emerges in A Tale is an entangled life writing project of multiple 
women, a collective inquiry into what it means to be “a time being”: “someone who lives in time, 
and that means you, and me, and every one of us who is, or was, or ever will be” (3). These musings 
on “time beings” stem from Jiko’s Zen Buddhist teachings and are purposefully juxtaposed 
alongside the novel’s preoccupation with dementia, providing spiritual and interdependent 
frameworks for coming to terms with and destigmatizing acts of forgetting.  
Though different from Masako, the biographical Jiko that Nao writes about in her diary 
forgets many things—such as her birthday and age. In her forgetting she is, according to Nao, the 
only person “who really understands time” (24). After Jiko dies, Nao resolves to write the story of 
her life and teachings, including Jiko’s outlook on the contingency of all memories and things: “It’s 
true she’s already dead, but her stories are still alive in my head at least for now, so I have to hurry 
up and write them down before I forget. I have a pretty good memory, but memories are time 
beings, too, like cherry blossoms or ginkgo leaves; for a while they are beautiful, and then they fade 
and die” (390). Nao’s invocation of the natural world’s ephemerality recalls the half-life of the gyre’s 




By the novel’s end, Nao’s narrative provides Ruth with an alternative way of thinking about 
memory and forgetting, a way of thinking that stems from Jiko’s teachings of zazen, Zen meditation, 
or how to “enter time completely” (181) by being present in the now. In her final reflections, Ruth 
adopts Zen Buddhist teachings into her own narrative: “zazen seemed like a kind of moment-by-
moment observation of the self that apparently led to enlightenment…To study the self is to forget the 
self” (400). Like Masako’s reorientation to time, Zen Buddhism forgetting of the self emphasizes the 
present, embracing uncertainty and not-knowing as “the most intimate way” (402). De-centering 
fixed points of view and the cultural demands to remember, the practices of zazen help Ruth come 
to terms with the ambiguity surrounding the lives lost in the earthquake and tsunami, including Nao: 
“I’d much rather know, but then again, not-knowing keeps all the possibilities open. It keeps all the 
worlds alive.” (402). Not-knowing opens Ruth up to being present in the moment and centers her 
within a web of interconnection and expanded sense of connection to others. A counterpoint to 
Masako’s literal forgetting and “not knowing,” the ideas and practices of Zen Buddhism in A Tale 
prompt us to consider how might we extend these ideas to the forgetting of dementia.  
Indeed, at the end of A Tale, Ruth extends the trope that people with dementia live 
“between worlds” to her own speculation of alternate realities: 
Maybe it wasn’t so bad. In other worlds, she had finished her memoir. The memoir, and 
perhaps even a novel or two…“Do you really believe this?” she asked [Oliver]. “That there 
are other worlds where…no one died in the earthquake and tsunami? Where Nao is living 
and well, and maybe finishing her book of Jiko’s life…Where there are no leaking nuclear 
reactors or garbage patching in the sea…” (399) 
 
By the epilogue, Ruth takes up the Zen Buddhist teachings of Jiko with regards to “not-knowing,” 
writing to Nao in the diaristic-epistolary form for the first time: “you quoted old Jiko saying 
something about not-knowing, how not-knowing is the most intimate way, or did I just dream 
that?…I think maybe it’s true, even though I don’t like uncertainty. I’d much rather know, but then 
again, not-knowing keeps all the possibilities open. It keeps all the worlds alive” (402). “Not 
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knowing is hard,” Ruth says at the end of the novel in reference to the lives lost and missing after 
March 11: “Their bodies were never found. Nobody would ever know what happened to 
them…‘Do you think Nao is alive?’” (400). Circling back to the beginning images of the gyre’s 
memory, this passage points back to the contingency of history and the impossibility of writing 
linear, finished histories. The memoir that may be finished in one world may be incomplete in 
another.  
 Continuing in appendices, too, the novel foregrounds as a takeaway the Zen Buddhist 
teachings of the “unbounded nature of not knowing” (409). Jiko and Nao open up the belief in 
alternative worlds as imaginative alternatives to closed, known, seemingly objective history. Neither 
Ruth nor Nao end up writing the life of their matrilineal line, leaving histories potentially forgotten. 
But what the novel does accomplish is leaving open the surprising possibility of meanings and 
histories that might emerge when readers, like Ozeki, loosen their grip on time. 
~ 
 On a hilltop garden overlooking the Pacific Ocean in Otsuchi in northeastern Japan is a 
white, glass-paned phone booth housing a disconnected rotary phone, notebook, and pen for 
visitors to jot down their messages and thoughts. Visitors are often regulars, and calls are often 
made to home phone numbers no longer in service, and to loved ones no longer alive. Although no 
actual voice emerges from the receiver, for the time being, the callers’ loved ones are present and 
listening. Since the devastating tsunami, the wind telephone (kaze no denwa)—erected and named by 
resident Itaru Sasaki—has facilitated conversations with the dead for over thousands of visitors 
wrestling with grief and loss. The wind telephone has been a way for people to stay in touch with 
those lost in the disaster. It also stands as a reminder for losses that cannot be forgotten.  
In some ways, calls home from the wind telephone are similar to the imaginary 
conversations Ruth and Nao have with each other across time, location, and even worlds. “A lot of 
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calls were just…straightforward updates about life,” This American Life producer Miki Meek reports, 
“The kind of a quick highlights reel you might give to any family member you were catching up with 
on the phone.” The space of the wind telephone elicits the diaristic performance of communicating 
to an absent interlocutor, conversations about the everyday, and a sense of dailiness that contributes 
to a sense of the intimate present for the caller. Bringing callers to the “now,” the phone booth, like 
the narrative of A Tale, enables the memorialization of those who may have begun to drift out of 
national concern or public imagination. Calling home is not so much an attempt to reconstruct a 
past narrative as it is a project to imagine a future located in the present. It is an act that relies on 
imagination and the suspension of worldly time, as callers experience a connection with their loved 
ones that are beyond the bounds of reality.  
 Throughout this chapter I have hoped to show through a disability studies analytic how A 
Tale takes up the value of this imaginative point of view through the lens of engaging with dementia. 
As a theme and literary deployment dementia enables the creative (re)imagining of Ruth’s 
relationships with the past and present as productively ruptured, incomplete, and unknown. Rather 
than signal loss and erasure, in A Tale, dementia features as a place of serendipitous re-imagining, of 
presentness pointing toward a futurity of an alternative narrative. Attending to dementia as a way of 
thinking through the consequences of forgetting and being forgotten in the novel also enables an 
interrogation of what gets remembered and what gets jettisoned in the waste streams of memory: 
from histories of colonial land dispossession and imperialism, to structurally disenfranchised 
communities devastated by “natural” disaster, to stories of the elderly, the dementing, and the 
disabled—all “time beings.”  
The vastly interconnected stories that circulate in A Tale open up space for readers to 
ponder what other stories might be lost and found in the gyre’s memory. To presently read disaster 
and disability in A Tale would also be incomplete without acknowledging that what many call Japan’s 
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“worst mass killing” since World War II occurred at a center for the mentally disabled, a third of 
whose residents were elderly (Rich and Soble). To the dismay of disability rights advocates in and 
outside of Japan, the names of victims have remained withheld to this day, perpetuating the 
elimination of the disabled and elderly from public imagination and memorialization.  
Taking to heart Ruth’s regrets after reading Nao’s diary—“wishing she’d done more to 
commemorate her mother’s passing” (370)—reading A Tale as a narrative as much about dementia 
as it is about writing and disaster allows us to hold space for the presence of intertwined life stories 
that might otherwise go forgotten. As narrative continues to call upon the representational power of 
dementia, we must continue to examine how literature helps us imagine futures in which actual 
people with dementia can be collectively remembered and accounted for outside of narratives of 











The Poetics and Politics of Alzheimer’s Dementia in Susan M. Schultz 
 
Writing about Alzheimer’s, as I do, is nothing if not writing about personhood, what 
it is, how it alters, remains, how much it depends--or does not depend--on 
reciprocity and “reading.” It’s writing about existence at the point at which existence 
is called into question. 
—Susan Schultz, Dementia Blog, Volume Two 
 
 
 In an essay titled “Alzheimer’s, Aliens, and the Cure of the Avant-Garde,” Hawai’i-based 
writer Susan M. Schultz reflects on events taking place after the death of her mother, Martha Jean 
Keefe Schultz, in “an Alzheimer’s ‘home’” in 2011. What follows is a provocative set of derivations 
that string together notions of ‘home,’ ‘homeland,’ and ‘homeland security.’ In one paragraph, a 
news article in the Yuma Sun about a missing woman with dementia found in the desert is juxtaposed 
with a report of 160 pounds of marijuana discovered in that same area of the U.S.-Mexico border, 
one well-known for the “transport [of] drugs and illegal aliens” (“Alzheimer’s, Aliens”). Another 
paragraph glosses the figure of the “illegal alien” in conservative and legal vocabulary alongside the 
pseudo-scientific claim that Alzheimer’s unknown causes can be traced to the invasion of “foreign 
mind parasites” (ibid.). Across the essay, Schultz traces an affinity across the inhospitable landscapes 
that confront the person with Alzheimer’s who has wandered away from home and “the smuggler, 
the illegal who crosses the national border and then hides” (ibid.).  
 Symbolized in terms of furtive non-human otherness that requires managing or elimination, 
the conflated homeland threat of immigration, drug trafficking, and terrorism at U.S. borders and 
the cognitive “invasions” of Alzheimer’s may seem unlikely bedfellows. But the creation of the 
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Department of Homeland Security in 2002 after 9/11, bolstering operations of the U.S. Border 
Patrol, is also contemporaneous with the boom of genetic and biomedical initiatives beginning in 
2003, centered on the detection and experimental policing of Alzheimer’s with “revolutionary” and 
“powerful new weapons,” placing Alzheimer’s at the “frontline” of America’s “national agenda” 
(alz.org).36 Indeed, since the dawn of the 21st century, both Alzheimer’s and immigration have been 
framed as national crises through the same ecological and military metaphors: they are “tidal waves” 
and “rising tides” poised to “inundate” American society (as Chapter 1 addressed) and in military 
rhetoric, “invasions” and “attacks” that must be “defended” against.37 As Daniel R. George and 
Peter J. Whitehouse have explored, “[i]n the decade following the tragedies of 9/11, a US-led ‘War 
on Terror’ has dovetailed with a US-led ‘‘War on Alzheimer’s disease (AD),’” arguing, “war 
metaphors – whether applied towards other human beings in actual military conflict or to social 
challenges such as drugs, poverty, or disease – always represent a rhetorical choice that minimizes or 
excludes alternative ways of behaving towards worldly challenges” (121).38 Making the “War on 
Alzheimer’s” all the more literal, in 2011 Congress authorized $15 million to the U.S. Department of 
Defense in support of research into the long-term consequences traumatic brain injury has on 
military personnel as it pertains to Alzheimer’s disease and other dementias (CDMRP). What 
emerges in the post-9/11 decade is a public discourse in which dementia as an age-related and war-
                                               
36 This rhetoric is commonplace among neuroscientific and biomedical initiatives, for example the research-based 
organization named “UsAgainst Alzheimer’s” (which, compounded, reads as the “USA” against Alzheimer’s) is also 
characterized by patriotic fervor in its red, white, and blue marketing aesthetic and call-to-duty to “fight” Alzheimer’s as 
a “national priority.” 
37 See Otto Santa Ana, Brown Tide Rising: Metaphors of Latinos in Contemporary American Public Discourse (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 2002); Leo R. Chavez, The Latino Threat: Constructing Immigrants, Citizens, and the Nation (Stanford: Stanford 
UP, 2008); and Daniel R. George, Erin R. Whitehouse, and Peter J. Whitehouse, “Asking More of Our Metaphors: 
Narrative Strategies to End the ‘War on Alzheimer’s’ and Humanize Cognitive Aging,” The American Journal of Bioethics 
16.10 (2016): 22-24. 
38 As George and Whitehouse argue further, “for medical conditions rhetorically understood through war metaphors, 
the possibility of absolute victory (i.e. a cure) against a pathophysiological antagonist becomes the explicit goal, and this 
metaphorical positioning of subjects in relation to disease often overshadows less adversarial but no less important 
pursuits such as rehabilitation, basic care, and ecological prevention in public attention and funding” (121). For recent 
discussions on cure see Eunjung Kim, Curative Violence: Rehabilitating Disability, Gender, and Sexuality in Modern Korea 
(Durham: Duke UP, 2017) and Eli Clare, Brilliant Imperfection: Grappling with Cure (Durham: Duke UP, 2017). 
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produced public health issue becomes intertwined with the material effects and language of violent 
social conflict.39 
 Literary texts can be powerful sites to contest and reimagine the antagonizing and alienating 
rhetoric of warfare surrounding mainstream Alzheimer’s treatment and advocacy. Indeed, research-
based Alzheimer’s activism often draws on the apocalyptic and inflammatory rhetoric of homeland 
defense. Consider activist James W. Smith’s speech at the 2008 Alzheimer’s Public Policy Forum 
Candlelight Vigil, in which he warns attendees of the genocidal proportions of Alzheimer’s 
destructive force, staging an urgent plea to “focus our national priorities and get in front of 
Alzheimer’s now”: 
WE cannot let our elected officials stand by and do nothing and allow Alzheimer’s Disease 
to overwhelm us. The next time you are in front of your congressman or senator, ask them 
this question: “If you knew – without a shadow of a doubt – that someone was bringing to 
our shores a biological weapon of mass destruction SO POWERFUL that it would kill 16 
million American citizens in a crippling, relentless and ruthlessly cruel manner – what would 
you be willing to do to stop that from happening?” Not just as an elected leader – but as a 
human being? Because that biological weapon of mass destruction is already here. That 
biological weapon of mass destruction is Alzheimer’s. It has already infected over 5 million 
American citizens – and is attacking a new person every 71 seconds. (“Changing the Wind”; 
emphasis in the original) 
 
Marked by extremist fervency, Smith’s speech draws attention to how the construction of fear 
surrounding Alzheimer’s disease and affected citizens is a convolution of fearful narratives toward 
hostile external forces (the offshore assault, the bioterrorist threat) and the internal menace “already 
here” in the nation (the hidden illegal, the smuggled goods).40 Smith not only constructs an image of 
                                               
39 Anne McGuire traces a similar phenomenon surrounding autism: “In the face of terror, what is required are 
immediate militarized acts of intervention and rehabilitation, invasion and occupation. In the name of life, the figure of 
death must be stopped up, silenced, eliminated at all cost. In this way, the war on autism and the war on terror can—and 
I argue should—be read as continuous biopolitical wars committed to a single aim of defining, preserving, and securing 
the borders of a normative homeland (or liberal versions of it) through the marking out of threatening types that (or 
rather who) require absolute eradication in the name of the life of the whole” (177). See War on Autism: On the Cultural 
Logic of Normative Violence (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2016). 
40 In an ironic twist, Smith himself became fodder for public paranoia regarding hidden threats of a different kind. Smith 
was formerly one of America’s chief “faces of Alzheimer’s” research activism until convicted of fraudulently collecting 
Social Security benefits in 2013 (Browning). The diagnosis of early-onset dementia which conferred Smith with the 
status of authoritative spokesperson turned out to be an elaborate performance of memory loss and behaviors that 
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Alzheimer’s as an enemy using the rhetoric of war, he also espouses an ideology that normalizes 
aggression as the only logical and moral response to any agent perceived as an enemy. The 
perpetuation of this kind of ideology has consequences on how real lives in actual conflict are 
devalued and acted upon. At stake in challenging these metaphors, then, is not just how to better 
approach and support the social challenges that accompany Alzheimer’s care, but also the 
recognition of basic human and social rights of individuals that come under threat during political 
crises and war. As George and Whitehouse suggest,  
 the War on AD may ultimately represent a rhetorical attack on ourselves in much the same 
 way the War on Terror has elicited self-induced anxiety in the public sphere…At stake on 
 the rhetorical battlefield of both wars is what constitutes full personhood in contemporary 
 Western culture, and at what point that status – whether through illicit terrorist actions or 
 unintentional physical and mental decline – is forfeited. (122)  
 
With this context in mind, I want to return to the essay this chapter opens with. What are the 
representational stakes of Schultz’s eliding of the illegal, smuggled goods and smuggler, and person 
with Alzheimer’s, given that both immigration policy and Alzheimer’s diagnosis and treatment have 
been viewed principally through the lens of national security since 9/11? Resonating with George 
and Whitehouse’s question regarding the limits of personhood, Schultz is undoubtedly invested in 
asserting the humanity of her subjects. Linking together the dehumanizing constructs surrounding 
the “illegal alien” and Alzheimer’s disease, Schultz’s essay foregrounds the rhetorical production of 
“the other,” highlighting the violent, metaphorical logic that accompanies any call for the policing 
and eradication of a threat, whether foreign, global, or biological.  
                                               
effectively deceived doctors, neurologists, policy makers, and everyday audiences. As what Ellen Samuels calls a 
“disability con”—“the masquerade of a nondisabled person who deceptively and deliberately performs disability, often 
for material gain” (Fantasies 70). Smith reinforces public suspicions surrounding disability, state parasitism, and the 
unreliability of dementia. Given the public sense of betrayal arising from his appropriation of a demented persona, Smith 




 As a response to the twinned anxieties surround the security of both “national boundaries” 
and “mental borders,” Schultz concludes her essay with a poetic call-to-action:  
A letting go of the boundaries, the borders, of self, of nation, and the respectful entering 
into a more chaotic, less limited, place. Not to imprison mother at home, but to wander with 
her…It’s that ability to witness, to be mindful of, to listen to what is there instead of what 
we want to be there, that enables us to see these wanderers--whether they be sufferers from 
Alzheimer’s or “illegal aliens”--more as themselves and less as what we most fear about 
ourselves. (n.p.) 
 
Schultz’s call to transgress the boundaries of the self, the nation, and the (nursing) home—by 
wandering with the mother with Alzheimer’s—is a compelling precursor to witnessing the lives of 
others and building coalition beyond borders in her other work. For Schultz, doing this kind of work 
in literature requires going beyond normative narrative structures, and she draws from her 
experiences caring for her mother as inspiration. At the end of “Aliens,” Schultz argues, “plasticity is 
the only way to approach such illness,” bringing together the aims of avant-garde and experimental 
writing and Catherine Malabou’s proposition that the altered brain’s “destructive plasticity” is an 
occasion for “creation through the destruction of form” (Malabou qtd. in “Alzheimer’s, Aliens”).41 Schultz 
concludes the essay with two criteria for writing “in the canon of plasticity” or “Demented Lit”: 
To write with plasticity is to do two things: the first is to record the chaos of the disease, of a 
brain that can still—in many cases—generate language, but cannot organize words into 
grammatical phrases…The second is to create a relationship with the reader analogous to 
that between a person with Alzheimer’s and her primary reader, daughter, spouse, friend. 
(To witness a person with Alzheimer’s is to attempt to interpret sometimes uninterpretable 
clues.). (n.p.) 
 
Schultz’s essay is, importantly, a disquisition on her approach to life writing and the aims of its play 
with form. For Schultz the work of writing about her mother is two-fold: it is a project that seeks to 
adequately evoke for readers the act of witnessing the life of a loved one with Alzheimer’s, and also 
a project that aims to give poetic witness to political violence without metaphorically equating the 
                                               
41 For a critique of Malabou see Lucy Burke, “Missing Pieces: Trauma, Dementia, and the Ethics of Reading in Elizabeth 
is Missing,” Dementia and Literature: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, ed. Tess Maginess (New York: Routledge, 2018): 88-102. 
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two. As this chapter will explore, what emerges in Schultz’s life writing projects about Martha is a 
juxtaposition of tensions between capturing the intimacy of personal life and communality of larger 
historical events.  
 To elaborate on the ethics of reading and writing practices that arise from her engagement 
with her mother, Schultz draws on Eileen A. Joy’s concept of “speculative reading”:  
a speculative reading practice might pay more attention to the ways in which any given unit 
of a text has its own propensities and relations that might pull against the system and open it 
to productive errancy (literally, ‘rambling,’ ‘wandering’ -- moments of becoming-stray)… 
literary criticism might re-purpose itself as the mapping of these (often in- and non-human) 
tensions and rifts, as well as of the excess of meanings that might pour out of these 
crevasses, or wormholes. We’ll call this reading for the weird, which is fitting when you 
consider that the word ‘weird’ (traditionally linked to ‘wyrd,’ or ‘fate’) is related to the Old 
English weorðan [‘to become’], rooted in Indo-European *wer- [‘to turn, bend’]. This will 
entail being open to incoherence as well, as one possible route toward a non-routinized un-
disciplinarity that privileges unknowing over mastery of knowledge. (“Weird Reading” 29-30) 
 
I quote Joy at length here because it is useful for thinking about the “weirdness” of juxtapositions 
and openings in Schultz’s earlier work, and how Schultz develops a poetic style that draws upon her 
mother’s Alzheimer’s to lead readers into different speculative “wormholes” of history and 
experience.  
I have opened this chapter with this reflection on the context and implications of Schulz’s 
essay to show how Schultz’s earlier experimental poetic memoirs about her mother posit the 
subversive potential of the person with Alzheimer’s. That person becomes a figure that exposes the 
limits of inclusion to nationhood and challenges the construction of exclusionary geographic and 
human boundaries. What emerges throughout Schultz’s work is the struggle to find an adequate a 
self-conscious search for a different literary form that can dramatize a transgression of these 
borders, resulting in texts that play with and break generic boundaries. The crux of representing 
Alzheimer’s dementia for Schultz’s is using it as a means to “approach the world-as-text as a place 
that is not a fixed home or homeland, rather a home that wanders” (“Alzheimer’s, Aliens”). 
Although no guarantee, the promise of Schultz’s poetics is to foster for readers a sense of 
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interconnection that challenges social and territorial demarcations that establish both biomedical and 
political border regimes.42 
Building on Chapter 1’s concern with dementia as a formal and ethical resource for thinking 
through legacies of disaster and personal loss, this chapter expands on issues surrounding the use of 
dementia as a literary-aesthetic style to engage with the representational challenges of narrating 
global politics and temporalities of injustice. In this chapter, I track the poetics and politics of 
dementia that develops over the course of Schultz’s life narrative project on Martha, consisting of 
Dementia Blog (2008) and its sequel, “She’s Welcome to Her Disease” [Dementia Blog, Volume Two] (2013), 
which also emerged from blog posts that were taken down and then heavily edited into a book that 
ends with Martha’s death. Leaving the blog format of first volume behind, the Volume Two is an 
eclectic collection of experimental poems, short essays, and vignettes. Reviewer Fred Wah describes 
it as a work that “gestures through theatre, choreography, poetry, medical, critical, and philosophical 
exposition, and yet manages to shape this all into an accessible and engaging journal” (Vol 2 n.p.). I 
read this pair of multi-genre texts as works that enact a fluid space for empathetic connections 
across geopolitical borders, historical contexts, and marginalized life experiences to collide.  
The first volume of Dementia Blog originated during the summer of 2006, when Schultz began 
keeping an informal travel weblog for family and friends. The blog took a turn in August when 
Schultz arrived in northern Virginia to visit Martha’s home, becoming an experimental “poetic prose 
project” about the processes of her Alzheimer’s.43 What became published in print as Dementia Blog 
in 2008 are the series of entries Schultz wrote between August 1, 2006 and January 3, 2007, 
                                               
42 I am drawing from Gesa Lindemann’s conception of biomedicine as a “new border regime” that makes demarcations 
around life and death. See “Medicine as Practice and Culture: The Analysis of Border Regimes and the Necessity of a 
Hermeneutics of Physical Bodies” Biomedicine as Culture: Instrumental Practices, Technoscientific Knowledge, and New Modes of Life, 
eds. Regula Valérie Burri and Joseph Dumit (New York: Routledge, 2007): 6-47. 
43 Susan M. Schultz, Dementia Blog (San Diego: Singing Horse Press, 2008): 8. Subsequent citations appear in parentheses 
abbreviated as DB Vol. 1.  
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documenting the changing relationship with her mother and their unpredictable interactions through 
a series of fragmented, detailed notes. Schultz structures the narrative loosely around entries that 
chronicle telephone calls, trips to Martha’s home, visits to prospective Alzheimer’s care facilities, and 
the events of Martha’s relocation into the latter. Each entry of the blog also indexes events from the 
world beyond of the walls of the care facility. Key events from the unfolding U.S. invasion of Iraq 
and the Bush administration’s War on Terror bleed into the narrative. News discourse such as LA 
Times and Washington Post headlines, CNN reports, White House debriefs, political commentary, and 
remarks from then-President George W. Bush punctuate text. What emerges in Susan’s notes is a 
bricolage catalogue of seemingly disparate yet interlinked legacies of war and occupation across the 
globe. Schultz’s project to narrate her mother’s life and the processes of her dementia is thus 
embedded in her engagement with the media that surrounds her and her mother. Throughout the 
text Susan also foregrounds Martha’s reactions to the news and experiences hallucinations of being 
in the Middle East. These moments take on particular significance when read alongside Martha’s 
own traumatic wartime experiences that surface in the narrative, and most saliently at the end of 
Volume Two. The broad aim of this chapter, then, is to explore the convergence of the subjective 
histories of dementia and war that Schultz sets up in the diaristic mode of the experimental blog as it 
unfolds retrospectively, out of chronological order, and in a deliberately confusing manner.  
In the Foreword to the first volume of the printed book Schultz guides readers’ in how they 
might understand their confusion in reading the blog: first, it operates to capture the confusion of 
Martha’s dementia, and second, it reflects the American public’s reception of deceptively confusing 
politics surrounding the reality of violence saturating the post-9/11 landscape, particularly with 
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respect to the rhetoric used by the Bush administration to justify the preemptive strike against Iraq 
in 2003 and to sell the Global War on Terrorism:44 
I began to record what I saw. What had seemed awkward about the blog, the way in which 
it’s written forward but read backward, suddenly made sense as a form in which to work on 
the process of memory and forgetting. Whatever is confusing about reading the story 
backward is intended by the form. The confusions offered by the form are similar (or at least 
apt metaphors) to the confusions of dementia.  
 
There is also a political content to this blog. During the time it was written, the Bush 
administration was pushing us closer to the abyss. The administration’s uses of language 
seemed, to this reader, demented. The split between reader and author, between the person 
who suffers (or causes to suffer) and the person who reads about it, forms a significant part 
of my “plot.” (7) 
 
The blog occasions Schultz’s reflections on dementia’s formal representation, which are 
subsequently tied to how politics and global conflict get represented. Susan relies on the known 
reputation of Bush and his administration’s responses to the events of 9/11—their reliance on what 
many scholars have analyzed as a strong rhetorical creation of the “identity” of the “enemy” and a 
“state of emergency”—the moment of exception “that one can witness the rhetorical sovereignty of 
the president” (Maggio 818). Schultz concludes with a dedication of the blog to “my mother’s many 
friends, to my family and to everyone for whom dementia is a family and/or national event,” 
reckoning, “Their losses of memory cause us to lose our loved ones; our loss of memory may cause 
us to lose our nation” (ibid.). The weight dementia carries here is complicated: as much as it is an 
aesthetic resource for Schultz, it also stands in for the “demented,” outrageous unilateralism and 
militarism of Bush administration foreign policy and rhetoric and also serves as a metaphor for the 
potential of a personal-turned-historical forgetting so severe as to destroy the collective future and 
identity of a nation. The blog is thus a place of tensions, and this chapter aims to tease out the 
                                               
44 See Babak Bahador, Jeremy Moses and William Lafi Youmans, “Rhetoric and Recollection: Recounting the George W. 
Bush Administration’s Case for War in Iraq,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 48.1 (2018): 4-26. 
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moments in which dementia takes on meanings and functions that go against the grain of and 
beyond what the Foreword lays out. 
Importantly, in grappling with how to narrate as well as personally cope with the 
“confusions of dementia” she encounters in her increased role as Martha’s caretaker, Schultz centers 
on the relationship between the retrospective mode of reading the blog form and the temporal 
dimensions of Martha’s “memory and forgetting.” Throughout the text, Martha’s confusions are 
foregrounded as a comingling of non-normative temporal reorientations, such as her retreat into 
past memories and inhabitations of multiple realities. I examine Schultz’s formal investment in 
enabling readers to see through the lens of Martha’s embodied temporal experiences, and how they 
are positioned as vantage points to address broader political concerns and histories beyond the 
personal. Thus this chapter asks: (1) why are the connections with war and violence so fundamental 
to the narration of Martha’s dementia, and (2) how does Susan structure Martha’s dementia as a 
productive and important lens through which to show and tell these histories? 
The intermingling of different memories and stories of violence across the globe that emerge 
in Schultz’s works can be productively read alongside Michael Rothberg’s concept of 
“multidirectional memory,” which perhaps serves as a useful intersection for putting disability 
studies perspectives on dementia in dialogue with memory studies and decolonial views on trauma 
theory. Rothberg is interested in “what happens when different histories of extreme violence 
confront each other in the public sphere” (Témoigner 176). In his book, Multidirectional Memory: 
Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization, Rothberg argues: 
the conceptual framework through which commentators and ordinary citizens have 
addressed the relationship between memory, identity, and violence is flawed. Against the 
framework that understands collective memory as competitive—as a zero-sum struggle over 
scarce resources—I suggest we consider memory as multidirectional: as subject to ongoing 
negotiation, cross-referencing, and borrowing: as productive and not privative. […] This 
interaction of different historical memories illustrates the productive, intercultural dynamic 




Rothberg’s asserts that the focus on achieving recognition of one’s individual memory as it is tied to 
one’s individual identity necessarily excludes the memories and identities of others (5). Openness to 
memory’s multidirectionality means calling into question the individual possession of memory and 
acknowledging, 
the borders of memory and identity are jagged; what looks at first like my own property 
often turns out to be a borrowing or adaption from a history that initially might seem foreign 
or distant. Memory’s anachronistic quality—its bringing together or now and then, here and 
there—is actually the source of its powerful creativity, its ability to build new worlds out of 
the materials of older ones. (5) 
 
Susan’s adoption of Martha’s memories and Martha’s inhabitation of a world outside of her physical 
own puts into innovative literary form these productive, fractured borders of memory and identity 
Rothberg points to. Indeed, it is not so much the anachronistic quality of memory as it is the 
experiences of dementia that are the source of Dementia Blog’s creativity and ability to construct an 
interconnected world (and the retainment of the blog form also evokes the connectivity afforded by 
digital communications). Furthermore, Rothberg rejects the assumption “that a straight line runs 
from memory to identity and that the only kinds of memories and identities that are therefore 
possible are ones that exclude elements of alterity and forms of commonality with others” (4-5). 
Rothberg’s rejection of that memory and identity are direct correlates is in line with a disability 
studies perspective on dementia that posits identity is not predicated on one’s normative ability to 
remember.  
Though Rothberg does not elaborate on what “elements of alterity” look like, I think 
Dementia Blog offers an occasion to think about dementia’s alterity as a means of forming 
commonality, enabling Susan to articulate multiple global stories of colonialism, violence, and so 
forth without assigning rigid value judgments and placing them in contest with one another. Or as 
Gabriele Schwab puts it, “It is not so much that our memories come from many directions, but 
rather that they are always already composites of dynamically interrelated and conflicted histories” 
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(30). Even as Dementia Blog puts forth an urgent call to remember many different instances of 
political injury and historical violence—rendering dementia dangerously close to its typical function 
as a rigid cultural metaphor for collective forgetting and the limits of humanity—the text also 
suggests dementia is a lens through which to put conflicted histories into communal perspective and 
space differently, a valid means of engaging with the past. 
Dementia Blog is not a typical Alzheimer’s caregiver narrative which often depicts the tragedy 
of its “sufferers” (as if suffering were the only possible emotion). These narratives often receive 
criticism for amplifying the voice of the caregiver over its subject, reifying the mainstream 
conception of what Arthur Frank calls the dementia patient’s “untellable silence” (101). Nor is the 
work mobilizing dementia in service of a political metaphor for unspeakable trauma as much fiction 
and non-fiction is wont to do. Dementia Blog instead wields the retrospective blog form alongside 
Martha’s embodied temporal experiences—her conflations of past and present and movements 
through spacetime—putting her perspective in the fore. As this chapter will show, Dementia Blog 
memorializes Martha in a way that foregrounds her dementia as a heuristic for thinking about how 
one writes and understands history. Dementia Blog prompts reflection on how dementia can be an 
enabling narrative resource that can bring formal modes of life writing into dialogue. I posit that 
Dementia Blog creates a mode of life writing around dementia that emphasizes vicarious imagination; 
Susan adopts a dementia aesthetic to not simply speak for her mother but to recover and imagine 
her stories. Like Rothberg’s understanding of multidirectional memory, her dementia represents a 
form “remembrance [that] cuts across and binds together diverse spatial, temporal and cultural sites” 
(11). The other voices and histories that emerge across the globe in the narrative thus also work to 
highlight non-Western and minoritized traumas that occupy the margins.  
 As a through line to my exploration of dementia, war, and form in the book, I center my 
analysis around what Schultz names in the first volume “the demented tense” (89). I attempt to 
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theorize what she means by this term, and how it develops over the course of the two volumes to 
name the embodied temporal experiences of Martha’s dementia; an aesthetics of her poetic style and 
narrative technique; as well as a theme that structures the relationship between different histories 
and memories that closely aligns with multidirectional memory. In this way dementia emerges as a 
heuristic device or aid for understanding and writing (life) history. My three guiding foci for 
exploring the demented tense are as followed: 
In the first section, I offer an overview of the differences of form in the two volumes of 
Dementia Blog and what is achieved in telling the story of Martha’s dementia and her wartime 
experiences two different ways. I focus on the formal aspects of the two texts and how they position 
“the demented tense” as a poetic aesthetic. As Michael Davidson suggests in Concerto for the Left 
Hand: Disability and the Defamiliar, “a poetics—as much as a politics—of disability is important: 
because it theorizes the way the poetry defamiliarizes not only language but the body normalized 
within language” (118).  
In addition to a narrative structure, the demented tense is also explored in Dementia Blog in as 
an experiential shift in relational disposition and responsibility. Section two examines how dementia 
transforms Susan and Martha’s mother-daughter relationship, setting up the importance for 
recognizing different ways of relating to each other. Susan’s adoption of her mother’s memories 
(and vice versa) is one aspect of what happens in the demented tense. This undoing and remaking of 
relationships is important because it sets up an ethics of identification and engagement crucial to the 
text’s engagement with other histories distanced by time and place. 
 The third section then looks at how Schultz deploys dementia as a way of understanding 
history by positioning the demented tense as a counter to what she calls “empire’s rigid grammar” 
(DB 1 16). Putting Alzheimer’s somatic experiences and linguistic performances (i.e. hallucination, 
discourse tangentiality, and breaches of grammatical codes) into poetic form, Schultz fashions a 
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critique of “empire’s rigid grammar”: a concept encompassing prescriptive notions of power and 
domination. I track how Dementia Blog frames Martha’s altered perception of events in time as useful 
and legitimate ways of thinking—as well as thinking collectively about the endurance of national 
violence. The connections the demented tense forges functions as a heuristic for understanding 
external histories or violence and war. I also consider how the text also prompts readers to think 
about the limitations its critique. Indeed, in as much as Dementia Blog offers a counternarrative to the 
notion dementia is itself is the war to be fought, it draws on dementia as a metaphor for the 
rhetorical obfuscation wrought by the Bush administration to justify the War on Terror. 
Nevertheless, Dementia Blog takes on the challenges of language and metaphor and the writing of 
another’s experience, offering multiple avenues for critical engagement. Overall, Schultz’s 
experimental writing further throws into relief contemporary literature’s growing investment in 
dementia as a site where the telling of global histories, personal narrative, and generic hybridity meet.  
 
 
Narrative and Aesthetics of “the Demented Tense” 
 
In the first volume, the template of the online diary weblog form aptly stages tensions 
between public and private experience, and the text emerges as a different way to assemble 
knowledge and history. In its reporting of large scale events and seemingly inconsequential personal 
details, Schultz’s diary weblog “offers a context where interpretable elements that would otherwise 
be excluded are retained,” and can be “usefully understood as a mosaic or assemblage” (Cardell 113). 
Much like interpreting the historical and cultural archive in the detritus of Ozeki’s gyres, reading 
Dementia Blog requires acts of excavating the details that are juxtaposed in each entry. Working to 
convey the confusions of dementia in its plethora of spontaneous minutiae and ephemeral 
sequences of connectivity require readers to tune into details they might not ordinarily find 
instructive or consider valuable. The kind of active participation the blog requires puts forth an 
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ethics of reading that counters uncritical consumption of media. Indeed, the text capitalizes on what 
Rebecca Hogan calls the paratactic form of the diary, which operates on the same principal as 
grammatical parataxis, “in which clauses are joined without connectives or with only coordinating 
conjunctions…avoid[ing] establishing transitional connectives that would suggest how the items are 
related” (qtd. in Sorapure 506). Madeleine Sorapure suggests such a form “engages the diary reader 
in assigning significance, and in the absence of transitions, making meaningful connections within 
and across entries” (506). This mode also parallels how Schultz writes about her mother, Martha 
Schultz, whose non-sequiturs, confabulations, and errant forms of communication require equally 
engaged and imaginative interpretation. Thus, the text is an invitation to “read” the life of Martha 
with Alzheimer’s more carefully, paying attention to the gaps between reality and hallucination, the 
possibilities of what can and cannot be adequately represented in certain forms, rational discourse, 
and conventions of language. 
Dementia Blog is in large part a search for the formal features adequate to witness the 
processes of Martha’s Alzheimer’s. Reflecting on the reverse chronological blog form as reading 
backward toward the past instead of forward into the future, Susan makes a suggestive analogy 
between reading the blog, the temporal facet of Martha’s Alzheimer’s, and a time she calls the “the 
demented tense”: 
--If you read what is written as it is published, you read in real time. If you come to it after a 
time, you are reading from the present into the past. You read back into memory, rather than 
toward the future that promises more writing. You read as an old person remembers, if their 
memory works, not yet unspooling what had been the present and past into a new tense. 
The demented tense. (89) 
 
What occurs throughout Dementia Blog is a looping back of the past into the present and future. 
Reading backward into the past, the blog enables readers themselves to travel back and forward in 
time. The picture of time that emerges is less a line than it is a dimensional plane that “folds” into a 
space in which one can turn around and look at the past. This section elaborates on the politics of 
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reading “backward toward the past” that Schultz’s two volume work enacts. In line with disability 
studies critics such as Michael Bérubé, I move beyond a diagnostic reading that might stop at the 
claim that the reverse order of the blog is meant to mimic the confusions or temporality of dementia 
as a reversion in developmental time. Rather, I focus on how the formal qualities of both texts 
express an aesthetics of “the demented tense” that Schultz develops to show what is productive 
about seeing through Martha’s experience.    
As the quote above suggests, the retrospective mode of reading Martha’s life in the blog 
form is the foundation of the text’s inquiries into memory and writing personal history. But Dementia 
Blog is not straightforwardly a blog—and in this section I begin with an overview of the ways the 
text plays with and breaks with from generic conventions of the weblog. Indeed, Dementia Blog’s 
investment in experimenting with form and generic hybridity makes it a rich site for exploring what 
Schultz explains to be a “place of paradoxes”45—it’s balancing of individual experience with broader 
social issues; local and global histories; the tensions between remembering and forgetting. The text 
intertwines the diaristic mode of the blog and experimental poetry as a life writing medium, which 
automatically liberates Schultz from having to write about memories in the constraints of coherent, 
linear form.46  
The first volume of Dementia Blog preserves the interface of its Blogger software packaging. It 
retains characteristics of the weblog genre of life writing through discrete posts as its fundamental 
organizing unit; date, time, and posted-by stamps; and other details such as the archive of previous 
posts titles. By doing so Schultz presents to readers a what appears to be a raw, unedited glimpse of 
her “obsessively-kept record” (DB Vol. 2 132) structured around regular visits to Martha’s home and 
                                               
45 Susan M. Schultz, “She’s Welcome to Her Disease” [Dementia Blog, Volume Two] (San Diego: Singing Horse Press, 2013): 
132; subsequent citations appear in parenthesis, abbreviated as DB Vol. 2.  
46 See Julia Novak, “Introduction,” Experiments in Life-Writing eds. Lucia Boldrini and Julie Novak (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2017): 1-36. 
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trips to prospective Alzheimer’s care facilities. Each post is comprised of fragmented content in 
paragraph/list form delineated by two dashes. Despite what straightforwardness the interface may 
intimate, the text is decidedly disorienting as the content wanders in a rogue mode. “Apologies: this is 
out of sequence” one post begins, a caveat that rings true for the entire text (109). An entry may dated 
“August 16, 2006,” but as it scrolls through disjointed declarative statements and reflections on the 
past, this date only loosely anchors readers, if at all. Encompassing a range of historical and present 
moments—whether factual, manipulated, or hallucinatory—each entry seems to transcend or make 
irrelevant the date of its timestamp, as Susan observes, “The blog assigns my entries a time, but it is 
always wrong” (31). Pairing the disjunction between historical date and Martha’s impaired sense of 
time, Dementia Blog critiques generic and discursive impositions of chronology over histories not yet 
past. 
As a whole, the blog reads as a catalog of tangents; the notes connect thematically at random 
intervals and at others seemingly not at all. Because the content in each entry is often arranged non-
chronologically, and the entries themselves read from end to beginning, readers often lack reference 
points for who the subjects in the post even are. Added confusion is created in the haphazard 
dispersal of italicized direct quotations from Martha, Susan (by which I mean Schultz as the 
narrator), other people at the nursing home, and reportage overheard on the nursing home 
television. The demented tense as a poetic aesthetic carries more critical purchase than a 
conventional narrative structure and trajectory because it brings together disparate stories and plural 
readings of them. 
Notably, news of key events from the War on Terror intrude on the narrative. Part of what 
makes Dementia Blog confusing is readers must traverse Susan’s criticisms and observations of war 
alongside details of Martha’s life; as I will show, these two tracks are deliberately inseparable rather 
than merely tangential. The entry of “Monday, October 16, 2006,” for example, indexes the day of 
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Army Lieutenant Colonel Steven Jordon’s hearing in the Abu Ghraib torture and prison scandal. As 
Susan records in the entry,  
--The congressman says Abu Ghraib was a “sex ring.” The commentator says they were 
fraternity pranks. At least no one died, one said of the anti-pedophile pedophile’s acts. 
Instant messaging makes a text of sex. My master’s eyes are nothing like this screen. (39) 
 
Here Susan offers how media reportage reinforces politicians’ denial of rape, murder, humiliation, 
and torture—evacuating the photographs that emerged from Abu Ghraib of their brutality. The 
fantasy and practice of violence at Abu Ghraib by members of the U.S. Army is transformed into 
pornographic entertainment in the same way sexting transformed living bodies into digital form.47 
More significantly, it is the “administration’s uses of language”—the rhetorical choices of the Bush 
Administration and power to define “a state of exception”—that “helped create a reality where the 
disturbing pictures of the mistreatment at Abu Graihb [sic] can coexist alongside the persistent belief 
that the United States still has moral responsibilities and duties in the world. The actions at Abu 
Graihb [sic] and the corresponding images are the fruits sown from the seeds of Bush’s post-9/11 
rhetoric” (Maggio 818-819).48 Parodying a line from Shakespeare’s “My Mistress’ Eyes Are Nothing 
Like The Sun,” Susan concludes the note with the ensorceling pull of the voices and images of 
digital media, or in the context of mediatized war, the power of what James Der Derian calls the 
“military–industrial–media–entertainment complex.”49 In its constant relay of news, Dementia Blog 
critiques what scholars have described as the “failure of news media and political institutions to 
check presidential war making” and state power since “public recollection of the substance of the 
                                               
47 See Judith Butler, “Torture and the Ethics of Photography,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 25 (2007): 
951-66.  
48 On the Bush administration’s discursive distancing of accountability for the torture at Abu Ghraib and the visual 
representation and claims to legitimacy in the administration’s War on Terror, see Laura J. Shepherd, “Visualising 
Violence: Legitimacy and Authority in The ‘War on Terror’” Critical Studies on Terrorism 1.2 (2008) 213-226. 
49 See Virtuous War: Mapping The Military- Industrial-media-entertainment Network (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001). 
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official case for war is incomplete, filtered by years of critical commentary, media revision, 
apologetics, and selective memory” (Bahador et al. 4).50  
 Where does Martha’s dementia fit in with the narrative’s mobilization of news? A cursory 
reading might suggest that Martha’s life is positioned as removed from these current events, unable 
to think rationally or reflect on them. As Susan writes in a later entry, “In her [Martha’s] year of 
forgetting,…[i]n her year of assuming new facts, she forgave the president his lies (he’s not so bad; 
don’t be so hard on him!)” (16). However, I suggest that Susan captures moments in which Martha is 
deeply engaged with the current events around her, in a different way. In the same entry on Abu 
Ghraib, Susan observes and captures Martha’s hallucinatory entanglements with global events 
(bombings in Iraq): 
--She kept breaking down. She said it was nerves, but each time her voice broke she’d said 
the word “Iraq.” We live in space but we feel most deeply in our sound. The quaver of her 
voice altered our positions in the room. We moved forward and then away, as if she were 
the murderousness she decried. Dead from injuries sustained when a roadside bomb 
exploded next to his convey. We are told of a place. But we are told in words. The sound of 
after-shock. It’s coming again, I feel it. (38) 
 
Throughout Dementia Blog, entries like this position Susan as a kind of “on the ground” reporter to 
her mother’s hallucinations, reinforced by her frequent shifts to present tense and sense-oriented 
descriptions. Blogging reportage on the news works to anchor Susan’s entries in a sense of “real-
time,” demarcating the precise moments when private and public intersect when news media is 
consumed. But Martha’s dementia adds another layer of immediacy to the news overheard on the 
television as she reacts to the noise of roadside bomb explosions as if she were there. Martha’s voice 
alters “positions in the room” as she mediates the news through her performance and hallucination 
                                               
50 On the immediacy of the diary form and coverage of the Iraq conflict see Cardell “The Ethics of Being There and 
Seeing: Thomas Goltz, Paul McGeough, and the Journalist’s Diary of War,” Dear World: Contemporary Uses of the Diary 
(Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2014): 50. 
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within it, pulling Susan and readers into peculiarly close and immediate positions of witnesses to 
distance violence.  
At the formal level, readers encounter notes within entries that take up the characteristics of 
dementia’s discourse tangentiality, and these tangents take readers from concerns of the nation and 
to the nursing home. The post of “Monday, August 14, 2006,” for example, concludes with the 
escalating US-Iran nuclear crisis: 
--Sy Hersh writes that Beirut is a test drive for Iran. They made their case to Cheney, and 
Bush followed quickly behind, then Condi. They will claim victory for Israel; they will bomb 
Iran. Anyone opposed to administration policy supports terrorist. Hallucination behind the 
eye. The birth of a new Middle East. Truck plastered with images of abortion, a child’s 
translucent head, mass of blood without breath. These are images no one in this country has 
seen of Lebanon, Iraq.  
No leader of the Khmer Rouge has faced a court of law. 
 
--Email from Karen: Mom slept. (93-4) 
 
The allusion to the false choices facing the Bush administration (bomb Iran or allow it to acquire a 
nuclear bomb) and the binary logic of supporting terrorists if opposed to “administration policy” are 
juxtaposed with “images of abortion” and a reference to the aftermath of violence in Susan’s 
adopted son’s country of birth (Cambodia). As each entry and note wanders across temporal and 
geographic boundaries, moving from the future tense of prospective decisions to bomb Iran to the 
oft-denied, vastly undocumented Cambodian genocide, Susan records the haphazard yet connected 
unfolding of timeless violence.51 In an interview with Gillian Parrish, Schultz commented on the 
fragmentary nature of this passage in particular: 
Hard to say in retrospect how one of those led to the next and then the next, whether simple 
as being there, or as narrative leading from bad politics to the care of one person for 
another. Karen was the social worker at an agency in northern Virginia who was point 
                                               
51 The genocide occurred at the height of non-interventionism and post-Vietnam syndrome and was denied by both 
members of the U.S. government and anti-war and humanitarian activists; see Michael Haas, Genocide by Proxy: Cambodia 
Pawn on a Superpower Chessboard (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991) and Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America 
and the Age of Genocide (New York: Harper Collins, 2002). The U.S.’s commitment to pursing justice for the victims of the 
genocide was not formally signaled until the 1994 signing of the Cambodian Genocide Justice Act. In 2013 Cambodian 
lawmakers approved a bill making it illegal to deny war crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge regime during the 1970s, 
echoing laws against Holocaust denial in European countries.  
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person for my mother when she still lived at home, but couldn’t deal with everyday life. 
These ways in which care moves between daughter and daughter surrogate (Karen reminded 
me of one of my cousins, down to a very similar name) are also intriguing to me.” (n.p.) 
 
Dementia Blog is a poetic memoir about her mother’s Alzheimer’s—and about war—but not in way it 
a reader would ordinarily expect. Rather than attempting to fit fragments of history into a narrative 
of cause-and-effect the narrative is fluid, and events are as “simple as being there.” Susan’s poetics 
of dementia, as “bricolage” and “collage,” are where contexts and lives meet (132). This is different 
from the typical dementia narrative that employs Alzheimer’s as a convenient political metaphor that 
ultimately culminates symbolically in incoherence or meaninglessness.52 For Susan, setting down 
these disjointed juxtapositions force readers to make unexpected connections between dementia, 
history, and politics: 
--She says my life sounds fragmentary. I say fragments must be set down to see where their 
edges meet 
… 
--Radhika makes her own connect-the-dots pictures. Which come first, lines or dots? In 
desert country, there are dots for cities, very few river lines. Anbar Province: 11 Americans 
killed yesterday by IEDs that can pierce a tank’s skin 
… 
-- To avoid fragments, join together mother’s pneumonia with the IEDs in Anbar  
(DB Vol. 1 26-27) 
 
What does it mean to join Martha’s pneumonia with the Iraq War in Anbar Province, the former 
heartland of the Sunni insurgency? The piercing image of shrapnel fragments from IEDs or 
improvised explosive devices—one of the defining weapons of the Al Anbar campaign—stands in 
stark opposition to the domestic details of Martha’s common nursing home-acquired respiratory 
infection. But it is precisely this disjunction between personal and public spheres that Dementia Blog 
                                               
52 For example, Don DeLillo’s Falling Man juxtaposes patients in an Alzheimer’s home with the protagonists’ reactions to 
9/11. According to Heike Hartung, both the terrorist attacks and Alzheimer’s “read as metaphors for the end of 
individual agency and responsibility,” a dissolution of language and narrative order that “dissolve into incoherence and 




suspends readers in a kind of dislocated present, constructing a present reality imaginatively out of 
fragments of remembrance. 
Like web diaries written in war zones by citizens, Dementia Blog “link[s] the national events of 
the world with personal perceptions, hence incorporating historic time within the spaces of self 
expression,” and reads as a “private narrative in a public space [that] challenges the temporality of 
war as well as the linearity of historicity” (Ibrahim). But Schultz also employs the blog form for its 
limits, and the presence of narrating dementia time pushes those limits even further. Schultz’s use of 
the blog, then, also draws on and challenges assumptions about “diary writing as more authentic, 
more intimate, and more ‘real’ than other kinds of autobiographical representation” (Cardell 9). 
Figuring the person with Alzheimer’s as a witness to alternative versions of history and reality of 
critical value to one’s own sense of the world, Schultz attempts to expand what a “more real” 
account of personal life and violent history might look like. Schultz takes on the promise of the blog 
as a democratic form of public commemoration, expression, and history making, experimenting with 
what that history can look like when poetically rendered through the vantage point of her mother’s 
dementia (which I explore more fully in the next sections). At many times, the disjointed, 
“demented” poetic style of Susan’s narrating “I” melds with the disorienting narrative inventions of 
Martha’s dementia. The text uses this merged “eye” of dementia as a different, if not experimental, 
means of narrating global conflict, which has always already been distorted by media. As Gillian 
Whitlock writes in Soft Weapons: Autobiography in Transit, there has always been a “‘conspiracy’ 
between the military and the television camera…effac[ing] the materiality of places, the presence of 
the natural world, and the corporeality of bodies; the [Iraq] war was presented to its audience ‘as live 
yet distant, instantaneous yet remote, as dramatically real yet reassuringly televisual’” (29). Returning 
to Susan’s critical stance toward news media coverage of American politics and its role in shaping 
national forgetting, it becomes clearer that Susan adopts her mother’s hallucinations in the narrative 
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to dramatize a different, felt viewpoint of war that is neither predicated on the “real” or the 
“televisual.” 
It is important to read Dementia Blog in the context of Schultz’s engagements with war 
because it provides an important context for the life narrative Schultz builds around her mother 
Martha. Throughout Dementia Blog Martha has particular reactions to news reports on the War in 
Iraq and experiences hallucinations that place her in Afghanistan (which I will explore more in the 
later part of the chapter). For Schultz these are moments of importance that deserve recognition 
because they are not just Martha being irrational, they are moments in which she feels there—and 
there is an ethical obligation to witnessing this experience. Furthermore, these are moments which 
we can learn things about how war is represented and experienced and part of Schultz’s political 
critique. What makes this all the more complicated is that readers do not get a full sense of how 
important Martha’s relationship to war is until the end of the second volume of the blog. To get to 
this we need to read backward into Martha’s life, “in the demented tense.” 
In the first volume, Martha’s experience with war is limited to one parenthetical aside when 
her son-in-law Bryant asks about her experiences abroad: “--What was Africa like? Bryant asks mom. 
Can’t say that in one sentence. I’ll let you have three. It was very pleasant. (She was there during the second 
World War, told stories of ducking in ditches to avoid bombs, of seeing a dead body in a trash can.)” 
(128-129). Early in the second volume of the blog, readers get a glimpse into this history but it is not 
clear whose it is due to the non-sequitur nature of the entry in the form of a play:  
Act One: 10 a.m. … 
A vicious German defense brought the Allied advance to a halt at a Casino. People say I look 10 years 
younger; I look 10 years younger.  





Fact and fiction blur together here as performance, history, and experience collide. It is not until the 
end of the second volume of Dementia Blog that readers learn about Martha’s actual traumatic 
wartime experiences in North Africa and Europe.  
The very last entry of Volume Two ends with comparatively lengthy entry, a seven-page elegy 
to Martha. This final entry operates as meta-commentary on pressure of the blog and what it could 
and could not tell. This delayed recognition caused by the backward unfolding of the blog invites 
retrospection on where the displacement of Martha’s private, unarticulated war memories fit into the 
overall project. Her hallucinatory involvement in Afghanistan may be a resurfacing of traumatic 
memories—readers cannot be sure—but nevertheless her experience of war stands outside of 
officially sanctioned historical narratives as a means of criticizing the truth status assigned to such 
narratives.53 Having been focused on her dementia, Susan reveals what the blog did not tell of her 
mother’s life, beginning with her wartime experiences:  
It did not tell how she invaded Italy with the US Army (in her function as administrator of 
entertainment to US troops), how she witnessed battles, met men who never came back 
from their own bombing raids, got a pair of small combat boots from one of the “Neecy 
boys” of the 442nd.  
 
It did not tell of the time she was driving a truck—later she would say, you know I drove a 
truck in the War—and thought she’d run over a child.  
 
It did not tell of her experience of the Battle of the Bulge, or of how she was at Dachau 
when it was liberated, of how it took her several days to even know what she had seen--all 
the bodies on the train cars, bodies everywhere, men in pajamas making shelters for 
themselves out of anything they found around them. (133)  
 
Martha’s fading sense of the atrocities she witnessed during World War II embodies the transition 
from personal memory to collective memory of national history. Martha’s inability to remember 
World War II marks the erosion of personal memory as it is tied more broadly to historical memory. 
                                               
53 The concluding chapter in Susan Faludi’s memoir In the Darkroom presents a more explicit example of this kind of 
case. Faludi describes how the traumatic histories of her father’s past as a Jewish fugitive in Holocaust Budapest 
“flooded into every synapse” in his late life with dementia (407). 
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The absence of Martha’s wartime stories is echoed in the loss of those from “men who never came 
back,” as well as the loss of the last eyewitnesses to World War II. Susan mentions Martha’s boots 
from the “Neecy boys” (a misnomer for ‘Nisei’) of the 442nd Regimental Combat Team comprised 
of second-generation Japanese Americans from Hawaii and the mainland United States, but the 
story behind this picture is brief, as are the other mentions of Battle of the Bulge and the Liberation 
of Dachau. Dementia Blog’s investment in Martha’s dementia more broadly raises the issue of—what 
happens when the last eyewitnesses to the history of the nation are gone, and how does this effect 
and play into the legacies and cycles of current and future wars? As senior editor of the New York 
Times Patrick Lyons comments, “a time always comes when the very last veterans of a war pass 
away, and [their deaths] relegate the cataclysm they saw with their own eyes to the bloodless 
abstraction of recorded history” (n.p.). More importantly, the text negotiates how to reconceptualize 
the popular deployment of dementia as a negative, political metaphor for the loss of collective 
memory. 
The focus of Dementia Blog is not the failure and doom of Martha’s personal forgetting. The 
burden of remembering does not fall on the survivor (Martha) but rather on Susan. Indeed, the text 
ends up focusing on Susan’s position as a caretaker—specifically of the postwar generation—and 
the obligation to remember and tell that entails. Dementia Blog does share with other dementia and 
postgeneration narratives a signature anxiety over the of loss of stories and first-hand witnesses to 
war. Though Dementia Blog originates as an “obsessively-kept record that memorialized her [Martha’s] 
forgetting,” (Vol 2 132), it also about the desire to and impossibility of reconstructing and accessing 
Martha’s past, particularly her history of having lived through World War II.   
With this culminating outpour of Martha’s wartime details, Susan’s narrative is productively 
read alongside the framework of Marianne Hirsch’s work on postmemory, describing “the 
relationship that ‘the generation after’ bears to the personal, collective, and cultural trauma of those 
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who came before” (5). Hirsch’s coinage of postmemory as a deeply familial phenomenon emerged 
as a term to describe her own relationship to her parents’ stories of survival during World War II (4); 
it describes a connection to the past that is “actually mediated not by recall but by imaginative 
investment, projection, and creation…It is to be shaped, however indirectly, by traumatic fragments 
of events that still defy narrative reconstruction and exceed comprehension. These events happened 
in the past, but their effects continue into the present” (5).  
Revisionary narratives of dementia strongly resonate with the concepts of postmemory, but a 
more distinction term is needed describe the relationship I observe throughout many of the texts 
this dissertation explores: that is, the relationship between the caretaker as part of a “generation 
after” and a parent with dementia, whose dementing memories of traumatic and everyday events 
overwhelm the aesthetic structure of the text and are adopted into their own narrative and 
memory.54 So when Susan says, in the first volume, “I called, I became her memory. She has not lost 
hers; it’s been given to me to hold. So much have I forgotten that now I cannot call back” (60), I 
take this to be representative of the postgeneration conundrum Hirsch describes as “growing up 
with overwhelming inherited memories, to be dominated by narratives that preceded one’s birth…to 
risk having one’s own life stories displaced, even evacuated, by our ancestors” (5). The difference 
here is that it is the inheritance of memories Susan is tasked with holding—memories that 
overwhelm her so she “cannot call back”—begins at a later stage in her adult life, and these 
memories have more to do with the person with dementia’s forgetting, hallucinations, etc. (inherited 
memories aren’t necessarily more “real” anyway) and the realities of caregiving. Yet what I am trying 
to describe also departs from postmemory in that “the postgeneration” or “the generation after” 
(second-generation and beyond) can be characterized as either knowing too much or knowing little 
                                               
54 Marlene Goldman mentions postmemory briefly in regard to John Mighton’s Half Life, see Forgotten: Narratives of Age-
Related Dementia and Alzheimer’s Disease in Canada (Chicago: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2017). 
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about what actually happened. It is the occasion of dementia unsettling the narrator’s outlook on (family) 
history and memory that prompts the narrator to excavate and preserve that history and memory of 
the experiences of their antecedents, such as in Lisa Appignanesi’s Holocaust survival memoir Losing 
the Dead (addressed in the Introduction) and Dana Walrath’s work on the Armenian Genocide and 
her mother’s Alzheimer’s (the subject of the Chapter 3). These kinds of narratives often ask the 
person with dementia if they “remember the war” or their traumatic history, which sometimes can 
raise ethical questions about whether one should trigger remembering for the sake of preserving the 
past.55 
The postgeneration of dementia (for lack of a better term) is characterized by its investment 
in imagination, projection, and creation, in ways similar and also different from the postmemory 
generation’s “intersubjective transgenerational space of remembrance,” or a sort of “retrospective 
witnessing by adoption” (Hirsch 221). Indeed, dementia is what inaugurates the auto/biographical 
stories in the texts I explore, and it is the link between generation of witnesses and survivors and 
“the generation after.” As the previous chapter explored, A Tale for the Time Being’s long, non-linear 
narrative arc from World War II to the War in Iraq surfaces in and around the narrative’s “temporal 
stutters” of dementia. And Nao, like Ozeki, is a second-generation Japanese-American who had 
family interned during World War II, sharing with Susan a common call to yoke together traumatic 
pasts and violent histories.  
Overall, the knowledge gained about Martha’s past at the end of volume two renders the 
background noise of war over the news more palpable; it enables readers to go back to the first 
volume and consider Martha’s relationship to war in a different way—as essential to her past and 
                                               
55 Raquel Medina has discussed this “detective work” of recovering personal and collective memory in Spanish 
documentary films about reconstructing the lives of their loved ones with dementia in the context of the Spanish Civil 
War. Her work in progress on El Tiempo Suspendedido (2015), a documentary on the Dirty War in Argentina by the 
granddaughter of a survivor with dementia, critiques how the film forgets the personhood of the survivor in its 
manipulation and showcasing of her memory loss for the sake of remembering the war. 
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present rather than merely in tangent to it. Dementia Blog is about the continuity of war across a 
continuum of crisis that stretches, at the very least, from the beginning of World War II to the War 
in Iraq. The entanglement of Martha in the War in Iraq is made most strikingly clear in an entry 
titled, “Toward a Documentary Poem about Alzheimer’s Care and the Carlyle Group” in Volume 
Two. In this entry Susan pieces together bits of news from December 21, 2007, in which the global 
private equity firm The Carlyle Group announce its acquisition of ManorCare, the nursing home 
chain in which Martha’s residence of Arden Courts resides. Readers learn “The American based 
Carlyle Group is heavily involved in supplying arms to the Coalition forces fighting in the Iraqi 
war”—a line excerpted from a Portugal News report. This is juxtaposed with scenes of negligence due 
to a diverting of funds from care: 
A dementia patient was raped by another resident in July but wasn’t taken to a hospital for 
more than 24 hours, a state investigation found (10/2007)  
… 
David Regan, the union’s president, said private equity firms that buy nursing-home chains 
commonly reduce staffing to increase profits, causing residents to suffer  
… 
On my last visit, I noticed that the place was under-staffed and the caregivers were highly 
stressed. There were a lot of little crises and not enough caregivers to watch over everyone. 
(53) 
 
 The suggestion in this entry is that Martha’s life is inextricable from the War in Iraq, her place of 
residence is networked to actors that have power over her quality of care. It is also ironic that 
dementia care is more intimately tied to the war than it seems. As I mentioned briefly in the 
introduction, in wake of the War on Terror the US Department of Defense has become increasingly 
invested in dementia research as related to traumatic brain injury (TBI) due to the profound use of 
IEDs. As George and Whitehouse note, 
TBI inflict[s] structural and functional damage that weaken one’s cognitive reserve, leaving 
the brain less resilient to age-related processes (i.e. further neuronal loss, oxidative stress, 
inflammation, altered glucose metabolism, and vascular damage, etc.) over time. Therefore, 
upstream neurological and psychological damage wrought by the War on Terror will be felt 
in the dementia care field for decades to come. Not only must countries allied in the War on 
Terror provide appropriate healthcare coverage for affected veterans, communities will need 
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to adapt to increasing numbers of persons who may experience the challenges of dementia 
earlier in their lifespan. (125) 
 
Although larger global crises threaten to overshadow the “little crises” of the nursing home, Susan 
brings them visibility together in the narrative of Dementia Blog. We might recall the passage I 
discussed earlier in which Susan reports of IEDs exploding in Al Anbar alongside the Martha’s 
nursing home acquired pneumonia as an illustration of this. So while the incursions of global politics 
through news media and war commentary overcrowd the first volume and seem tangential to 
Martha’s experience (appearing as literal background noise in the nursing home), by reading 
backward into Martha’s past in the second volume, we can see more clearly how these are all 
interconnected. Despite how tangled the rhetoric of the “war on terrorism” and the “War on AD” 
are, Dementia Blog approaches Martha’s life story and dementia in a way that goes beyond “anguish 
towards persons affected by memory loss” and the expected “rhetoric of battle and victory” (George 
and Whitehouse 122, 121).  
Even as Susan expresses how the blog “did not tell how her [Martha’s] life was woven in 
with historical time, how one woman wandered through wars” (Vol 2 136), I suggest that taking 
these two texts together elicits a model of reading forward and backward across time that allows 
readers to see otherwise. Central to Dementia Blog’s narrative inquiry around dementia is not only an 
ethics of reading but also a relational ethics: Susan’s relationship with Martha in her dementia—and 
Martha’s own changing sense of relationships to others—has much to teach readers about their own 
relationship to others. 
 
Dementing Relationality, Engendering Responsibility 
Expanding on the meaning of “the demented tense” in Dementia Blog [Volume Two], Susan 
writes, “Dementia offers us the conditional, the provisional tense, the not-present or not-past or 
not-future tense. Invent a new tense for those who have forgotten you. It changes you, to be 
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forgotten so” (21). If tense structure is a blueprint for a particular way of locating an orientation in 
time, expressing the temporal relation between one or more situations, the demented tense maps out 
contingency, possibility, conjecture, and wonder in both senses of the word. What might be 
achieved in narrating what happens in the liminal, in-between temporality of Martha’s dementia, and 
Susan’s intimate witness to it? In her invention of the concept of the “demented tense,” Susan 
positions forgetting not as an absolute loss of connection with her mother but an undoing and 
remaking of relationships, producing openings (or “wormholes,” recalling Joy from the 
introduction) for meaning-making and ethical reflection. The altered perception of family 
relationships and history is not only experienced by Martha, but Susan as well, as she adopts and 
embraces her mother’s point of view. What emerges in the text, then, is Susan’s sense of 
responsibility and obligation as a caregiver to recognize Martha’s hallucinations as conscious 
experiences that carry meaning. The narrative challenges readers too, to embrace the dementing 
quality of these relationships, to reevaluate the definition of irrationality often attributed to such 
confusions. This section explores how the narrative asks readers to take part in a shared sense of 
responsibility for the stories of others and interchange them with their own—as Susan and Martha 
do—an act of ethical consequence in an increasingly globalized yet divided world. Schultz is not just 
concerned with mimicking or describing effects of memory impairment, but engendering sense of 
unfamiliar connection with and obligation to the recognition of other histories and narratives. 
 Many of the posts in Dementia Blog track the recurrence of Martha searching for her mother. 
These are moments in which Martha moves about her surroundings, moments of liveliness: 
--To tell her the truth only agitates her. Your mother is dead, mom, doesn’t work, because later 
she comes back into mind, alive in her being missing. (92) 
 
--She looks around the house for her mother; asks the caregiver where her mother has gone. 




In her search Martha traverses not only space but also time, as Susan likens Martha’s new sense of 
family history to that of unrelenting time travel, intensely kinetic and incommensurable in language:  
--Her mother lives in the future; she has gone but can perhaps be found…The old woman, 
my mother, folds her past into future. Where we see her future as a short space, she knows it 
goes as far as her mother has traveled. It’s been days since she left, and those days are in the 
past. But the worry that summons her into presence…keeps going forward, which is back, 
which is only not still. This is no bridge into time; it is a train in the tunnel that has forgotten 
to stop. It is the blur of movement without the subtitles, or even the original, if 
unintelligible, tongue. (91) 
 
Martha’s experience of “going forward, which is back” is an embodied form of the “demented 
tense” Susan has emphasized to be a part of the blog’s form. This is one of several passages in 
which Susan draws attention to the way readers relate to time differently than her mother. While 
readers “see her future as a short space” but her mother’s dementia brings “past into future” which 
enables her sense of real connection with her dead mother (Susan’s grandmother). This happens at a 
formal level of grammatical indeterminacy throughout the texts in which it is not clear who 
she/her/I refers to at many moments in the text. For example, in one note, Susan writes, “(her 
mother has gone for three days). The evasions must be mine, not hers. They must exist only in the 
composition. She will be composed, whether she is she or I” (83). 
Crucially, what happens in the demented tense is a folding of time that reverses the familiar 
sense of relationship between mother and child. Susan observes Martha becoming her mother 
(“Shown a photograph of herself…2 or 3 years ago…she doesn’t recognize herself. That’s my mother, 
she says” [128]), while Susan and Martha become intertwined. A sense of responsibility emerges for 
Susan as well, to enter into the demented tense and also search for Martha’s mother: “My mother’s 
mother is stronger than her daughter’s imagination. She is. And she is missing. And I’ve been tasked 
with finding her” (96). 
What is the significance of the time travel that occurs in the demented tense, what does it 
mean that Susan and her mother become entangled with one another? Martha’s dementia is 
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positioned not only a loss of memories; her disorientation in time and place is narrated by Susan as a 
gaining of a past that is not hers, which opens up to wider histories. Consider these two passages in 
which Susan describes Martha and her histories becoming one: 
-- Figures of speech. Something having to do with two facts becoming a single invented 
irreality. She remembers her past, but forgets that it is hers. She has forgotten my past, 
replaced it with hers. It does not quite fit, and yet it cannot quite fit, either. When she sees 
that the car is gone, she asks, where’s Pa? That was our past, yes. The one I remember. (120) 
 
--She often confuses us. She told Bryant I was born in 1917, which is her birth year. She was 
born on the day of one of the Russian Revolutions. She tells me now that I went away to 
school when I was a child. I wonder what happens to her past, once it becomes mine. (124) 
 
Susan becomes a kind of surrogate of her mother’s memory and thus becomes her, while Martha’s 
forgetting leads the memories of Susan to become her. In these exchanges of memory, the text 
prompts us to ask readers to suspend ‘authentic’ memory-based connection, making room for 
connections in spaces of memory that cannot quite fit with what is logical. By insisting memory is 
something that can be shared as an act of care, Susan moves readers away from the individualized 
notion of memory as belonging an individual alone, displacing the idea one’s past resides in one 
body and thus can ever truly be lost. The intimacy between Martha and Susan here are instead 
founded on suspension of disbelief, on an emphasis on the imagination. The question, “I wonder 
what happens to her past, once it becomes mine,” might also be one to be ventriloquized more 
generally by the reader. In this adoption of Martha’s past as an act of care, Susan stages for readers 
an ethical obligation. The ethics that may emerge from taking on the past of others is clearer in the 
latter note in which histories about the Russian Revolution converge. In the entry, Martha’s past 
becoming Susan’s finds parallel in the transnational effects of the Russian Revolution and its 
intertwining history with, for example, Hawai’i’s past. In a racist scheme to make Hawai’i “more 
white” and subdue “yellow peril,” the Hawaiian Board of Immigration brought 1,500 Russians 
(many active revolutionaries) from Siberia (also a site of indigenous conquest) to replace Asian 
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sugarcane laborers on strike (Khisamutdinov). Between the lines of the text, this subtle intimation of 
this failed Russian immigration scheme is one of many histories left for readers to wander into.   
The text stages Susan’s responsibility for Martha’s memory in ways that take us back to the 
book’s concern with violence and war. Fragments—of sentences, memory, and bombs—return in 
the narrative on Wednesday, September 06, 2006, the day news outlets reported seven casualties 
from a suicide attack in Kandahar. In this entry, the intimacy of caretaking and memory work on 
Martha’s behalf coalesce with the figure of the suicide bomber: 
--Mom was in the ER last night: difficulties breathing, several broken ribs. She could not 
remember anything. I called, became her memory. She has not lost hers; it’s been given to 
me to hold. 
… 
--It’s ritual, this mother daughter forgetting. What she remembers of me is now her. And 
what I remember or her is now fact: she fell on a sprinkler and later complained of pains in 
her side. That’s all I know.  
… 
--She and she bear no responsibilities in this exchange…It is I who must remember, in order 
to sort the useful from what can be used against. A human shield. The bomber kills self 
before others. So the self must be held hostage to our care. (60) 
 
As “a human shield,” Susan cannot think her caretaking apart from protecting her mother from the 
figure of the suicide bomber’s “lethal altruism” (Tobeña) on one hand and “sacrificial militancy” on 
the other (Houen). Alluding to the 2003 anti-war human shield movement in Iraq (the deployment 
of large numbers of western citizens to make U.S. invasion untenable), Susan moves herself from 
the private sphere into enemy territory. What makes this passage particularly striking is how the 
intimacy of caretaking (including Susan’s duty to her mother’s memory) is tied together with the acts 
of resistance to imperial occupation.56 And the violence of imperial occupation itself is also critiqued 
if we consider the other tangential threads that have emerged in the narrative connecting to neo-
                                               
56 The maternal intimacy of caretaking also erupts through the hegemonic masculinity of governmental and media “war 
talk” as Ehrenreich writes, “Media coverage of Gulf War II, in particular, has expressed and enforced this construction 
of masculinity, disguising American imperialism as noble expressions of civilizing, manly power…popular discourse on 
war and terrorism enacts and reinforces an image of masculinity as nationalistic, racially aggressive, homophobic, and 
sexist.” (133).  
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colonial, racist U.S. immigration schemes and the Bush administration’s justifications for U.S. 
occupation. Schultz’s approach to representing care relationships alongside the politics of borders 
and war speaks to Amelia DeFalco’s assertion that the representation of caregiving in dementia 
narratives can be “a private demonstration of fidelity that speaks to national and political policies of 
exclusion and abandonment…demonstrat[ing] the relevance of ethics of care philosophy to 
discussions of identity, both personal and familial, and political and historical” (139). The crisscross 
between dementia and global politics is essential to Schultz’s demented poetics, through which the 
text exacts its critique and exploration of ongoing cycles of violence.   
 
Dementia and the Memory of Violence 
 
As the previous sections have explored, throughout the text the demented tense necessarily 
involves the intertwining histories of the personal and the global, establishing narrative connections 
between Susan’s recording of Martha’s life and political conflict at home and abroad through 
tangential fragments. In this section I explore further how Susan develops a poetic aesthetic of 
dementia to link interrelated yet contradictory contexts and histories of domination and colonization 
that are fundamentally different from each other but similar in their experiences of marginalization 
and struggles for self-determination. More than a metaphor or warning against the perils of 
forgetting war and history, the demented tense helps resist the violent logic of what Susan names in 
the antepenultimate entry of December 23, 2006, “empire’s rigid grammar” (16). This is a key 
juncture in the text in which the subversive logic of Schultz’s demented poetics is brought to the 
fore. Susan’s observations on Martha’s dementia evolves into a compelling counterpoint to the 
project of U.S. imperialism; particularly the imperial ambitions of the “New American Empire” 
pursued by the Bush administration in Iraq (Lake). 
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Like many of the entries in Dementia Blog, this one opens with fragments of news reportage 
on the war in Iraq. Susan’s recording of Martha’s forgetting becomes an occasion to topically draw 
together multi-decades of selective memory:  
--Bad year for empire. Occlusions of memory. Do not tell us what you did in Vietnam or 
Panama or the Philippines, Cuba or Cambodia. We have chosen to tivo those out. Shiites 
“reorganize” neighborhoods. Once mixed, they’re now “purified.” We’ve created a culture of 
dependency in Iraq, the governor opines. If only they’d grown up to be like us…The journalist 
compares Iraqis to American Indians. Forgetting is not easy; there is blood on its hatchet, 
too.  
 
-- In her year of greatest dependency, she lashed out at others…In her year of forgetting, she 
took on new memories…In her year of assuming new facts, she forgave the president his 
lies (he’s not so bad; don’t be so hard on him!). (16) 
 
The italicized opening of the note is the title of journalist Jim Lobe’s article, “A Bad Year for 
Empire,” in which he points to the failure of the U.S.’s overwhelming demonstration of military 
power in Afghanistan and Iraq in shocking “the rest of the world – and particularly Washington’s 
foes and aspiring rivals – into accepting its benevolent hegemony” (n.p.). In what follows, Susan 
calls attention to truncated histories of countries affected by U.S. imperialism and military 
involvement at the speaker’s behest (“Do not tell us what you did”) and points to how these 
histories have already been forgotten, quite literally, through technological media (represented by the 
selective digital recording program, “tivo”). Additionally, the invocation of a journalist’s comparison 
of “Iraqis and American Indians” on public news media “summons the history of Native American 
and US military encounters” in a way that signals how the past is “forgotten” or retold through 
present political filters to justify the present state of U.S. military imperialism in the Middle East 
(Silliman).57 Overall, the note offers a condensed critique of ongoing imperial violence distanced and 
                                               
57 As Stephen Silliman writes, the “Indian Country” metaphor of Iraq and Afghanistan on news media is “rooted in 
colonialism and aggression, and it feeds on a belief in the continued historical legitimacy, and expected military success 
of the United States,” a discourse that “also seems to feed on elements of White supremacy, because, historically, the 




fragmented by media, geography, and time. As Hannah Zeilig has argued, Dementia Blog “exposes the 
extent to which our lives are fragmentary, whether we are living with dementia [or not], and the 
illusion of coherence in the political stories that we are continually told” (265). Susan’s project of 
blogging her mother’s memory and forgetting is thus bound up with struggles over collective 
memory and the denial of violent history. That Martha cannot herself remember the Bush 
administration’s aggressive wielding of power (“she forgave the president his lies”) presents an 
ethical question for the reader: is one to read dementia as the marker for a national amnesia, the 
ultimate “forgetting” of political violence? Susan offers an alternative to this view in the remainder 
of the entry. 
The rest of the entry proceeds with several notes that keep reader’s attention on the subject 
of empire. First is Susan’s statement of locatedness in Hawai’i, told through a description of an 
adjacent road that crosses a popular symbol of American cultural imperialism (McDonald’s) before 
concluding with her son’s inquiries into the complex political negotiations that earned the Nepali 
state independence: “--I live in `Ahuimanu, Temple Valley, Kāne`ohe, on Hui Kelu Street, near the 
cemetery and the McDonalds, windward side of the Ko`olaus, mauka of the highway, parking lot 5. 
Were they part of the British empire? he asks about Nepal. They gave their soldiers to the British and kept 
their land” (16).58 The concluding notes of the entry shift attention to the topic of empire as it has to 
Martha, and it is here that Susan sets up the demented tense as the foil to “empire’s rigid grammar”: 
--She writes about Jerusalem. Old Arab man attacked by young Arab men. Enter the Israeli 
police. Blame put where it always is. Hers is not a defense of empire, but a puncturing of 
                                               
58 It is worth noting that Susan’s location (marked at the end of every blog “page”) of writing is Kāne`ohe, Hawai`i; 
Schultz has lived in Hawai’i since 1990 and has reflected at length on how being a haole (white, non-native) in Hawai’i has 
impacted her views on gender, race, writing, and language on a regular basis. What emerges in the demented tense is a 
productive dialogue between indigenous and disabled perspectives of temporality as a means to think differently about 
relationships with the past and the now as nonlinear, a kind of decolonial alliance that goes beyond the colonial legacy of 
Western linear time. See Schultz’s Tinfish Editor blog entries, “‘Be a Haole, a Dumb Haole, or a Dumb F-ing Haole’: 
On White Writing in Hawai`i,” “Writing While White: Thoughts on Writing Race as a White Poet,” and “When the 
author is dead: Posthumous collections of poetry from Hawai`i.”  
On temporality from the perspective of native Hawaiians see Lilikalā Kame`elehiwa Native Lands and Foreign Desires 
(Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press, 1992). 
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story that fails to acknowledge particular fact. Not a call to action, but to observation. 
Dangerous to see amoeba in the microscope where there is sea! 
 
--The brain is wider than. Oh for an ounce of your poetry’s acid, Emily, to sear through this 
empire’s rigid grammar. (16-17) 
 
If we continue from the previous notes (on Martha forgiving the president), the vague pronoun 
reference to ‘she’ here continues to be Martha, writing perhaps on the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict 
over the boundary of national territory. Susan notes that wherever Martha puts the “blame,” her 
blame is “not a defense of empire” due to the fact she is perceived incapable of making rational 
judgments. However, the text nonetheless attempts to capture a different way that Martha exercises 
agency by emphasizing the disruptive poetic agency she possesses and bestows upon Susan as the 
observer and writer of her life. 
The entry’s references to empire across the globe end with a reference to Emily Dickinson’s 
“The Brain—is wider than the Sky—” (1863), a poem celebrating the capacity of human imagination 
and the plasticity of the mind by comparing it to the sky, sea, and God.59 As Sabine Sielke notes, 
Dickinson’s poems such as this one  
are preoccupied with physiological operations and, more significantly, with their disruption 
and failure…Loss of consciousness, paralysis, pain, and the limits of perception are central 
to her poetry and poetics–a poetics that explores the lacunae and gaps of cognition and 
exposes the brain’s capacity to break down information and remember experiences and 
sense impressions in a highly selective and associative manner. (68) 
 
Dementia Blog is similarly concerned with the reconfiguring of perception and remembering, and thus 
one could read Susan’s invocation of “The Brain” as a comment on how the mind persists with 
dementia. And certainly, Dementia Blog’s fragmentary form at many moments nods to Dickinson’s 
                                               
59 Many neuroscientists have turned to this poem as a reflection on the operations of the human mind, for example, late 
Nobel laureate Gerald Edelman uses the poem’s opening line as the title of his book, Wider Than the Sky: the Phenomenal 
Gift of Consciousness, while French neuroscientist Stanislas Dehaene uses the first stanza in the epigraph to Consciousness and 
the Brain: Deciphering How the Brain Codes Our Thoughts. But I agree with Sabine Sielke’s sentiment that “we need to resist 
reading into her poetics the insights about cognition that evolved during the second half of the twentieth century and, in 
particular, the 1990s, the so-called ‘decade of the brain’” since “both art and science work by way of metaphor and 
mediation” (69-70).  
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fragmentated aesthetic, as both writers employ dashes as a means to create “a poetry whose 
interpretation becomes a process of decoding the way each fragment signals meaning” (Denman 33). 
Thus, the most obvious significance of Susan’s evocation of Dickinson here is that the challenge of 
putting Martha’s dementia into form closely approximates Dickinson’s own poetic endeavors, as 
Kamilla Denman points out, “Dickinson conducted her most intense exploration of language and 
used punctuation to disrupt conventional linguistic relations, whether in an attempt to express 
inexpressible psychological states or purely to vivify language” (33). For Susan, Martha’s dementia is 
the “inexpressible psychological state” she is obligated to give language to. As Susan asks, “My 
mother is an involuntary poet. Who is there to workshop her verses, refine her craft, edit her 
lines? …the question remains of how to attend to its repetitions, its failures of completion, its half-
steps…If dementia is endless repetition, then how to write it down without altering it, so that it is at 
once legible to the reader and varied enough for her to absorb it?” (80, 115-116).   
But I want to focus on how Schultz’s invocation of Dickinson here is also political. Bringing 
the recitation of the poem’s first line to a full stop, Susan interrupts the line with a longing for 
Dickinson’s poeticism and its ability to “sear through this empire’s rigid grammar.” This is a 
significant moment in the text because it connects Susan’s poetics and aesthetics of dementia to 
political and social resistance against the logic of empire building: the imperatives of expansion and 
conquest. In the context of the War on Terror this U.S. empire building process is based on “the 
ideological cover, the appearance of being unaffiliated to empire, of being ‘international’ rather than 
imperial… conver[ing] international aggrandizement to an ‘internal struggle’ between local 
antagonist, and provide an ideological cover of ‘expanding democracy’ to justify imperial hegemony 
or dominion” (Petras 8). 
If Dementia Blog is a poetic commentary on Martha’s dementia inseparable from the historical 
context of violence during the War on Terror, it finds strategic alignment with Dickinson’s poetry as 
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deeply embedded in the political history and civilian experience of the American Civil War. As Betsy 
Erkkila points out, Dickinson criticism has overemphasized the poet’s “isolation from the war and 
history” despite over half of the poems in the Franklin variorum edition being written during the 
Civil War between 1861 and 1865 (158). Erkkila reveals in her study of Dickinson’s poetry and 
letters that Dickinson was in fact intensely against “the public rhetoric of blood sacrifice for the 
Union cause or the sin of slavery,” expressing “doubt about the larger meaning and value of war, 
suffering, and death”: 
Locating her poems historically amid the ‘charnel steps’ of the war at the same time that she 
suggests the role of poetry in singing ‘off’—or against—the blood site of democratic history, 
Dickinson’s comments reveals the ways the internecine carnage and trauma of the war 
inflects and intensifies her struggle against the specters of loss, change, unmeaning, and 
death during the war years and after (159-160).60 
 
Although “The Brain” does not take up the topic of war directly, it is one of 300 poems Dickinson 
wrote during 1863, “a year of crisis and turning point in the war” and also the year in which 
Dickinson most vocally expresses in her letters her resistance to the “redemptive democratic vision 
of the Gettysburg Address (1863) in which Lincoln locates the blood sacrifice of the Civil War 
within a consoling national narrative of ‘a new birth of freedom’” (158, 160). The public discursive 
context of the Civil War that Dickinson positions her anti-war sentiments against is not unlike the 
euphemistic discourse of ‘democratization’ and ‘regime change’ propounded by the Bush 
administration and critiqued in Schultz’s text. While it may be an interpretive stretch to stay Susan 
invokes “The Brain” as an allusion to Dickinson’s political perspectives, I suggest that following 
Susan’s lead in wandering with the juxtaposition of empire and Dickinson is intended to lead reader 
to a consideration of poetic responses to historical cycles of war. This passage thus sets up for the 
reader how Dementia Blog envisions the demented tense as a kind of poetics of resistance.   
                                               
60 Erkkila specifically discusses “Victory comes late” and “The Eagle’s Golden Breakfast.” 
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Dickinson’s experimental approach to thinking and writing about the mind as the “acid” that 
can undo “empire’s rigid grammar” is concomitant with Susan’s concept of the “demented tense.” 
The grammar of empire seems to signify several things: it recalls linguistic imperialism (i.e. global 
English as a key dimension of U.S. empire) and what Bliss Cua Lim calls “the temporal logic of 
colonialism, a linear, evolutionary view of history that spatialized time and cultural difference…in 
which radical cultural differences brought to colonial contact were framed as primitive or 
anachronistic” (13). It seems then that writing history and a life in the demented tense, a form that 
emerges from the imaginative depths of the changing mind, is a resistance to linearity in narrative 
patterns that have been mobilized in service of upholding colonial ideologies. Susan posits that the 
subject’s forgetting isn’t a “defense of empire” but a way of thinking that destabilizes the way we 
remember. It is an alternative way of constructing a narrative; and in many paratactic moments of 
the blog, Susan demonstrates that writing in the demented tense exceeds what our grammar and 
templates for writing history can convey. The poetics that emerges is, for Susan, the aesthetic gift 
that interpreting and writing Martha’s life bestows upon her. All the while, the text is careful to point 
out the ethics of this kind of representation, as Susan admits, “I read her style, her life, her dying as 
my appropriation” (64).61 Here readers are reminded of Martha’s actual life at stake being lived, and 
that it is a life Susan mediates to certain political and metaphorical ends that Martha may not be 
aware of. 
Returning to Susan’s critique of the U.S. public image of war, the notion of empire’s rigid 
grammar also resonates with what Christopher Corker and others have called “the grammar of 
killing”: “the articulation of an act: how we perceive it, how we reflect on why others do what they 
do and how we tend to experience once done…Killing is rhetorical. It aspires to be heard and to 
                                               
61 For more perspectives on disability poetry as it “opens up the problems and possibilities of speaking for others” see 
Alice Hall, Disability and Literature (New York: Routledge, 2016): 169. 
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persuade, which is why it is grammatical.” (115-116). Similarly, Sebastian Kaempf suggests the 
“grammar of killing” in Western military operations hinges on media representation of war that is 
bloodless and clean, suggesting the “mediatisation of warfare has not only altered the physical 
experience of conflict through the means of technology, but has also sought to obscure the fact that 
waging war is still about killing others” (598). Susan’s articulation of “empire’s rigid grammar” might 
thus also be understood as the hegemonic, rigid framing of conflict or any representation of war in a 
digital age. Judith Butler, writing about the photographs of Abu Ghraib, points to how visual news 
of war is delivered in service of the “digitalization of evil” (960). For Butler what is troublesome 
about this contemporary moment is the “inability to register human loss and devastation across 
global distance” (955): 
It is this numbing of the senses…the decimation of the capacity to feel outrage in the face of 
human suffering, the belief that any suffering one inflicts is justified by the suffering that one 
has undergone, or others have undergone. It is not that some stray people in the military or 
in security contracts failed to see, to feel, to maintain a moral perception of other persons as 
persons. This ‘not seeing’ in the midst of seeing, this not-seeing that is the condition of 
seeing, has become the visual norm, and it is that norm that is a national norm[.] (966) 
 
In its accumulation of references to war and other violent histories, Dementia Blog launches readers 
into meandering tangents on Abu Ghraib, Vietnam, Panama, the Philippines, the Nazi regime and so 
on; they point towards these grammars of killing and challenges to register the reality of global 
violence.   
Given there is a critical tendency to idealize “exceptional” figures, I want to be clear that I 
do not mean to suggest Dementia Blog valorizes dementia as a certain kind of epistemological ideal or 
access to “truth,” or that it glamorizes Martha’s impairment as a kind of symbolically decolonial 
embodiment.62 But I do think close attention to Martha’s dementia and the hallucinations Susan 
                                               
62 There’s also gendered critique here given the demented tense’s focus on maternal relationships and how it stands in 




records are important because they demand readers to broaden their imagination of what kind of 
subjective experiences of time, space, and place are possible—and these imaginative openings are 
essential to fostering senses of human connection across global distances.  
If empire’s grammar is rigid, the demented tense is fluid, concept that is perhaps best 
captured in Susan’s writing down of Martha’s hallucinatory conflations of past and present; in this 
way Susan creates a poetics of dementia that hinges on disjointed juxtapositions that perform the 
breakdown of conventional ways of writing history. As I touched on previously, Susan’s recordings 
of her mother’s hallucinations focus on Martha’s sense of direct presence in the Middle East. 
Consider this note on the 2004 bombings and assassinations in and around Beirut: 
--She drives in her car, dreaming of Lebanon. She pays for gas, feels bombs in that other air, 
which is also hers. The disease is not empathy; empathy is a symptom, side-effect, erosion, 
self-wound rendered in another tongue. Her mother is not capable. I call her mother, say they do 
not know where she is. (56) 
 
Susan is careful to state Alzheimer’s “is not empathy” but rather, her mother’s identification and 
sense of shared air with those in Lebanon is an effect of her own reality “rendered in another 
tongue”—the demented tense. The nursing home deems Martha incapable, unlocatable in normative 
terms, but Susan, “call[ing] her mother” holds space for her dislocation. In the dislocated past-made-
present, the demented tense makes visible different histories and relationships to people and place 
that do not fit in current grammatical modalities.63  These “wormholes” or moments of errancy and 
weirdness (to return to Joy’s sense of the word) in the text open up different channels and transverse 
connections for relating to others in and out of time, disrupting normative notions of sociality and 
the notion that history lives in the past tense.  
                                               
63 On the relationship between place and Alzheimer’s see Catriona Mortimer-Sandilands: “Alzheimer’s shows the deep 
particularity of experiencing and reflecting bodies in their relations to place…in Alzheimer’s disease the question of 
memory ties together bodies and landscapes in ways that reveal the inextricable connection between physicality and 
reflection and also the ways in which different types of memory combine to enable (or not) socially sanctioned and 
culturally meaningful interactions with the more-than-human world” (271). See “Landscape, Memory, and Forgetting: 
Thinking Through (my Mother’s) Body and Place,” Material Feminisms, eds Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekman 
(Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2008): 265-287. 
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The heart of what is at stake in the demented tense—this different sense of identification 
and relationality with others across private realms (i.e. Martha and her dead mother) and public 
spheres—emerges most powerfully in a telephone call Susan has with Martha. Recounting their 
conversation on Saturday, August 19, 2006, Susan begins with a record of Martha’s hallucination, 
written in italics: 
--I’m in a nursing home in Afghanistan and I need to get home to Wooster; Ohio; I need to find myself a 
train. I have my checkbook and you know I can take care of myself. I’m so glad you called; I don’t have 
anyone’s number. I might be on the road for a few days, so you won’t hear from me… 
 
--What is the function of the word Afghanistan in the statement above? It is far away; it is 
dangerous; she has never been there before. Wooster is where Joe, Mary, and Karen lived, and 
Mother in her old age… 
 
--The names remain, however. Wooster, Afghanistan. There’s history there, and it’s not just 
hers. (84-85) 
 
In these entries, in the demented tense, Martha occupies her home of Wooster as well as 
Afghanistan—proper nouns that name geographical location coalesce into a shared history that is 
beyond normative bounds of rational understanding. Martha has never been to Afghanistan, but her 
dementia draws her into a history beyond her own. Stressing the importance of linking the self to 
others, and the constructed nature of national borders, Susan prompts readers to consider what it 
might mean to recognize Martha’s hallucinations not as signs of pathology but as valid realities, 
openings into histories “not just hers.”  
Dementia Blog, then, seems to frame dementia as a window into different, unimaginable 
realities—those of Martha and those of others—that deserve social recognition. But in this entry 
Susan is also careful not to idealize Martha’s sense of dislocation, writing that her change of home is 
like “living a fairy tale of origins,” and “Like many tales, it contains no happiness, only struggle” 
(85). Nevertheless, Martha’s occupation of Afghanistan is something the narrative returns to 
repetitively, gesturing at questions regarding the limits of representation and identification: “--…If 
she uses Afghanistan as a word, and I know it as a war zone, can I not still say she suffers for being 
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there—apart from where she is? When is a word only a word? When is a word no longer a word?” 
(78). Wandering into and adopting the histories of Afghanistan, Martha highlights the limits of 
occupation, blurring the boundaries between enemy and ally, interrogating the presumption of 
dementia as an apolitical, individualistic matter. To consider Martha’s suffering in Afghanistan as real 
is to acknowledge that war’s reach extends beyond what is immediately visible—that war and 
violence, even in its hallucinatory form as Martha experiences it, transgresses national and 
geographic borders and shapes domestic everyday life in real and subtle ways.  
~ 
 What ultimately emerges from the demented tense is an ethics of different identification: the 
narrative of Martha’s dementia and the personal narrative between Susan and Martha draw into 
connection wars that feel far away and the lives of others that ordinarily seem far away. Dementia Blog 
makes these connections possible through the narrative’s accretion of tangents laid down from 
fragments in the demented tense. Though increased discourse tangentiality is in neurolinguistics 
terms is a sign of Alzheimer’s pathology, Dementia Blog’s dissemination of tangential memories 
creates possibilities for unexpected moments of historical and personal connectivity.  
I hope to have illustrated some of the ways Dementia Blog makes imaginative space for 
Schultz’s call to action in the essay “Alien’s” this chapter began with: the need to let go of “the 
boundaries, the borders, of self, of nation.” Playing with generic borders and invested in the formal 
expression of the temporal and geographical boundary crossing of Martha’s dementia, Schultz puts 
forth an ethics of identification and imagination that encourages a reaching out to unexpected 
stories and experiences. Giving voice to Martha’s experience as both a poet and a kind of caregiver-
as-translator, Schultz offers readers an invitation to wander with her mother through what many 
readers will find to be foreign experiences. The work of Schultz’s life narrative project is making 
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Martha’s experience accessible, putting into form the history and experience of her life into a form 
that captures its complexity.  
In Chapter 3, I continue exploring issues surrounding the representation of dementia, 
historical violence, and intergenerational spaces of remembrance relationship in life narrative. I 
specifically turn to graphic life writing because the unique freedom of expression afforded by the 
visual-verbal medium tackles this intersection most innovatively; comics can re-draw borders in the 
most literal sense of the word. Dementia, trauma, and the absence/abundance of history, all push on 
the boundaries of what is accessible and (un)representable through language. The artists I explore 
wield the graphic form to transform existing medico-scientific and cultural narratives of dementia 















Drawn to History: Dementia and Trauma in Graphic Life Narrative 
 
In the last chapter, I examined how Susan Schultz’s poetics of a “demented tense” weaves 
together personal and global histories, dramatizing an ethics of reading these entangled stories as 
that which is enriched by “being with” the perspective of the person with dementia. Continuing with 
the contention that hybrid literary forms can forcefully enact fluid spaces of collision for readers’ 
confrontation with disparate historical contexts and life experiences, this chapter turns to how 
graphic life writing can uniquely orchestrate the embodied representation of dementia alongside the 
memory of historical violence. Dana Walrath’s Alicehiemer’s: Alzheimer’s Through the Looking Glass 
(2016) and Stuart Campbell’s These Memories Won’t Last (2015) are two unconventional graphic 
narratives about family members with dementia and traumatic, historical memories of the Armenian 
Genocide and World War II, respectively. In my readings of these texts, I ask: how do these authors 
use the graphic form to engender and critique readers’ affective engagement with people with 
dementia—and the subject of forgetting—alongside the fraught memory and history of traumatic 
pasts that must be remembered? Inversely, how do they deploy dementia as an innovative narrative 
resource to re-imagine trauma, thereby expanding the possibilities of personal and collective 
memorialization and storytelling?64 Lastly, I elaborate on the previous chapters’ explorations of 
thinking alongside and honoring the differences of people with dementia’s subjectivity and 
                                               




experiences by looking at how the graphic form bestows space for these authors to destabilize 
empathetic reading from a position of “being like” someone to one that emphasizes “being with.”65 
By turning to their experiences with a family member with dementia, Walrath and Campbell do the 
dual work of rewriting dominant medical narratives through graphic form and of inviting ethical 
reflection on readers’ imaginative and empathetic engagement with personal, political, and historical 
experiences potentially very different from their own. 
Comics scholars like Scott McCloud, Hillary Chute, and Jared Garner have established how 
the graphic form typically draws metareflective attention to its own materiality and status as 
representation; invites a high degree of reader participation; and provokes questions regarding the 
ethics of spectatorship and identification that play out between narrators, authors, subjects, avatars, 
and readers. Recent criticism in disability and comics studies (as both separate and overlapping 
fields) have explored the various ways that graphic narrative is a powerful medium with which to 
represent both disability and extreme experiences of personal and collective trauma. The visuality 
and materiality of graphic narrative pushes against the conception of what critics frequently refer to 
as the “unsayable” or “unrepresentable”—a term Kate Polak interrogates as “a coded term for the 
real ethical demands of empathy…an immense intellectual, emotional, and experiential undertaking” 
(215). While Polak is referring to the demands of reading historical fiction in comics, it applies to the 
demands of reading narratives of dementia as well, since dementia is often written off as an 
“untellable silence” posing significant interpretive barriers to readers’ comprehension (Frank 101).66 
                                               
65 I am borrowing Cynthia L. Bennett and Daniela K. Rosner’s phrasing; their approach to design resonates with how 
one might approach graphic works and the boundaries between reader/subject. In their words, “being with” entails 
holding onto the “inevitable asymmetries” of empathy, and they argue reworking “empathy as ‘being with’ could raise 
asymmetries not as things to be avoided but as things to be ongoingly accountable to.” Furthermore, they insist on 
“rejecting empathy as an accomplishment, a means to an end,” and instead encourage “being with” as “learning to be 
affected and attending to difference without reifying that difference once again…In so doing, we imagine empathy not 
only as a type of affective partnership but as a point for destabilizing and reimagining imposed boundaries (e.g., between 
categories of “disabled” and “designing” or “designer” and “user”)” (11).  
66 Interestingly, Arthur Frank’s category of these untellable “chaos narratives”—describing the plotless experience of 
illness (especially Alzheimer’s)—originates from his reading of stories about the Holocaust: “What cannot be evaded in 
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What concerns me is how the “ethical demands of empathy” are particularly redoubled in graphic 
narratives that set out to represent dementia and extreme experience concurrently, an undertaking 
which can often risk reifying negative metaphors.67 Subordinating the experiential history of 
dementing to the larger historical issues of memorializing catastrophic violence is also another risk. 
Conversely, because the texts at hand are generically categorized as being works “about dementia,” 
their broader historical engagements can be easily missed. The texts I address take on these risks, 
challenging prevailing views of both dementia and trauma as disappearance, inarticulable, and 
unrepresentable, while also productively grappling with how much a reader can really empathetically 
identify with the trauma and history of others (the person with dementia, but also the experience of 
caregivers and relatives who are the main agents of telling these stories).  
Before elaborating on the texts, I offer a brief survey of the main critical and generic context 
framing their reception. Within the last decade the literary marketplace has seen an explosion of 
graphic life writing narratives centered on disability and illness. The sheer diversity of approaches 
and audiences for these works is reflected in the myriad terms that have emerged to describe the 
burgeoning genre. Medical and health humanities circles most often default to the phrase “graphic 
pathographies,” intended to highlight both the rhetorical appeal of pathos and underscore the 
portrayal of ‘disease’ and ‘suffering’ that ‘patho-’ implies (Meyers and Goldenberg). G. Thomas 
Couser however suggests the term is still pathologizing, reinforcing subjects’ positions as patients; 
and thus he prefers the more neutral designation, “graphic auto/somatography,” which shifts the 
                                               
stories told by Holocaust witnesses is the hole in the narrative that cannot be filled in…The story traces the edges of a 
wound that can only be told around. Words suggest its rawness, but that wound is so much of the body, its insults, 
agonies, and losses, that words necessarily fail” (98). 
67 By which I mean disability metaphor can come at an expense or overshadow the materiality of disability. For example, 
parts of David B.’s graphic auto/biography Epileptic give visual form to his brother’s epilepsy using highly stylized 
flashbacks of war, fantasies of Adolf Hitler and Genghis Khan, and animal imagery. Epilepsy becomes metaphorically 
charged with the imagination (or reality) of the violent historical crimes committed by dictators and tyrants, and also 
becomes a complicatedly “Other” threat to his brother’s identity as images of animality, monstrosity, and racial 
difference blur together. 
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focus from disease to the soma or ‘body’ (Signifying Bodies). More recently, the designation “graphic 
medicine” has gained popularity. British physician Ian Williams coined the phrase in 2007 to 
categorize texts at the intersection of comics, medicine, and healthcare discourse, which he collated 
on his website, GraphicMedicine.org. The website attracted a core group of participants in medicine 
and the humanities who became founding contributors to the Eisner Award-nominated scholarly 
volume, Graphic Medicine Manifesto (2015). Today, graphic medicine has grown to denote not just a 
genre but also medium, practice, and entire field of study predominantly grounded in medical 
education, patient care, and health literacy.68 While graphic medicine is undoubtedly a pathbreaking 
subcategory of comics practice and scholarship, it structures some disciplinary, interpretive gaps that 
this chapter seeks to fill. 
Rooted in the medical humanities, graphic medicine “combines the principles of narrative 
medicine with an exploration of the visual systems of comic art” (Czerwiec et at. 2), an approach 
founded on physician and literary scholar Rita Charon’s concept of “narrative medicine.” According 
to Charon, narrative medicine is “medicine practiced with narrative competence to recognize, 
absorb, interpret, and be moved by stories of illness…[providing] health care professionals with 
practical wisdom in comprehending what patients endure in illness” (vii). I agree with feminist 
disability studies scholar Ally Day who rightly cautions against narrative medicine’s “insistence on 
knowing” or solicitation of as much personal information as possible to improve medical treatment 
at the expense of privacy and of honoring “spaces of unknowing” (92). Indeed, narrative medicine 
arguably leaves the power dynamics of doctor-patient relationships unchallenged, reinforcing the 
authority of medical practitioners as narrative experts, entitled to access patients’ presumably 
                                               
68 The U.S. National Library of Medicine recognizes graphic medicine as “a growing literary genre that uses comics to tell 
personal stories of illness and health.” Attesting to its rising popularity over the last ten years, graphic medicine takes the 
form of an annual conference, book series, and reference category in university and public library collections. Funded by 
a Will Eisner Graphic Novel Grant in 2014, the Ypsilanti District Library houses the largest graphic medicine collection 
in the U.S. and provides book club kits on various health topics.  
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knowable and diagnostic “truth.” Subjects of this narrative gaze are relegated to the script of the 
“sufferer” (a term Charon uses exclusively throughout her book), while doctors are elevated to the 
roles of empathetic witnesses to the “plights of their patients…join[ing] courageously with their 
patients in their struggles toward recovery, with chronic illness, or in facing death” (vii). Sentimental 
narrative expectations, a focus on individual diagnoses, and assumptions of direct access to patients’ 
subjectivities are just a few of the limits of narrative medicine, the approach on which graphic 
medicine is founded.69 
Although graphic medicine purports to “resist the notion of a universal patient,” its 
dependency on visualizing the very category of patienthood can leave the medical model 
unchallenged.70 Furthermore, graphic medicine’s central pedagogical focus on using comics 
(predominantly auto/biographical ones) as a tool to “cultivate an understanding of and empathy for 
patients’ experiences with illness” can detract from the exploration of broader, structural and 
systemic conflicts and politics encircling these experiences (Meyers 88).71 In other words, using 
graphic memoirs about disability and illness to create more empathetic healthcare professionals is a 
                                               
69 For further criticism see Jeffrey P. Bishop, “Rejecting Medical Humanism.” Bishop questions both the claims of 
fostering empathy and the field’s general approach: “insofar as the humanities must show effectiveness, the medical 
humanities do not escape instrumental thinking about humans…In a way, narrative medicine becomes a tool that gains 
the trust of the patient, a more subtle tool because it masquerades as an authentic relationship. Medical Humanism, like 
all other humanisms, promises intimacy, but is really about control…subjectification and objectification are the necessary 
conditions for the kind of medicine that is practiced today in the West; humanism is the add-on that makes the power 
more palatable.” (21-22). 
70 For example, in Alex Demetris’ comic Dad’s Not All There Anymore (2016), the representation of his father’s life with 
Lewy body dementia is limited to clinical settings and understandings. The text is also dominated by images of his father 
as a marionette and an incomplete puzzle that presumably only biomedicine can solve. The text’s pervasive use of 
puzzle-piece imagery to represent dementia echoes what has been said to be problematic about puzzle pieces used to 
represent autistic people “as puzzling mysterious, less-than-human entities who are ‘short a few cognitive pieces,’ who 
are utterly self-contained, disconnected, and [who] need to ‘fit in’” (Heilker and Yergeau 494). 
71 Brian Fries’ Eisner-winning memoir Mom’s Cancer (2006) is a prime example given its wide use in medical humanities 
courses. In one series of images Fries depicts young cigarette smokers and their eventual selves “in front of the cancer 
clinic” as “the walking dead” with “oxygen strapped to their wheelchairs.” This image at the entrance to the hospital is 
captioned, “Their weak, willful, selfish stupidity disgusts me. They deserve whatever they get. All of them” (55-56). Fries’ 
comic does little to explore smoking and cancer beyond a matter of personal agency and fault; missing the opportunity 
to interrogate the sociopolitical, cultural, and biological factors at play. Rather than critique the aggressive marketing and 
strategic manipulation of the multinational tobacco industry, Mom’s Cancer (as the title suggests) reinforces a cultural 
norm tobacco companies have long exploited to their success: that individuals are uniquely responsible for their health. 
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significant objective, but I share feminist cultural studies scholar Carolyn Pedwell’s dismay at how 
empathy can “become a kind of end-point. Precisely because it is so widely and unquestioningly 
viewed as ‘good’, its naming can represent a conceptual stoppage in conversation or analysis” (x).72 
The question of empathy and ethics in both graphic narrative and disability representation 
writ large is a central one. In Ethics in the Gutter: Empathy and Historical Fiction in Comics, Polak locates 
“[r]eader’s feelings, their level of identification and affective attitude” as key components to the 
successful reception and comprehension of a text’s political project (11). But using the promise of 
empathetic identification to measure the “success” of a text in comics criticism sets up ableist norms 
and expectations of what it means to read. As disability scholars note, treated as a means to an end, 
empathy can frequently reify difference and distance (Bennett and Rosner), and the presumption 
that empathy is a “fundamental human trait” fuels deficit views of cognitive difference (Dinishak). 
Walrath and Campbell’s texts are self-reflexive about mobilizing reader’s feelings, but they also 
experiment with how to read their works as a means of ethical reflection. What I want to focus on is 
how they experiment with graphic form to accommodate and spur multiple kinds of encounters 
with the subject of dementia and historical traumas, and how they do so by playing with the distance 
between story and reader—an essential function of the comics medium (McCloud, Understanding 
Comics).  
I do not intend to read how Walrath and Campbell’s texts operate as “graphic medicine”—
that is, how they bolster audiences’ empathy, including medical practitioners, and “offer patients 
                                               
72 Suzanne Keen expresses a similar skepticism of empathy in the medical humanities: “Despite the broad assumptions 
about the value of empathy embedded in educational programs such as narrative medicine, we still have limited 
knowledge about how well empathy can be taught through reading…altruistic acts prompted by empathy may conflict 
with justice” (12, 56). However, Keen and other narrative theorists still rely on medicalized notions of “deficiencies in 
empathy” as “psychopathlogy” (9), problematically reifying the supposed “lack” of autistic people and mental disability. 
See Melanie Yergeau’s critique of “autism as disempathy” (90) in “Occupying Autism: Rhetoric, Involuntarity, and the 
Meaning of Autistic Lives,” Occupying Disability: Critical Approaches to Community, Justice, and Decolonizing Disability, eds. 
Pamela Block et al. Chicago: Springer, 2016): 83-96. For more on the tensions of empathy in the medical humanities 
with perspectives from disability studies in literature see Anne Whitehead, Medicine and Empathy in Contemporary British 
Fiction: An Intervention in Medical Humanities (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2017). 
  
 107 
accessible, subject-inflected iconographies with which to ‘learn how to be ill’” (Williams, qtd. in 
Chidgey 130). Instead, I explore ways they heed bioethics scholar Rebecca Garden’s warning: 
“Thinking that empathy is more first-person experiential knowledge than firstperson observation, 
that ‘I am you’ is a more ethical way of framing ‘I and you,’ risks denying the subjectivity and agency 
of the patient” (560). Both texts play with readers’ distance to/from characters, settings, and stories 
to stress the individual agency and uniqueness of their loved ones’ experience; keep open 
unknowable spaces and discussions of difficult histories; and thus, preserve a shared search for 
meaning which forestalls easy ethical and formal closure. My reading echoes Molly Abel Travis’ 
insistence that rather than “domesticate difference” and “overcome otherness,” “the most ethical act 
for literature is not the bridging of gaps through the creation of empathy, but the articulation and 
keeping alive of intractable ethical questions about the asymmetrical relationship between self and 
other…It is only through openness to alterity that there can be an ethical relation” (232).  
The main portion of this chapter focuses on Aliceheimer’s and the surprising juxtapositions 
Walrath makes between her mother’s Alice’s dementia and the subject of genocide, creating affective 
complexity in the narrative. Published through Penn State’s Graphic Medicine book series, 
Aliceheimer’s is from the onset positioned for readers as a text that solely sets out to transform 
dominant medico-scientific and cultural narratives of dementia and aging, as Walrath writes in the 
introduction: 
People with Alzheimer’s are perceived as zombies, bodies without minds, waiting for valiant 
researchers to find a cure. For Alice and me, the story was different. Alzheimer’s was a time 
of healing and magic. Of course, there is loss with dementia, but what matters is how we 
approach our losses and our gains. Reframing dementia as a different way of being, as a 
window into another reality, lets people living in that state be our teachers—useful, true 
humans who contribute to our collective good. (4) 
 
But Walrath’s reframing of dementia is also the occasion for exploring her family history and 
identity as a second-generation Armenian. Indeed, Aliceheimer’s demonstrates a broader investment in 
grappling with how to visualize private and public traumatic history, a distinction that often 
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destabilizes and dissolves in the particular embodied experiences of dementia, such as in 
hallucinations and changes in time perception—something explored throughout this dissertation. 
Pairing personal essay with the visual-verbal affordances of the graphic form, Walrath’s Aliceheimer’s 
links her experiences of caregiving, her mother Alice’s dementia, and Armenian family history to the 
adventures of Lewis Carroll’s Alice, creating a sense of both dissonance and exploratory freedom to 
approach subjects that might ordinarily be regarded as unapproachable: aging and coping with 
Alzheimer’s, death, and the Armenian Genocide. A deceptively simple sketchbook within a book, 
Aliceheimer’s visual-verbal form highlights nested narratives, reverberations of space and time, and 
interrelationships that reach across pages (fig. 2.1). 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Page spread from Aliceheimer’s, Dana Walrath. On the left side of the page, a scanned drawing of Alice and her late husband 
appears. They are reaching out toward each other across the centerfold of the sketchbook page. On the right, an essay titled “Through 
the Looking Glass” appears, with ample white space between it and the image on the left (51). 
 
Rather than resist the associations of graphic narratives with juvenilia and dementia as a 
reversion to childhood, Walrath wields these notions to her advantage, fusing the personal and the 
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political across irresolvable stories that are discordantly about both trauma and transformative 
“healing and magic.” This is particularly important because stories of dementia typically focus on 
what it “might feel like to be so marginalized, bewildered, and neglected” (Kruger 118) at the 
expense of capturing the humanity and life that still exists. Visualizing and materializing the body, 
the texts in this chapter are counternarratives to mainstream conceptions of persons with dementia 
as “empty shells of themselves,” “already gone,” and “ruins” of a former self. These stereotypical 
sentiments toward dementia suggest some of the profound limits of empathy: how can one 
empathize with an “empty shell” or “ruin,” without that empathy being borne out of feelings like 
pity and fear? In typical representations of dementia, sources of empathy are often over-determined 
and based on the reification of these absences of self. Through the graphic form of storytelling, 
these texts assert the presence of the self, but also prompt reflection on readers’ affective 
engagement with the representation of those lives. 
This chapter concludes with Stuart Campbell’s Eisner-nominated web comic, These Memories 
Won’t Last, which I consider to be another exemplary, unconventional graphic narrative that offers 
an expanded view of how bodily and temporal experiences of dementia and trauma can be visualized 
and addressed. Like Walrath, Campbell politicizes the representation of his grandfather’s experiences 
with dementia as a Hungarian World War II veteran, and I explore how his use of the digital form 
presents unique affordances to representing some of the issues that arise in Aliceheimer’s. Unlike a 
paper comic, These Memories is characterized by user-initiated scrolling motion and disappearance, as 
scenes fade to nothing after several seconds of appearing on the screen (fig. 2.2). Requiring intense 
viewer participation, These Memories stages a difficult encounter, thwarting readers’ easy access to the 
narrative. It innovatively and self-consciously reflects on how history can be told through the 
vantage point of dementia, prompting audiences to examine their emotional and ethical relationship 
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to the inseparable interplay between form and content.73 The text offers an opportunity to think 
further about the ethics of representation and aesthetics of dementia in autographics, as well as the 
affordances and constraints of the digital interface in engaging readers in the life experiences of 
others.74 For Campbell the stakes of representing the life of his grandfather, Ladislav ‘Jim’ Szoke, are 
high: “I’m sure my grandfather would like to be remembered for his sense of humor. But my wish is 




Figure 2.2. Screenshots from Stuart Campbell’s These Memories Won’t Last 
                                               
73 Web comics are often approached as two distinct categories: form-based comics showcase what can be done with 
comics on the web, while content-based comics are less concerned with formal experimentation (hence using traditional 
formats, such as the comic strip), focusing more on the themes of the story. These Memories is exemplary of melding both. 
74 I use Gillian Whitlock and Anna Poletti’s term “autographic,” which draws to the fore the cross-discursive, 
multimodal and -media composition involved in the act of assembling a life narrative. They describe “autographic” as 
both a product and a practice: “Life narrative fabricated in and through drawing and design using various technologies, 
modes, and materials,” one that “emerges in and through specific attention to the phenomenology of reading these 
multimodal cross-discursive texts, and this is accompanied by self-consciousness about the process of interpretation that 
distinguishes this work of textual criticism” (v-viii). 
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A key issue in this chapter is how Campbell and Walrath mobilize the comic mode to 
navigate and entwine two thematics: the importance of collective memory as resistance to violence 
and the necessity of interrogating the stigma attached to personal memory impairment. My 
examination of Aliceheimer’s and These Memories is located at the intersection of a foundational body of 
graphic life narrative criticism focused on personal trauma and historical violence (Chute, Hirsch, 
Whitlock, Gilmore) and a growing chorus of scholars rethinking comics theory through the lens of 
disability studies (Alaniz, Dolmage, Squier). This kind of work, the editors of Disability in Comic Books 
and Graphic Narratives write, “calls for attention not just to how meaning is attached to disability, but 
that views the knowledge and meaning which disability generates, moving beyond policing negative 
portrayals of disability to recognizing disability as an engine of innovation and rhetorical invention” 
(Foss et al. 15). Using dementia as their “engine,” Walrath and Campbell raise questions about the 
relationship of dementia to history and how that history (whether real, imagined, or denied) is 
visualized. What does it mean to bear witness through physical and digital marks on a page but also 
through the “materialization of perception” based on the perceptions of dementia? (Chute, Disaster, 
25).75 And since Walrath and Campbell are formally invested in using dementia to make meaning 
(in)accessible in different ways, their texts also put pressure on some of the defining expectations of 
comics. 
 
Imagination Beyond Horror: Art as Alchemy in Aliceheimer’s  
 In his introduction to In the Shadow of No Towers (2004), renowned comic artist Art 
Spiegelman writes 9/11 left him “reeling on the faultline where World History and Personal History 
                                               
75 “Materializing history,” Chute elaborates, “through the work of marks on the page creates it as space and substance, 
gives it a corporeality, a physical shape–like a suit, perhaps, for an absent body, or to make evident the kind of space-
time many bodies move in and through; to make, in other words, the twisting lines of history legible through form” 
(Disaster Drawn 27). 
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collide—the intersection my parents, Auschwitz survivors, had warned me about when they taught 
me to always keep my bags packed” (n.p.). This evocative remark reflects No Tower’s ambition to 
balance the representation of both the local and the global, the personal and the political—a task 
Spiegelman suggests is one of the major challenges facing artists, especially after 9/11 (Melnick 123). 
The rise of graphic narrative and criticism since the mid-twentieth century arguably originates from 
such fraught questions of how best to represent devastating events in history (Polak 2). How graphic 
form can reframe violence temporally and spatially on the page, render bodies visible or invisible, 
and materialize witnessing to history through the embodied labor of drawing are all crucial inquiries 
encircling the artistic juxtaposition of personal memory and public narrative. Graphic narratives 
have a long tradition of connecting readers to historical and personal circumstances distant from 
their own, reclaiming images and stories from hegemonic sources of information in ways unique to 
their medium. They can, as Polak writes of J.P. Stassen’s Deogratias, a graphic novel on the Rwandan 
Genocide, “work cross-culturally and transnationally as objects that may confront the Western 
viewer with an alternative perspective, representation, and method of memorialization” (41). 
Contemporary graphic auto/biographical narratives on the Holocaust (Art Spiegelman), the 
bombing of Hiroshima (Keiji Nakazawa), and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Joe Sacco), to name a 
few, are just a small sampling of works attesting to artists’ pursuit for meaningful strategies to 
negotiate the relationship between individual and collective experiences of trauma.  
Dana Walrath’s approach to these intersections in Aliceheimer’s is disarming if one considers it 
a text as much about the Armenian Genocide as it is a work of graphic somatography. As often as 
Aliceheimer’s circulates on medical humanities reading lists, it also appears on the shelves of London’s 
Armenian Institute Library as an artifact of Armenian-American culture-making and history. 
Featuring whimsical sketches, collage, and elements from Alice in Wonderland, Aliceheimer’s might 
easily be mistaken for a children’s book, as it also withholds sensational written details and visual 
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traces of “violence” and “trauma” that already saturate mainstream consciousness. What scholars 
observe of Marjane Satrapi’s minimalist approach to the Iranian Revolution in Persepolis is arguably 
also true of Walrath’s aesthetic: as both a narrative and political choice, its style claims the 
“historically traumatic need not be visually traumatic” (Chute, Graphic Women, 135). In an interview 
on her time in Armenia as a Fulbright scholar, Walrath recalls that when she told people there about 
her mother’s memory loss, “they immediately asked if she were a genocide survivor, linking trauma 
to memory loss” (Miller-Lachmann).  
To be clear, I refer to ‘Walrath’ as the author/artist of Aliceheimer’s, who I also consider to be 
the narrating “I” of the text’s introduction. I refer to ‘Dana’ as the narrated “I,” or Walrath’s 
construction of herself in the text’s vignettes. ‘Alice’ refers to Walrath’s real mother, while “Alice” in 
double quotes denotes the narrating Alice (the mother’s story narrator). This narrated “Alice” also 
appears as a hand-drawn/collaged image and voices her memories in the vignettes and comic panels. 
Lastly, there is Lewis Carroll’s “Alice,” to which I will refer to as such. This array of narrative figures 
speaks to Aliceheimer’s visual and intertextual complexity. Formally, this multitude of perspectives and 
voices offers readers a more decentralized and pluralistic form of storytelling. As such, Carroll’s 
“Alice” brings both relief and nuance to Aliceheimer’s story of trauma.  
Indeed, part of what Aliceheiemer’s sets out to do is maintain a level of formal and thematic 
distance from trauma; it seeks to spark readers’ imaginations of both historical atrocity and aging 
with dementia beyond horror. Rather than tell one sustained traumatic narrative, Walrath scatters the 
stories of her family’s experience in the Armenian Genocide piecemeal throughout the text. As I 
explore below, the lack of traumatic or ‘graphic’ images accompanying the brief, fragmented stories 
is a deliberate withholding in response to “photo fatigue” surrounding mainstream forms of 
reportage on distant violence (Orbán 123). There is no dearth of photographic evidence of what 
happened: between 1915 and 1923 more than half of the Ottoman Empire’s Armenian population 
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was killed via mass execution, starvation, deportations, and serial massacres; what artifacts of their 
cultural heritage survived were either destroyed or co-opted as Muslim or Turkish in origin 
(Melson). But as Peter Balakian notes, despite the Armenian Genocide emerging alongside an 
evolutionary era of war documentary photography, its visual culture has been lost up until the last 40 
years of scholarly work (92). Historians and political scientists echo that the “forgotten history” of 
the Armenians is barely known to international audiences due to the Turkish government’s ongoing 
campaign to falsify its past (Balakian 92). In the United States, many public officials and media 
outlets still tactically avoid the word ‘genocide’ to assume an “in-between” position that is neither 
denial nor recognition (Zarifian).76  
This lack of public acknowledgment, as perpetuating the rawnesss of historical trauma and 
forestalling individual and communal healing, is often the focal point of memoirs on the Armenian 
Genocide. Meline Toumani’s There Was and There was Not (2014), for example, focuses on “the 
pathology of genocide denial as it upends archival records, thwarts recognition and restitution, and 
thereby frustrates the process of communal healing in the public sphere” (Kalaidjian). Not 
unsurprisingly, the “pathology of genocide denial” is often expressed through the trope of the 
dementing mind—a popular character trait in contemporary representations of genocide deniers, as 
well as a figure for the anxieties surrounding the loss of eyewitness accounts of injustice.77 
                                               
76 The U.S. administration has long prioritized good relations with Turkey over acknowledging historical truth, 
equivocally avoiding the word ‘genocide’ out of geopolitical and diplomatic strategy. Although 49 states have recognized 
the genocide through resolution or proclamation, it has not received formal recognition as national policy or presidential 
recognition as ‘genocide’ since Ronald Regan in 1981. Similarly, while several major American media outlets are 
definitive about the genocide as such, there are others that align themselves more closely with revisionism and 
government interests; the Washington Times for instance has published articles signed by deniers. As of April 2019 yet 
another Senate Resolution to formally recognize the genocide is pending before the Foreign Relations Committee. See 
Julien Zarifian, “The United States and the (Non-)Recognition of Genocide” and Jessica L. Taylor, “Through the Eyes 
of the Post: American Media Coverage of the Armenian Genocide.” 
77 Atom Egoyan’s film Remember (2015) captures many of these historical and generational anxieties as it follows a Zev, a 
Holocaust survivor with dementia and the last person able to identify a particular Nazi war criminal who he must kill (it 
turns out, Zev is the war criminal, and kills himself upon this recognition at the end of the film). Dementia and age-
related memory impairment is also frequently deployed in fiction and nonfiction as a pretense to discussing the lack of 
access to survivors’ histories of atrocity, and an end of an era of witness (i.e. Lisa Appignanesi’s Losing the Dead and 
Susan Faludi’s In the Darkroom). 
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Aliceheimer’s rejects these usages—which infuse the lived experience of dementia with guilt, villainy, 
and fault—instead exploring how communal and personal healing is possible through the 
imaginative storytelling and perspectives that emerge from Alice’s newfound “innocence” with 
regard to the atrocities of the past. Ultimately, Walrath’s healing of transgenerational trauma is 
framed as only possible when explored alongside and through the lens of Alice’s dementia. Rather 
than use Alice’s dementia to comment on the loss of personal and historical memory, Walrath 
presents Alice as an important agent in recuperating trauma through story and history making. 
In a keynote speech, “Transmuting Transgenerational Trauma,” Walrath asserts that the 
powers of art and drawing lie in their ability to turn “horror into human connection.”78 This 
transmutation is not simple change, but rather signifies a “cognitive shift” that takes place for the 
reader—through a kind of identification based on encountering the text at one’s own pace and on 
one’s own terms. This connection with the text is not characterized by getting to know exactly what 
that horror was like, but “being with” those experiences and acknowledging one’s distance from it. 
These shifts in identification lie at the heart of Walrath’s approach to reclaiming the social stigma of 
Alzheimer’s and the history of the Armenian Genocide through graphic form. For Walrath, tapping 
into collective memory and creating capacious, new shared social meaning are the keys to healing 
through story. She writes Aliceheimer’s introduction: “Healing is not the same as curing a disease. 
Healing involves creating shared social meaning. It does not take place inside of individual 
bodies…This social process depends on sharing stories with others, on letting our collective 
memories meet. By meeting through story, we make peace and move on” (5). Aliceheimer’s dramatizes 
                                               
78 Keynote given at the Dementia, Violence, and Politics of Memory (2018) conference. Walrath’s talk mainly focused on her 
interactive digital and museum piece, “View from the High Ground,” intended to help audiences engage hands-on with 
material embodiments of nine genocides from the past 500 years. Walrath writes on the project’s website, “The 
interactive component of the piece—the handmade books presented here—forces the viewer to experience 




Walrath’s own performance of healing over the course of the text and invites readers to be part of 
similar processes of collective memory and meaning making through its form. Critically, this 
transmutation (the “alchemy of art” that Walrath points to in her talk) occurs by means of the 
interpretive gaps, distances, and surprises of meaning that emerge from Aliceheimer’s juxtapositions of 
disparate images and narratives. 
 
Juxtaposing Alice(s) 
Aliceheimer’s images originated from drawings Walrath created in 2010 and e-mailed regularly 
to her friend, Beijing-based artist Patty Hudak. In 2011 Walrath contributed the images to the 
Brooklyn Art Library’s Sketchbook Project (a global art project, community space, and largest 
museum collection of sketchbooks in the world). Subsequently, Walrath wrote a series of essays to 
accompany the images and published them on her personal blog. Like Schultz’s Dementia Blog, these 
were later extracted and formatted for publication as Aliceheimer’s.79  
Playing with its medium, in Aliceheimer’s Walrath eschews conventional uses of panels and 
gutters, transparently preserving its origins in the form of a sketchbook. The sketchbook portion of 
Aliceheimer’s typically appears on the left side of each page spread. It features pencil drawings 
collaged with paperback cut outs of Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (1865) and occasional 
scraps of colored paper and photographs. In many images, the center crease of the journal is visible. 
On the right side of each page spread, vignettes titled after phrases from Carroll’s work appear 
opposite the images. Irene Velentzas observes that “the sketchbook’s compilations are not 
structured under a linear chronological narrative; rather, the preparatory images offer a more freely 
associated collection of observations” (n.p.). Aliceheimer’s thus draws attention to itself as a 
multifacted composition, an assemblage of perspectives, materialities, and histories. It is as well a 
                                               
79 See www.danawalrath.wordpress.com 
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text showcasing, visually and textually, a collectivity of voices: Walrath’s mother Alice, the figure and 
narrated “Alice,” Walrath’s narrating “I” as Dana, and Carroll’s “Alice.” 
In the introduction to the text, Walrath speaks to how Carroll’s work plays an essential 
intertextual role in Aliceheimer’s, both formally and thematically:  
I found the story’s voice the day I cut up a cheap paperback copy of Lewis Carroll’s Alice in 
Wonderland, using the page fragments to make her bathrobe, Alice’s favorite garment. 
“Apples are Better” was the first picture that I made for the book. It was only after drawing 
it in its entirety that I realized that the haloes that had appeared around Alice’s head were 
reminiscent of Armenian manuscripts, a subconscious reference to her first language, to her 
reversion to childhood, and to her altered magical state. (3) 
 
This is certainly an aspect of the graphic narrative taken up by critics who focus their attention on 
how the text’s use of Carroll challenges negative representational paradigms, offering an alternative, 
more positive perspective on Alzheimer’s as a “magical state.” As one set of scholars argue, 
While collage as a compositional strategy concretizes Alice’s ineffable and surreal experience 
of AD, it also vividly enmeshes myriad realities to illustrate her altered state. Most important 
in many ways, through appropriating Carroll’s fantasy narrative, Walrath poignantly depicts 
AD as a magical state that unravels novel facets of subjectivity. Specifically, instead of 
grieving her mother’s loss of cognitive abilities and incapacitation, Walrath encourages her 
readers to acknowledge and accommodate the new selves that emerge during AD. 
(Venkatesan and Kasthuri 79) 
 
And certainly, Carroll’s books “offer an exemplary, iconic narrative of the movement between 
ontologically and sensually distinct worlds” (Bonner and Jacobs 41), which resonates well with 
Walrath’s conception of Alice’s Alzheimer’s. But there is far more to the intertexuality Walrath 
deploys, involving the ethical and representational consequences of appropriating Carroll not only in 
looking at Alice’s Alzheimer’s, but telling the story of historical trauma. the collaged juxtapositions 
of Alice in Wonderland also serve as contact points for Aliceheimer’s exploration of the intergenerational 
relationship of memory to the Armenian Genocide. In this way the text can be read with more 
nuance as one that grapples with the most effective and ethical way of conveying the relationship of 
traumatic and impaired memory to the present in a manner that is relatable to readers without 
collapsing distance and becoming voyeuristic or too easily consumed. 
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Let us consider how juxtaposition functions in the page spread, “Apples Are Better,” 
featuring the aforementioned first image Walrath created for the text. In this vignette, the text 
introduces readers to the subject of the Armenian Genocide for the first time. The story begins, 
“Alice was never a starving Armenian…Most people with Alzheimer’s lose interest in meals. 
Instead, hunger consumed her. Her particular conformation of plaques and tangles set up short 
circuits that reintroduced hunger within an hour of eating…She went from trim and stylish to quite 
large. Off to Lane Bryant” (25). This lighthearted narrative segues into Dana’s more serious recount: 
Alice’s parents did in fact starve, barely surviving the genocide of 1915, when hundreds of 
thousands of Armenians were marched into the Mesopotamian desert, without food, to die a 
slow death. I used to wonder if starvation in one generation might account for a run of 
obesity in the next…Now that Alice is simultaneously starving and fat, I sometimes wonder 
if her hunger is a distant childhood memory, perhaps one that even spans generations. (25) 
 
Dana is concerned with transgenerational trauma and the (in)visibility of its transmission through 
eating habits, but the visual language with which she approaches these speculations materializes on 
the page in ways that are pictorially palatable. The accompanying image to this story signals 
plenitude and (agricultural) fertility: three figures of “Alice” with colored broccoli and apple trees 
growing out of her ears are captioned, “The night that broccoli grew out of Alice’s ears, she saw 
endless possibilities. Broccoli is good, but apples are better” (24, fig. 2.3). The whimsical comics 
page is rich with subtle details to be discovered due to the collage form—a trend that runs 
throughout—and adds a level of surprise and opacity to the reading experience. The story of 
starvation juxtaposed with the image of fantastical growth effectually makes the horror of the 
former visually inaccessible and distant. It mirrors Dana’s pondering how trauma can extend across 
the distance of generations in ways not apparent to how they affect those of the postmemory 
generations. 
The page also calls attention to Aliceheimer’s overall project of keeping readers’ appetites for 
easy interpretive closure and sensational imagery at a distance. Though there are no traumatic images 
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per se,80 the interaction between images and text creates a discordance that arguably slows readers’ 
encounter with the page as they (potentially) draw upon their existing knowledge (or lack thereof) of 
Alice in Wonderland. Performing closure or “closing the gap between what is shown and what can be 
known” to “mentally construct a continuous, unified reality” is a task that requires deliberate, slow 





Figure 2.3 Image of page accompanying the essay “Apples Are Better,” Aliceheimer’s.  The figure of Alice appears twice with florets of 
broccoli and apple trees growing horizontally out of her ears. The caption reads, “The night that broccoli grew out of Alice’s ears, she 
saw endless possibilities. Broccoli is good, but apples are better.” 
                                               
80 By which I mean conventional representations of war, extreme violence, death, etc. Undoubtedly, what constitutes a 
traumatic image is subjective and relational (what might be traumatic or triggering for one reader might not be for 
another). In this case, for example, images of food can be read as both innocuously whimsical and also a reminder of the 
traumatic hunger Dana narrates in the attendant description of Alice being simultaneously “starving and fat” (25). 
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For example, looking closer at the largest collaged image of “Alice” on this page, a reader 
may notice the use of pages from the scene in which Carroll’s “Alice” is confronted with the ‘EAT 
ME’ cakes. Readers familiar with Alice in Wonderland and the accompanying illustrations might recall 
that eating is fraught with dangers throughout the book, and that Alice’s control over her body is 
tenuous as her body size changes in accordance with what she consumes. If readers are familiar with 
Alice in Wonderland as a text widely interpreted to dramatize the “arbitrary and unjust authority 
systems that threaten the innocence of the child” (Lim 386), how does this affect the reading of 
Walrath’s depiction of her mother’s “reversion to childhood, and to her altered magical state” and 
the story accompanying the image? One might argue Walrath refuses to visually and thematically 
depict her mother as an inheritor of transgenerational trauma all together and instead draws readers’ 
focus to her identity as far more complex and inaccessible as an ethical move. Of course, this aim is 
complicated by the prevalent societal infantilization of older adults (especially with dementia) and 
disabled people, a process of disablement that defines dependency as undesirable and bodies as 
incomplete or near death (Luborsky). As Karin Jongsma and Mark Schweda caution, 
the underlying analogy drawn between the vulnerabilities and losses of cognitive capacities 
and independence caused by dementia on the one hand and certain childhood vulnerabilities, 
capacities, and dependencies on the other is superficial and problematic. First, it is based on 
a narrow neurocognitive understanding of dementia and therefore promotes misleading 
conceptions of the condition. Second, it neglects the central significance of human 
temporality and the individual life course for ethical reasoning. People with dementia are at 
another point in their lives than children and the fact that they have developed their own 
values and have their own narrative and identity is morally significant. For these reasons, the 
second-childhood trope can also have ethically problematic practical consequences for 
dementia research and care. (416) 
 
Walrath’s well-intentioned recourse to the trope of childhood raises these ethical issues of 
representation, but at the same time, the text also troubles the cultural logic that devalues dementia 
as social immaturity and a regression toward a lack of narrative agency. Rather, Walrath uses the 
iconography of the child in nuanced ways.   
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Firstly, since childhood plays such a large role in both the Carroll and Walrath texts, one 
might consider Walrath’s reappropriation of Carroll’s “Alice” as a reworking of how the image of 
child and mother have been typically mobilized in visual narratives of the Armenian Genocide. For 
instance, Aliceheimer’s deliberately withholds images typical in popular pictorial representations of 
Armenian suffering created and mobilized by the Near East Relief’s humanitarian campaign, which 
aimed to depict the “suffering innocence” and “martyrdom” of starving women and children 
(Balakian 110). According to Balakian, “These images embodied encoded meanings and metonyms 
for Victorian and Christian moral values…appeal[ing] to the mainstream American viewer who 
encountered such symbols of innocence in captivity and death through a deeply emotive Victorian 
Christian lens” (111). In addition to photographs, Near East Relief’s internationally sensational, 
Carroll-inspired documentary fiction Alice in Hungerland (1921) depicted a singular American child’s 
visit to orphanages in Armenia and Turkey as an effective means to convey “the history of a whole 
crowd of starving people” (Abrahamyan n.p.). Walrath’s use of Carroll imposes a different Victorian 
lens for audience appeal. Instead of adding to an already saturated market of “wrenching images” of 
atrocity (Balakian 112), Walrath offers a counterimage of her nourished mother as child- and doll-
like (literally growing food from her body) “with new fruits appearing every time she reached out to 
pick one” (25). It is a story and image of regeneration and flourishing above all else. Unlike Alice in 
Hungerland, Aliceheiemer’s refuses to turn the child image of her mother into a figure of suffering. If 
the usual aim of representing the atrocities of genocide and losses accompanying Alzheimer’s is to 
make suffering transparent, Aliceheimer’s does the opposite by withholding conventional images to 
distance readers’ comprehension of the histories at hand. 
Secondly, the collaging of child Alices creates a kaleidoscopic range of interpretations to be 
likewise approached with a child-like exploratory freedom. Juxtaposing Alice in Wonderland with the 
child-like avatar of her mother, Walrath calls upon her readers’ potential knowledge of Carroll to 
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encourage making connections between disparate stories. But Alice in Wonderland is also a work of 
fantasy and literary nonsense, and Aliceheimer’s too, is also about enabling a kind of encounter that 
holds space for delight in contradiction, unknowability, and interpretive play. This kind of encounter 
is important because it recreates, to an extent, the acts of imagining Walrath herself performs in 
caring for Alice and retracing her family history. Like the story above, Walrath’s descriptions of her 
family history are just snapshots—often interrogatory and conjectural in nature—and they are often 
inaugurated in the narrative by one of Alice’s utterances. According to Walrath, the intimacy 
between her and Alice was “born of Alzheimer’s, expressed in its language of hallucinations, 
assertions, and questions” (33).  
Caring for Alice in her so-called return to childhood entails being open to the twists in 
language and logic that arise in her dementia, which in turn enables Dana to connect to aspects of 
her family’s history that were once hidden or unspoken. Dana notes that Alice “hardly spoke about 
Armenian school until Alzheimer’s brought her back to that time and place” (59), and “[w]ith each 
passing day, Alice was becoming developmentally younger. Soon she might speak only her first 
language, as she did sometimes when she woke up from a nap” (61). Here, Dana falls on the 
discourse of developmentalism—predicated on assumptions of normative stage-like, linear 
progression defined by neurotypical milestones. But rather than conceive of Alice’s “second-
childhood” as a deficiency or regression of linguistic and communicative skill, Dana frames it as a 
meaningful resurfacing of her first language, a cultural aspect of her and her family’s identity that 
was once oppressed by pressures of assimilation (“As a child, I didn’t understand her distorted 
affinity to all things blond…we spoke no Armenian at home. Our job was to fit in, to leave most 
everything Armenian behind, to become blond” [17]). In her return to the Armenian language, Alice 
is able to name a version of herself that once belonged to the past: when the Der Hayr (‘married 
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priest’) asks Alice for her name at church one day, Walrath recounts how Alice surprisingly 
answered, “’Aghavni’…Dove, it was the name her father, Yeghishe, had given her” (61).  
Dana attempts to destigmatize if not normalize this conception of Alzheimer’s as a reversion to a 
childhood self by framing it as a means by which Alice reclaims part of her identity and family 
history. So while the trope of second-childhood often disempowers the person with dementia, in 
Aliceheimer’s it serves to convey Alice as a valid contributor to shared creation of the narrative of 
their family history: Alice’s transformation becomes an occasion for Dana to “make the missing 
pieces of our past into more than ideas” (61). In other words, the text values Alice’s non-normative 
ways of thinking in her “second-childhood” as a means of uniquely contributing to knowledge.81 
At another point in the text, Dana recounts Alice’s delusion that she has just had her first 
menstruation (“ just got my period…it’s the first time, you know” [57]). This prompts Dana to 
reflect, “Though I never knew my maternal grandmother, I could imagine her response to young 
Alice’s first time…And what about my grandmother’s first time [having a period], perhaps at the 
orphanage in Aleppo in the years after the Armenian genocide? Maybe it took years to recover from 
starvation, so it didn’t happen till she was older, on the boat to France perhaps.” (57). This act of 
imagining, of filling in the blanks of her family history, of not definitively knowing that history, is 
formally conveyed in the accompanying image on page 56: a photocopy of Alice’s Armenian grade 
school photo is cut out and pasted onto pencil drawings of a class picture with colored paper cut 
outs to create the American and Armenian flags. This image emphasizes Walrath’s literal retracing 
                                               
81 Jongsma and Schweda are instructive here: “while we should definitely avoid equating childhood and dementia, 
a comparison of these life phases within a life-course perspective can provide important theoretical as well as practical 
insights. Ultimately, it may even help to reconstruct the ethically respectable motives behind the second-childhood trope: 
the promotion of a positive view of and accepting attitude towards aspects and phases of human existence that 
rationalistic and individualistic strands of ethical thought tend to neglect or even abominate.” See “Return to Childhood? 
Against the Infantilization of People with Dementia,” Bioethics 32 (2018): 414-420.  
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and subjective recreation of her family’s history. As with the others in the text, this image rests on 
cut outs of Alice in Wonderland.  
Alice in Wonderland functions as more than aesthetic decoration or background. How Alice in 
Wonderland functions as a visual intertext that is juxtaposed with the vignettes in Aliceheimer’s is 
perhaps best viewed through Thierry Groensteen’s theory of tressage or “braiding” in comics: 
Braiding can sometimes be likened to the more common procedure of quotation. When a 
work or an image, quoted from elsewhere, makes an appearance in a comic (and 
contemporary comics cultivates all kinds of intertextuality and intericonicity), readers who 
have the correct reference in their personal encyclopaedia are offered the pleasure of 
spotting it; in principle, if the quotation goes unnoticed, the reader is not disconcerted by an 
absence of meaning; the narrative can be understood on a simpler, more naive level. (n.p.)  
 
Braiding is essential to Groensteen’s concept of “general arthrology” or connections across a given 
page. This concept of arthrology can also describe the relationship between elements on 
nonadjacent pages (what Groensteen calls “tele-arthrology”). Aliceheimer’s braids Alice in Wonderland 
into its narrative—it can be understood on multiple levels of the kind Groensteen suggests. Readers 
with critical knowledge or familiarity with Carroll may draw more complicated conclusions from the 
braiding of Alice in Wonderland in Aliceheimer’s, especially with regard to the topic of political violence.  
For example, in the page spread of “Drink Me,” readers learn Alice’s father Yeghishe 
Mashoian “had lost his sons to the genocide and Down syndrome” (61), a story fragmented across 
several vignettes. The emotive dissonance between the title of Carroll’s “Drink Me” reference and 
the tragedy of Yeghishe’s experiences is jarring. In Alice in Wonderland, Alice’s confrontation with the 
potion labeled “Drink Me” is a moment in which Carroll’s “Alice” is aware of how one’s bodily 
integrity is connected to the ability to follow the rules. This parallels the understanding Dana 
narrates of her mother “becoming developmentally younger” against the rules of “various social 
negotiations” (61). But the double page and element of braiding go further, and they can place 
immense pressure on readers pausing over the unsettling juxtaposition between Alice in Wonderland 
and Armenian Genocide. Consider how the vignette is juxtaposed with an image of ageless, smiling 
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“Alice” assembled out of pages from Carroll’s “The Queen’s Croquet-Ground”—a famous scene 
featuring the Queen of Hearts “settling all difficulties, great or small” with the brutal decree, “Off 
with his head!” (#). The invocation of the Queen’s penchant for execution is worth dwelling on 
here. Daniel Bivona’s work on imperialism in Alice in Wonderland reads the Queen’s croquet match as 
a chapter “dominated by Alice’s attempt to gauge the power of the ‘savage’ Queen…the rules of the 
English game of ‘croquet’ and the official power of the King and Queen over life and death” (163).82 
The braiding of this page spread invites reflection on authoritarianism, power, and powerlessness  
over life and death on multiple levels. Like the other pages in Alicehiemer’s, text and image work 
together subtly, even serendipitously, to create layers of potential interpretation that are both 
amusing and disturbing. Presenting the traumatic narrative of Yeghishe from a distance, Aliceheimer’s 
provides space for a new readership to come into contact with the subject. And in this hybrid 
format, with its uncertain and surprising connections to a well-known children’s classic, the genocide 
narrative acquires a relevance that does not necessarily further a clearer understanding of the event 
but maintains a measure of distance and interpretive closure from it so as to simply raise questions.  
Another jarring juxtaposition exists between the image of Alice as a child and the absent 
history of Yeghishe’s son with Down syndrome, mentioned only once. It is conjecture what 
happened, but historically known that “defective” children (and many children in general) were 
forcibly institutionalized in state orphanages as part of the Ottoman Turkish government’s plan to 
collectively erase Armenian cultural identity (Sargsyan et al.). The image and text may not directly 
relate the institutionalization of children as a systemic form of cultural genocide, but the invocation 
                                               
82 On the Armenian Genocide, news correspondent Azer Ahmadbayli has similarly cited the Queen’s adage “sentence 
first - verdict afterwards” as representative of the current Turkey-Armenia conflict of political recognition. See “The 




of the Queen and distance kept from Yeghishe’s story is evocative of persons disappeared; the way 
lives are controlled and manipulated; how stories are kept unread and unknown. 
Walrath’s juxtaposition of stories from Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland, Alice’s Alzheimer’s, and 
the Armenian Genocide raise ethical questions of representation. Walrath’s use of Carroll is striking 
not just because it offers an analogy for the strange landscape of embodied Alzheimer’s her mother 
experiences, but also because it expresses the “playful intellectual interest in political issues” that 
Carroll’s work embodies as well (Bivona 144). As Anna M. Wittmann suggests, Alice in Wonderland is 
particularly relevant for contemporary readers struggling to understand the terms used to designate 
violent conflicts of the 20th and 21st centuries: “Just as Alice moves through the unfamiliar and 
illogical dystopia of Wonderland in a state of confusion, constantly asking or being asked the 
‘meaning’ of terms and situations she encounters, so the contemporary reader faces similar 
problems, asking an untold number of questions” (xv). Readers of Aliceheiemer’s likewise face a 
recursive search for meaning in attempting to make sense of the juxtaposed meanings that may 
emerge from the visual-verbal collages and Alice’s Alzheimer’s. 
As much as Aliceheimer’s invites readers to partake in the process of revising and reimagining 
the past, it also entrusts them with the obligation to bear witness to the objective reality of past 
atrocity, which is of particular urgency because the past in question—the Armenian Genocide—is 
one that is arduously denied by its perpetrators and their political allies. Walrath refuses the popular 
metaphor of dementia as national forgetting, instead favoring what arguably is an analogy between 
the purposeful denial of the reality of the Armenian Genocide and the denial of simultaneous or 
alternative realities of Alice’s dementia. Walrath ultimately highlights how (in Alice’s case), dementia 
is a resurfacing or rediscovering of stories, their Armenian heritage, and an opportunity to assert the 
presence of her family in the process of retracing their history through the graphic form.  
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Overall, these pages of Aliceheimer’s exemplify how complementary and competing stories 
work synergistically together throughout the text, enacting the book’s narrative focus on multiple 
storylines and histories. To an extent, the text’s use of collage as a composition strategy invites 
readers to undergo a process of discovery that is similar to the one Walrath embarks on in the 
process of creating Aliceheimer’s. For Walrath, this ability of the image to tap into the “subconscious 
processes both the composer and the reader” is what “give[s] graphic storytelling its power” (3). 
Walrath takes the revelations she has from her mother’s utterances and recreates this process for her 
reader through the slant associations that may emerge from the formal juxtapositions of image and 
text. Each page spread forms a kind of diptych, encouraging readers to make their free own 
associations between the image and vignette. Rather than follow the definition of comics as 
sequential art, Walrath’s use of illustrated, juxtaposed vignettes approximate what Groensteen calls 
“the double page”: “pages situated opposite each other are dependent on a natural solidarity, and 
predisposed to speak to each other” (System 35). Rather than describe or illustrate each other, the 
image and text function “nonsynchronously”—Chute explains the effect in this way: “a reader of 
comics not only fills in the gaps between panels but also works with the often disjunctive back-and-
forth of reading and looking for meaning” (Chute, “Comics,” 452). In other words, image and text do 
not necessarily map onto one another, they work to an extent separately, encouraging an ethics of 
reading that keeps interpretation fluid and open. The comic form offers a transferrable lesson to the 
subject of dementia, because it is not unlike the kind of understanding Walrath argues Alice requires. 
With Alzheimer’s, Alice’s stories do not always coincide or add up to a neat, linear, comprehensive 
narrative; there are multiple perspectives to piece together and witness in their fragmentation or 
irresolvability. This is also of ethical consequence for Aliceheimer’s because it reminds readers the 
story of her mother’s Alzheimer’s is not a metaphor or story of historical amnesia—it is, foremost, 
simply the way Alice exists.  
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However, it’s important to note that this ethics of distant and slower-paced, engaged 
encounter is premised on an audience that reads in conventional terms. Jason Helms gestures 
towards this interpretive inaccessibility when he points out that “[c]omics make reading difficult by 
depending on readers who are capable of shifting between looking at the pictures and through the words 
(and vice versa). They create ethical readers by training them in interpretive instability and 
hermeneutic hesitation” (n.p., emphasis mine). In her introduction, Walrath is mindful of this bias 
toward non-disabled readers and encourages differing kinds of engagement with the text. She sees 
comics as a “medium that someone with dementia could access,” and calls on her audience to read 
the book in several ways: “Page through to feel the storyline as it exists in the drawings on their 
own; read it cover to cover, feeling the long narrative…and finally, when your attention is short, as it 
is for anyone with memory challenges or simply pressed for time, leaf through the book to any page 
and take in a single vignette along with the image that set that story into motion” (5-6). Walrath’s 
open invitation to different kinds of encounters de-emphasizes or de-hierarchizes what might 
constitute a more ethical encounter based on normative expectations of empathetic identification or 
logical understanding. Alice herself “devoured every graphic narrative that came into the house, even 
without the benefit of a short-term memory” (5), demonstrating how images are understood—and 
enjoyed—long after words stop making meaning. Put simply, the text relieves interpretive pressure; 
Walrath insists readers need not conform to the compulsory cognitive demands that graphic 
criticism insists comics create for its audiences. She thus cedes the pace of and approach to reading 
to her audience, releasing them from the strictures of experiencing the memoir in a particular linear 
or logical manner as a means to a certain interpretive end. This encourages an ethically different kind 
of encounter necessary for presenting and honoring the narrative of Alice’s Alzheimer’s as well as 
the narratives of trauma Walrath chooses to share that readers might find tasking to witness. 
  
 129 
Overall, the fantasy and historical worlds that Walrath juxtaposes her mother within differ 
starkly from typical graphic memoirs about dementia (and disability/illness in general) that unfold 
around the hospital, nursing home, and other clinical sites.83 In this way, Walrath seeks to sustain 
Alice’s humanity—by drawing her into a world that doesn’t appear visually traumatic or horrific at 
all—as well as reclaim traumatic (post)memories. As I elaborate on below, the collaged images and 
form of Aliceheiemer’s also harbor important juxtapositions that attest to Alice’s personhood and the 
transformative power of graphic art. 
Altered Embodiment and the Altered Book 
The pictorial embodiment of the graphic and disabled subject is a defining concern of both 
comics and disability studies criticism. In his keynote address at the 2016 “Pathography and Graphic 
Medicine” conference, G. Thomas Couser argued: “if the great advantage of the graphic memoir of 
illness and disability is that it features the body in the text, for greatest effectiveness—and 
affectiveness—the body ought to be recognizable as a particular human’s, manifestly a thing of flesh, 
blood, and bone, a truly corporeal body” (qtd as published in a/b: Auto/biography Studies 356). For 
Couser, the most salient aspect of an effective and affective graphic memoir is its depiction of a 
particular human body, one that portrays “recognizable individuals rather than self-caricatures” (356).  
Running counter to McCloud’s theorization that more realistic images are less universal, and thus 
harder for readers to identify with (36), Couser contends avatars and visual substitutes are 
counterproductive to readers’ engagement with the memoir’s subject.84  
                                               
83 E.g. Alex Demetris’s Dad's Not All There Any More (2015) and Paco Roca’s Winkles (2011). 
84  McCloud argues that iconic abstractions, or cartoons, enable a reader “us to travel in another realm…we don’t just 
observe the cartoon, we become it”; realistic representations, on the other hand, give readers less room for interpretation 
and perception (36). Between Couser and McCloud, I find it impossible to definitively say which approach is more 
effective or valid, as I believe each work needs to be approached on a case-by-case basis, accounting for the artist’s 
stylistic choices in the context of the work as a whole. As Chute points out, drawings that lack realistic detail can be 
mobilized in service of more than simple identification—they can “unsettle selfsame subjectivity” (Graphic 31) and be 
off-putting as a political maneuver. Indeed, identification need not be the absolute end goal of readerly encounters—
conflict and discord are necessary and productive for engagement as well.  
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Underlying Couser’s preference for a high register of mimetic representation is the 
assumption that artistic realism best approximates the “authenticity” of one’s individual experience 
of illness and disability, and that that experience is in itself individual—experienced by no other 
body—and best represented as such. Walrath’s stylistic approach to representing Alice through 
collaged sources however takes a different tack. On McCloud’s scale of progression from realistic 
iconic representation, the figure of Alice falls close to the latter.85  But the figure of Alice is not just 
an iconic abstraction or cartoon in McCloud’s typical sense. As the previous section explored, 
Walrath’s work indexes Alice in Wonderland as a book, a material object, crucial to the narrative story. 
The materiality of Alice in Wonderland is also an essential part of Alice’s iconicity—the figure of Alice 
is not simply a singular cartoon, but composite of sources, breaching the limits of McCloud’s scale.  
Like Spiegelman’s treatment the Holocaust in Maus (which depicts humans as animals) and 
the criticism leveled against it, Walrath’s visual representation of the auto/biographical and traumatic 
narrative is not “realistic.” Walrath’s non-realistic depiction of her mother as a literal textual body is 
the antithesis of the fleshy body to which Couser refers. Walrath’s artistic experimentation with 
Alice’s body—or specifically what I call “altered embodiment”—must be understood in context 
with the of practices of collage and the altered book—a craft or form of art in which a previously 
existing book is recycled into a new work of visual art (Brazelton).86 These experimentations with 
Alice’s iconicity, I argue, actually serve to reinforce the referential for readers, helping to make the 
experiences depicted more forceful.87  
Making both collages and altered books are time-intensive tactile, visual, and physical 
experiences, and to consider Aliceheimer’s in these overlapping traditions, one might say the text in its 
                                               
85 See Understanding Comics p. 29. 
86 Any type of book can be used, as well as an array of other art processes to alter it, including gluing, tearing, writing, 
painting, and collage. See Harrison. 
87 I am taking a point from Irene Kacandes, who argues “unlike authors who ‘have engaged with forms of life-writing – 
biography, autobiography, memoir, diary, journal – increasingly for the purposes of fiction’ (Saunders 2010: 14, my emphasis), 
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physical form is a very “real” embodied tracing of Walrath’s own intimate process of understanding 
her mother’s “altered magical state” and their family history. The embodied labor of Walrath’s 
meticulous collaging manifests the extensive contemplation and process involved in the desire to 
reimagine Alice and their family history through nondominant modes of knowing such as the visual  
arts and dementia.88 
Walrath’s representation of Alice’s body runs counter to Couser’s criteria and desire for a 
body that is “manifestly a thing of flesh” because she urges readers to read the body as extended 
beyond the individual. Trained as a medical anthropologist, Walrath’s approach to the body is not as 
individual but collective. She locates sickness and health in three interconnected bodies: “the 
political, the social, and the physical…not in individuals but instead in families and communities” 
(4).89 Capitalizing on the materiality of the collage form and altered book to create Alice’s body, her 
representation is effective and affective precisely because it is uniquely not “a truly corporeal body”—
but literally an intertextual one that is meant to be communal and symbolic in meaning. As Alison 
Gibbons argues, altered books are dialogic: “[t]hey bring about an exchange of ideas…have a 
polysemous and polyvocal quality…That is, readers’ perceptions of character voice and the visual 
world of the narrative is inflected by both the original collage novel they are reading and the 
contexts, perhaps numerous, that the source texts signify” (431). Relying on readers’ potential 
familiarity with Alice in Wonderland imbues the icon of Alice with a high degree of intersubjectivity as 
                                               
our topic here needs to be authors who experiment for the purposes of autobiography, that is to say, life writers who employ a 
technique for the purposes of fact or of enhancing, reinforcing or drawing attention to the referential level. Such authors 
aim to convey some aspect of the “realness” of certain life experiences that could not be conveyed as well without 
pushing at the form itself, without playing with the pact” (383). 
88 This experimentation with collage also resonates with Schultz’s formulation “[d]ementia is bricolage, is collage, is 
mixed-up syntax” (132) in Dementia Blog, and her attempt to express its epistemic border crossings through the bricolage 
of generic forms. 
89 Echoing Martha Stoddard Holmes’ observation, “While most practitioners would agree that the body’s material reality 
is both powerful and nonnegotiable, most would also assert that the meanings of that materiality are, in contrast, 
continually created and renegotiated through social and cultural agents, and shaped by the verbal and visual narratives 
individuals, families, and institutions generate: stories of the body.” See “Embodied Storytellers” (11). 
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the reader becomes a participant in determining the meaning of the texts’ juxtapositions. In other 
words, the text positions the altered embodiment of Alice’s body as something dually alienating or 
distant (not easily seen as “real” or relatable as “human” from Couser’s perspective), yet familiar 
(due to its collaging of the popular Alice text), to foster readers’ curiosity for—rather than immediate 
identification with—the different relationships between contexts and stories that Alice literally 
carries on her body and expresses in her experience of Alzheimer’s.  
To state Alice’s experience is not all horror and trauma is one thing. To see it approachably 
in Wonderland-esque images of Alice’s unmoored travels through hallucinatory landscapes and 
simultaneous realities is another. Walrath’s experimentation with the non-realistic forms of collage 
and altered book also enables readers to reflect on the validity of Alice’s nonnormative relationship 
to time and space (an aim shared by all authors in this dissertation): might readers’ escape to the 
imaginative space afforded by any creative art be similar to Alice’s? Or if readers are capable of 
identifying with these imagined spaces, might they not also be able to hold space for Alice’s sense of 
“altered” sense of reality and time as well? 
Indeed, one of the most crucial themes of Aliceheimer’s (and a repeated trope this dissertation 
examines) is the notion of dementia as time travel, as Alice’s hallucinations repeatedly appear in the 
text as a point of narrative interest. Dementia as time travel frames differently the developmental 
notions of Alice’s reversion to childhood I explored earlier, alternatively recognizing Alice’s non-
normative, non-linear experiences of time and space as painful but also liberating.90 Collaging Alice 
                                               
90 As I also referred to in Chapter 1, I am drawing from Ellen Samuels’ formulation in “Six Ways of Looking at Crip 
Time”: “Crip time is time travel. Disability and illness have the power to extract us from linear, progressive time with its 
normative life stages and cast us into a wormhole of backward and forward acceleration, jerky stops and starts, tedious 
intervals and abrupt endings. Some of us contend with the impairments of old age while still young; some of us are 
treated like children no matter how old we get. The medical language of illness tries to reimpose the linear, speaking in 
terms of the chronic, the progressive, and the terminal, of relapses and stages. But we who occupy the bodies of crip 
time know that we are never linear, and we rage silently—or not so silently—at the calm straightforwardness of those 




into different settings and universes to visualize Alice’s recurrent time travel (alongside the material 
index of the travels of Carroll’s Alice cut and pasted to make up her body), Walrath makes sense of 
Alice’s altered state (for herself and readers). And since some of these hallucinations are of traumatic 
situations, Walrath uses the graphic form as a tool to redraw her mother (and readers) out of them. 
In “Sundowning” Dana describes how “sunsets sometimes bring a different kind of magic. Black 
magic…Newsreels from her [Alice’s] childhood come back through the ether” (35), bringing her to 
the time when she watched World War II unfold on the television. This is the only vignette with an 
accompanying image in the text that utilizes conventional comic panels, effectually mimicking 
Alice’s sense of containment as the “Japanese soldiers surround the house” (34). For Walrath, the 
collaged graphic form’s ability to capture multiple temporalities is essential for illustrating for readers 
the “magic” release of Alice’s experience. The power of recognizing Alice’s reality through co-
storytelling and the graphic from to release Alice from this horror is dramatized in the page spread 
immediately following. In this vignette titled “Light, Years, Later,” the accompanying image is of 
Alice flying free from the previous image. This breaking free is suggested by the dotted line 
travelling across the page. The figure of Alice is not depicted as hostage to her reality of being in the 
World War II era but freed with the assistance of Walrath’s understanding and artistic 
reinterpretation: 
 “Are you in World War II?” She nodded…We needed more than biomedicine could offer 
to make peace with the Japanese soldiers that sometimes emerged from her memory of a 
1945 newsreel to surround our house at sunset. Instead of insisting that the soldiers weren’t 
there, we used another branch of science to interpret Alice’s visions: space time travel, her 
special power, accommodated simultaneous realities. (37) 
 
Walrath meets Alice where she is—Walrath’s turn to the imaginative realms of “space time travel” 
recalls the unrelenting time travel Schultz describes her mother to experience in her inhabitation of 
scenes from the War in Iraq overheard on the television. While Schultz turns to experimental poetry 
and the blog form to capture dementia’s temporality, Walrath uses the collage and graphic form’s 
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unique ability to juxtapose styles, timescapes, and spatial arrangement dynamically from page to page 
to “make peace” or give form to Alice’s hallucinations. These images attest to the fact that Alice’s 
understanding of time is not “broken”; rather, “different temporalities cogently intersect and 
together produce new narratives” (Chidgey 134). At the experimental juncture of the real and 
fantasy, Walrath’s depiction of her mother’s altered embodiment tell stories that hold space for her 
realities and imagination, speak to the importance of seeing the “real” in the non-real, and attest to 
the transformative graphic effects of art.  
 
Disappearance as Discovery 
Importantly, the altered book and collaging strategy Walrath employs asserts the material 
presence of Alice’s enduring selfhood in her altered state. Despite not being “realistic,” in each 
image and each new collage, Alice’s body and presence is made anew and reasserted. From the onset 
of the text, it is clear that Walrath sets out to redefine the “disappearance” narrative of Alzheimer’s 
by using the graphic form to imaginatively capture her mother’s dementia as a meaningful 
transformation. On the second graphic page of the book, the text “Alice is disappearing, soon there 
will be none” takes the place of Alice’s absent head, where only a cut out of the Cheshire cat’s broad 
grin remains. Alice’s disappearance is framed as a curiously fantastic power, a transformation in 
identity that opens up new ways of relating rather than a loss of self.  
In the vignette that accompanies this image, Dana explains, “Often, the ‘internal governor’ 
of people with Alzheimer’s also disappears: they say exactly what’s on their mind. This 
disappearance lets new things appear. Alice found parts of herself that she had kept hidden, from 
her children anyway. She wished out loud she had gone to medical school…The years of her 
pushing me…away from creative work made sense at last” (11). Rather than dwell on the loss of 
Alice’s memory, Aliceheimer’s emphasizes discovery and the emergence of new family and personal 
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stories. Disappearance as discovery is dramatized on pages 16-17 in which various parts of Alice’s 
face are erased, accompanied by the text, “She isn’t losing tangible parts though she is disappearing” 
(fig. 2.4, 17).  
 
 
Figure 2.4 “She isn’t losing tangible parts though she is disappearing,” Aliceheimer’s. Panels of Alice’s face with different parts erased 
and Alice dancing below them (4). 
 
This image is followed by a vignette in which Walrath describes her mother’s physical appearance 
and identity as Armenian for the first time: 
Alice was always beautiful—Armenian immigrant beautiful, with thick, curly black hair, olive 
skin, and big dark eyes…Alice is still beautiful…Until the end stages, when facial expressions 
and the ability to move disappear, Alzheimer’s remains invisible. The missing pieces stay 
hidden. Hiding has always been Alice’s friend. As a child, I didn’t understand her distorted 
affinity to all things blond…we spoke no Armenian at home. Our job was to fit in, to leave 
most everything Armenian behind, to become blond. Now, when she looks in the mirror, I 
guess it isn’t just age, or the weight she has gained with Alzheimer’s, that drives her to say, “I 
look awful.” But other times, blond values disappear. She comes down from her room for 




This spread of image and text establishes Alice’s experience with Alzheimer’s as importantly a 
resurfacing and renewal of her Armenian identity lost to assimilation that Walrath is prompted to 
learn more about and reclaim. As Walrath writes later on, her mother “hardly spoke about Armenian 
school until Alzheimer’s brought her back to that time and place” (59). The altered embodiment of 
Alice becomes reflective of bodily and cultural hybridity—American and Armenian identities—but 
also the intense sense of presence Alice has of herself even with Alzheimer’s. In this page spread 
readers also see how the materiality of the collaged text keep the figure of Alice dancing through the 
pages in the midst of her “disappearance.” In effect, the book literalizes the idea that the self is kept 
alive through the stories and imagination of others. Through the collage form of storytelling 
Walrath’s memoir gestures toward how life with Alzheimer’s—and bodies in general—are always 
already socially situated and given meaning by others. Despite its avoidance of corporeal “realness” 
Aliceheimer’s asserts the presence of the self and identity, offering reflection on how the meaning of 
the body’s materiality can be positively shaped by narratives told by individuals and families.  
~ 
Overall, Aliceheimer’s is an example of transgenerational storytelling that is invested in healing 
on a personal and collective level, it offers a unique lens through which to bear witness to one family’s 
experience with dementia and difficult histories. As Alice rarely discussed stories from the past or 
spoke in Armenian prior to her Alzheimer’s, Aliceheimer’s highlights how the precariousness of family 
and collective history lies in in a complex web of language, cultural, and personal barriers inhibiting 
the transmission of family stories, not merely the forgetting of dementia. On the contrary, Walrath’s 
memoir shows how intimate contact with the perspectives that arose in her mother’s Alzheimer’s led 
to the personal discovery of fragments of histories below the surface.  
In its collaged, hybrid approach to telling these stories, Walrath’s memoir is a site where her 
investigation into the memories of the past and imagination of the present meet, creating a new 
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mode of expressing family history. Aliceheimer’s reorients readers to different ways of being in 
relation to new and surprising contexts, inviting consideration of how reading alongside altered 
perspectives—of memory impairment as well as the collaged, “altered” book form—can enable 
productive shifts in expression and understanding. In its materiality and emphasis on process and 
healing, Walrath also suggests readers consider the memoir—and the graphic form in general—not 
merely as a passive receptacle or ‘thing,’ but a therapeutic space. Aliceheimer’s recalls something 
cartoonist Lynda Barry writes of in her graphic memoir how-to sketchbook, Picture This (2010): “I 
believe making lines and shapes and coloring them in can still help us in the way it helped us when 
we were kids. When we used paper as if it were a place, rather than a thing. A place where 
something alive can happen through motion. The motion of our bare hands—the original digital 
devices; wireless, biofueled, completely ours. Drawing is one of our oldest ways of working things 
out” (110). Thinking about paper as a place akin to a stage or other space of creative expression 
points to the affordances that experimentations with the graphic medium have for giving 
imaginative and recuperative space to the dislocating experiences of dementia and traumatic history. 
 
Digitalizing Dementia in Stuart Campbell’s These Memories Won’t Last 
Artists like Walrath and Barry favor the work of “bare hands,” wherein hand-crafted images 
are believed to more effectively and affectively represent their subjects in ways mediums like 
photography cannot. Comics scholars, too, seem to agree that “the act of reading and looking at a 
text that is entirely handwritten…creates an intriguing aesthetic intimacy,” demanding prolonged 
engagement. This slowed engagement is often hailed as a key ethical feature of auto/biographical 
graphic narratives of violent and traumatic histories, from Maus to Fun Home (Chute, Graphic, 6). 
Frequently, this aesthetic intimacy is attributed to the intrinsic narrative capacity of comics to make 
personal and collective memories multimodally accessible or ‘visible’ (to sighted readers), leading 
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artists and scholars alike to theorize comics as memory. Cartoonist Chris Ware observes that comics 
are themselves “a possible metaphor for memory and recollection” (xxii), while Chute argues that 
“[t]he art of crafting words and pictures together into a narrative punctuated by pausing or absence, 
as in comics, also mimics the procedure of memory” (Graphic 4). Chute focuses on the formal 
similarities auto/biographical comics share with traumatic memory and the excavation of childhood 
memory, but the same might be said for the impairment of memory that accompanies dementia and 
aging. In this concluding section, I explore further questions of reader intimacy and representing 
memory and trauma when the graphic form and representation of dementia goes digital.  
Through the affordances of digital space, These Memories takes storytelling through the lens of 
its subject’s dementia to an extreme. Alongside the digital form, These Memories offers an example of 
how dementia serves as a driving force of innovative experimentation for comics. In setting out to 
aesthetically render the experience of his grandfather’s dementia and wartime trauma through the 
digital mode of the web comic, Stuart Campbell plays critically with many of the expectations and 
definitions associated with contemporary comics: namely, that they are universally easy to 
comprehend and thus identify with or “relate to” at first glance. Print comics are associated with 
“aesthetic intimacy” due to their hand-drawn nature and reliance on readers to participate in 
meaning-making, also known as performing “closure.” McCloud argues, if “visual iconography is the 
vocabulary of comics, closure is the grammar, and comics is closure” (Understanding 67). “Closure” 
relies on readers to “clos[e] the gap between what is shown and what can be known,” thus “mentally 
construct[ing] a continuous, unified reality” (ibid. 67). This interpretive expectation of readers is 
taken for granted as an automatic, natural response to reading comics as a universal language. As 
disability scholars note, comics criticism often theorizes “graphic narrative as a semantic structure 
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based on (abled) embodiment” (Foss et al. 7).91 Campbell’s web comic draws attention to the 
normative cognitive assumptions underlying the expectation of print-based closure by deliberately 
impeding it through digital techniques. Unlike a print-based, static comic, the images and panels of 
These Memories blur, fade away, and disappear after roughly 10 seconds—forcing a certain pace of 
engagement and drastically reducing the amount of time readers have to perform closure in a single 
encounter. Moreover, These Memories distinguishes itself from other web comics in that most works 
are characterized by an investment in facilitating readers’ navigation of the unusual or experimental 
form of the text. For example, McCloud’s first web comic, “Porphyria’s Lover” (1998) uses 
flowchart lines to help readers through in correct sequence, while the interface of Marvel Infinite 
Comics is straightforward in helping readers through different areas of the text. Indeed, many web 
comics have arrow markers or table of content-like pages that make it “easy” for readers to go back 
to previous “pages” to refresh their memories. The perceived success of web comics using what 
McCloud calls the web’s “infinite canvas” in particular must be built a “reader-centered philosophy,” 
as he writes on his webpage: “The only way the infinite canvas approach can ever come of age is if 
the readers’ needs come first. Advancing from one panel to the next should be as easy as hitting a 
spacebar or tapping the screen. Bookmarking locations for return reading should be as easy as, well... 
a bookmark. If all-in-one downloads would be convenient, readers should have that option” (“The 
Infinite Canvas”). These Memories’ features such as disappearing panels and the impossibility of back 
scrolling fly in the face of McCloud’s wish list. Like Aliceheiemer’s, part of These Memories’ ethical 
project is to play with creating distance between reader and the histories being read. 
These Memories opens with the figure of 93-year-old Jim in a sofa chair, clutching a rope 
dangling from above with his right hand; readers will help him “pull” through his memories by 
                                               
91 For example, Foss et al. point out how Groensteen uses the medical term “arthrology” (referring to the study of 
joints) to describe the visual structure of comics. Groensteen’s analogy theorizes comics’ as a particularly kind of body, 
underlying able-bodied assumptions (8).  
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scrolling their mouse or trackpad to initiate the comic’s moving images. A red line also runs through 
the frame, embodying Campbell’s curation of the images or the narrative ‘thread’. While many digital 
texts mimic the modern book form through virtual “pages” that flip, These Memories takes advantage 
of “infinite canvas,” using parallax scrolling to take readers through the story (Reinventing 200). As 
readers scroll down, the background moves more slowly than foreground, creating illusion of depth, 
distance, and instability as the narrative ‘thread’ and images (connected by the rope) never quite 
align. A nod to the scroll as an early book form, These Memories does not have markers that might 
assist readers’ in assessing their location in the text.  
These Memories is purposefully unstable, meant to dissolve from visibility, and prevent the 
reader from scrolling back to check past details and revisit images. As users scroll down (or 
“forward”) through the story, previous images fade away. This hastens the temporal experience and 
sense of urgency to get through the story before it disappears, challenging readers’ agency. In my 
own encounter, comprehending the entire story took multiple “refreshes,” including several 
inadvertent re-readings due to accidental trackpad swipes “back” (exiting the webpage). Andrew 
Kunka suggests, “The cumulative effect of the work allows the reader to experience the ephemeral 
nature of the present and the blending of the past and present that is an approximation of the 
grandfather’s daily existence” (144). Kunka’s reading typifies other reviewers’ statements about the 
function of These Memories as a kind of embodied dementia simulation exercise. As one reviewer 
writes, “Disappearing Interactive Comic Simulates What it’s like to Have Dementia” (Ehrhardt). But 
as much as These Memories sets out to show what the comic-as-memory looks like when it becomes 
“demented,” it also draws attention to the ethics of using comics to mimic memory impairment for 
readers as a means to promote empathetic identification with someone with dementia.  
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From a disability studies standpoint, embodied simulations are often problematic, 
buttressing a medicalized model of disability and reinforcing stereotypes.92 As Tobin Siebers argues,  
Disability simulations fail to give the student pretenders a sense of the embodied knowledge 
contained in disabled identities. Disability simulations of this kind fail because they place 
students in a time-one position of disability, before knowledge about disability is acquired, 
usually resulting in emotions of loss, shock, and pity at how dreadful it is to be disabled. 
Students experience their body relative to their usual embodiment, and they become so 
preoccupied with sensations of bodily inadequacy that they cannot perceive the extent to 
which their “disability” results from social rather than physical causes. (Disability Theory 28) 
 
Reading These Memories as a simulation of “what it’s like to have dementia” downplays social and 
cultural aspects of aging and age-related impairments and reduces dementia as a disability to a set of 
cognitive difficulties with reading comprehension that can be temporarily experienced by readers 
and rendered through Javascript and HTML5. Reviewers’ reports of their frustration with reading 
These Memories is indicative of the way Campbell’s attempt to “replicate” the “frustration of memory” 
may serve to reinforce the stereotypes and prejudicial notions readers may have about the horrible 
and confusing life (aging) people with memory impairment live (“Dreamtime”). Thus, in some ways 
These Memories attests to the limits of empathy vis-à-vis simulation, in that the user’s perception of 
the experience of dementia is predicated on imagining themselves to be different (“being like”), 
instead of offering mindful reflection one’s own positionality and relationality as a means of 
affecting change in how one approaches others (“being with”). 
Yet, I want to suggest the text nevertheless can be productively read beyond embodied 
simulation. As These Memories forces re-readings (by users’ choice or accidental “exits” that restart the 
comic), its pathways through (and obstructions thereof) panels can be characterized as also 
experimenting with the affordances of what Espen J. Aarseth terms the “ergodic” (from the Greek 
                                               
92 Also see Lydia Brown, “A Critique of Disability/Impairment Simulations” which critiques the ableism accompanying 
age-related impairment simulation exercises; and Victoria Pitts-Taylor’s argument against the basic assumptions of 




ergon, ‘work’ and hodos, ‘path’). Ergodic literature is exemplary of “cybertext,” which according to 
Aarseth is not limited to “electronic textuality,” but refers to the “mechanical organization” of a text 
that poses “the intricacies of the medium as an integral part of the literary exchange…[and] centers 
attention on the consumer, or user, of the text, as a more integrated figure than even reader-
response theorists would claim” (1).93 Aarseth’s concept of cybertext is a useful perspective on These 
Memories in that it effects an engagement that constantly reminds readers of “inaccessible strategies 
and paths not taken, voices not heard” (3).94 Characteristic of multimodal experiments in literature, 
These Memories activates reading—“not just as using, but also as engaging and performing” (Bray et al. 
421). While the text’s programmed speed arguably thwarts readers’ agency in managing their 
encounter with the text, only the reader can initiate the continuation of the story (the comic does 
not scroll itself; panels disappear after approximately 10 seconds, leaving the canvas blank until 
readers initiate a transition to the next image). Drawing readers in through non-trivial or “difficult” 
comprehension and navigation bestows readers with responsibility to carry out the completion of 
Jim’s story’s. Arguably the text shifts emphasis away from Jim’s memory difficulties to the reader’s 
own involvement in keeping another’s story alive, an ethical act that, as I explore in the next section, 
carries particular weight when interpretive attention is broadened to include how These Memories 
grapples with visualizing dementia as it intersects with historical trauma and post-traumatic stress. 
 
Forgetting “The Toll of War” 
While Aliceheimer’s plays with the visual and affective distance between Alice’s dementia and 
                                               
93 Such a text, Aarseth argues, instills responsibilities on a reader that go beyond “eye movement and the periodic or 
arbitrary turning of pages” (1). As others have pointed out, the term “ergodic” has its own ableist assumptions since it 
assumes a reader’s “eye movements” and “periodic or arbitrary turning of pages” are “trivial” responsibilities, assuming a 
universal kind of reader for which these actions are in fact trivial (Landow 42). 
94 On the ergodic form, the distance enacted by (medical) archives, disability and black history, see the collaborative, 




the trauma of the Armenian Genocide, These Memories speaks loudly to the complex entanglement of 
dementia with the social trauma of war. Much of the narrative of These Memories takes readers 
through Jim’s wartime memories in World War II, to which he was drafted at age 21: the bullying he 
experienced, the clever pranks he would play on his supervising officer, the bloodshed he witnessed 
on the battlefield resulting in the death of his friends, and his migration to Australia as a Hungarian 
refugee. One question this comic raises is how historical trauma and the experience of post-
traumatic stress mediates the experience of dementia. In the visualization of these overlaps, These 
Memories is not only interested in simulating and depicting dementia or memory loss as an individual 
embodied phenomenon (a reading that reproduces a depoliticized framework for understanding 
both dementia and post-traumatic stress disorder); it also intends to offer readers a re-politicized and 
historicized picture of Jim’s dementia as situated in the social conditions of perpetual war.  
The text’s pivotal moment is when Jim has a blood clot and the ambulance ride to the 
hospital triggers a “psychotic episode” flashing back to combat during the war (fig. 2.5). In this 
longest stretch of horizontal-moving images, readers move through a smoky battlefield, blood 
splattering. Militarizing the space of the hospital room, a soldier emerges to drag Jim in his sofa chair 
across a field of carnage while a tank fires red into the distance behind them. The intensity of the 
past wells up and surfaces in Jim’s physical aggression: “He hit two nurses and threatened to hit 
another, he was convinced the nurses were poisoning the patients’ food” (n.p.). The continuous 
movement of the animated panels bring violent history into the present in an immediate, explicit 
way; but just as quickly, violent scenes fade from sight. The narrative ushers readers’ through a level 
of the uncertainty as to whether Jim’s hallucinations are a result of dementia or post-traumatic stress, 
speaking to how the “cumulative, fluid nature of traumatic injury and consequent disability indicates 
that notions of ‘traumatized’ and ‘disabled’ are emergent, changeable across time, and inevitably 
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contested” (Morrison and Casper n.p.).95 Jim’s aggressive “behavioral problems” are curbed by the 
anti-psychotics given to him at the hospital, but readers get the sense this quick-fix and resultant 
happiness, like the comics’ images themselves, are temporary, as Jim’s conspiratorial delusions and 
verbal aggressions recur at the end of the narrative. The text illustrates the challenges of individual 
pharmacological treatment, and the ending importantly interrogates to what extent the persistence of 
personal and historical trauma is remediable through individualized, biomedical intervention. 
 
 
Figure 2.5 Screenshot of image from These Memories of Jim in a sofa. Jim is dragged backward by a soldier through a battlefield. The 
caption reads, “My mother called the ambulance and grandpa as rushed to the hospital. The ordeal triggered a psychotic episode that 
thrust his mind back into the war.” 
 
                                               
95 Daniel Morrison and Monica Casper write, “Diagnostic categories are fluid, and their use may say as much about 
embodied phenomena as about history, politics, culture, and institutions…Connections between PTSD, TBI, and a 
more diffuse ‘combat stress’ (historically known as ‘shell shock’) are complex and ambiguous—it is often unclear where 
one condition ends and the next begins.” See “Intersections of Disability Studies and Critical Trauma Studies: A 
Provocation,” Disability Studies Quarterly 32.2 (2012). 
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As These Memories approaches its end, Campbell narrates how Jim’s delusions and subsequent 
agitation make caregiving and social interaction difficult. In the final panels, Campbell’s avatar 
reflects how the social losses are double-edged: “grandpa was forgetting us / and the world was 
forgetting him.” There is a visual moment of uncanny recognition following this assertation, as Jim 
and Campbell look at each other as mirror images, sitting on their respective chairs (fig. 2.6). Far 
more than suggesting Campbell (and readers) will eventually grow old and potentially lose their 
bearings on memory, the text powerfully ends on the larger issue of the perpetually disabling cycle of 
contemporary imperialist war. Jim’s last words concludes the text: “Too much of my life was spent 
watching friends die” / “What have I even lived for?” These two comments on senseless violence 
are followed by the penultimate image of Jim, gazing distraughtly and directly at the reader, with a 
newspaper headlined, “Australia Supports Airstrikes in Iraq” (fig. 2.7). The ruthless cycle of violence 
Jim has witnessed in his lifetime propels the final image of him falling off the narrative’s visual rope, 
his disappearance concluding the comic. 
 
   
Figure 2.6 “Too much of my life was spent watching  Figure 2.7 Jim with newspaper titled, “Australia Supports 
friends die,” These Memories     Airstrikes in Iraq,” These Memories 
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The challenge the fading panels intend to pose to readers’ access to and remembrance of the 
narrative forces readers to grapple with the actual disappearance of Jim—as a grandfather, but also a 
veteran—from collective memory. Jim fades from view not because of the presumed dissolution of 
his identity due to dementia but under the march of history repeating itself and his felt 
inconsequence within it. The tragic experience These Memories attempts to convey is more than 
“about” aging and dementia; it is the “social wounding caused by war” (Goler 177). The ethical 
confrontation—or what Ato Quayson might call “aesthetic nervousness”—that occurs between the 
reader and Jim requires an engaged consideration of not only the social marginalization of his 
impairment but the imperialist interventions and that perhaps gave rise to it.96 Like Aliceheimer’s, what 
is most productive about These Memories is how the story reverses the narrative and popular 
metaphor that dementia abets national forgetting. Instead, Jim’s narrative gestures towards an 
awareness of the historical and political contexts that give rise to and shape his dementia, 
highlighting its social and relational constructions. And while Walrath narrates Alice’s return to her 
Armenian history as occasions for rediscovery and healing, Campbell shows Jim’s reliving of trauma 
as acutely painful and disruptive to his family life and care circles. To this the disappearing form of 
These Memories insists on readers’ reflections on the ease with which traumatic images dissipate from 
their view, in comparison to Jim’s lifelong reliving of these images. By forcing readers to un-see 
trauma at every turn, the ephemeral images of These Memories question the impulse of laying claim to 
another’s trauma and even questions the value of flawlessly preserving individual memories in 
contexts like post-traumatic stress. Its temporal experimentations with visualizing intense yet fleeting 
                                               
96 I echo Laura Jordan Jaffee’s writing on the production of cognitive and psychiatric disability under the conditions of 
imperialist war. She argues, “While disability studies scholars and activists should doubtless be concerned with reducing 
the marginalization of individuals labeled with PTSD, they should also be actively engaged in preventing the imperialist 
interventions that give rise to PTSD…Uncritical support and advocacy for a social model that does not account for 
global power imbalances risks invisibilizing instances wherein disability is created through imperialist violence and 
broader geopolitical injustices.” (489) 
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violence and trauma prompt reflection on ethical tensions surrounding one’s “right to forget” 
traumatic memories, alongside the collective necessity to “remember the toll of war and to use that 
memory to resist future wars” (docubase).97 Ending with an image that criticizes Australia’s 
involvement in the U.S.-led occupation of Afghanistan, Campbell foregrounds not merely the toll of 
memory loss but the toll of war; especially how the military apparatus debilitates those occupied and 
oppressed by imperialist forces as well as the individuals called upon to perpetuate it. 
~ 
Walrath and Campbell employ the unique qualities of the graphic medium to embody their 
understandings of their loved ones’ dementia; explore the overlaps in personal and historical 
memory and trauma; and bring into view the intimacy of nevertheless unknowable experiences. 
They draw our attention to the ethical obligation to read dementia and trauma as inextricably tied, 
but not necessarily causational.98 While these texts are careful not to definitively suggest dementia is 
a “symptom” of war or trauma, they nevertheless draw attention to what it might mean to consider 
aging with dementia as embedded in issues related to the legacies of structural and militarized 
violence. Furthermore, Aliceheimer’s and These Memories attest to the importance of broadening the 
understanding of dementia beyond medical discourses and stigmatizing metaphors for cultural 
forgetting, while considering the “healing and magic” that might inhere in these new perspectives.  
                                               
97 Raquel Medina poses a similar ethical question of whether traumatic experience should be remembered for the sake of 
preserving the past for others in her talk on El Tiempo Suspendido (2015), a documentary on the Dirty War in Argentina. 
Medina critiques how filmmaker Natalia Bruschtein unethically triggers her grandmother Laura Boneparte’s memories of 
the war, which she has largely forgotten due to Alzheimer’s. Medina argues eliciting testimony from a person with 
dementia is retraumatizing: by insisting on their remembering for the sake of collective and national memory, one 
neglects the personhood of the person who lived through that trauma. 
98 Beyond reducing stigma and increasing accessibility, Morrison and Casper ask what the “curb cuts for social traumas 
such as war” are, noting that certain types of social trauma (such as empire-building, genocide, and other violence 
conflicts) “are not acute, one-time ordeals” (n.p.). They instructively suggest, “In understanding these enduring traumas 
that are written on and in turn harm the body, we must consider the structural, historical, and geopolitical arrangements 
that shape human affairs at their most intimate and global levels” (n.p.). 
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In reading dementia as an artistic resource for these writers, and a heuristic for thinking 
about history, I do not mean to romanticize it or obscure the importance of the actual lived 
experiences of the people in these texts. I echo Laura Jordan Jaffee writing on cognitive and 
psychiatric disability in the context of imperialist war; Jaffee writes that “romanticizing 
neurodiversity can dangerously depoliticize disability and hinder calls for political action” (489). 
Instead I have aimed to highlight how these works explore the very necessary question of how to 
support and remember loved ones with dementia in individualized ways while recognizing the 
historical and social circumstances in which they are written.  
Thus, I have also hoped to show how the usual interpretive framework of “graphic 
medicine” is not capacious enough to capture the functions of these texts, as they much more than 
about dementia as it relates to health discourse and the construction of a disease; they are reflections 
on representing and bearing witness to violent histories and temporalities of ongoing injustice. As 
texts typically read as only “about dementia,” Aliceheimer’s and These Memories importantly invite 
audiences to examine, perhaps unexpectedly, their own positions as witnesses to stories of the 
potentially distant historical and geopolitical contexts of genocide and war. Indeed, these texts lead 
readers to confront the relational “materiality of difference within specific historical contexts” 
(Erevelles, “Thinking With,” n.p.) in which their subjects’ cognitive impairment is embedded, and 
animate discussions relevant to medical humanities, disability studies, and trauma studies at the 
intersection of contemporary conversations on imperialism and war.  
As Shane Denson argues in the afterword to Transnational Perspectives on Graphic Narratives, 
“the transnational work of comics and graphic narratives—their propensity toward various acts of 
border-crossing, adaptation, and reimagination—[is] a more or less natural extension of volatile core 
processes at work in the act of reading comics” (272). To Denson and other comics scholars’ 
suggestions that comics go hand-in-hand with reimagining borders, I would add that the 
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experimental, border-crossing work of the texts I have explored in this dissertation is also a natural 
extension of authors’ attempts to represent and interpret the complex experiences of dementia.  
The next chapter continues exploring the connections between the representation of 
historical trauma, post-traumatic stress, and dementia. As I shift to popular fiction over the 
remainder of this dissertation, I delve deeper into how the narrative deployment of dementia, genre, 
and gender are strategically tied. Playing with the conventions of their respective genres, the 
subsequent authors I examine center on dramatizing the tensions between the “alternative realities” 
and “lived realities” of dementia—something each “entangled story” has touched on. Turning to 
writers’ attempts to represent the experience of dementia through popular genres, I highlight works 
that show the utility of fiction in commenting on the realities of aging and dementia care as well as 





Reorienting Realities: Gender, Aging, and Care in the Genre Fictions of  
Emma Healey and Jo Walton 
 
 
 In many of the texts this dissertation has explored, authors grapple with the representation 
of a family member’s experience of fluctuating realities accompanying dementia-related cognitive 
changes. Dramatizing moments of lucidity, confusion, and states in-between, writers like Ruth 
Ozeki, Susan M. Schultz, and Dana Walrath draw upon the lived experience and trope of dementia’s 
“alternative realities” as a means to contemplate shifting mother-daughter relationships, 
temporalities of injustice, traumatic histories, and enduring legacies of violence. They also present 
readers with ways of thinking about life with dementia that move beyond detrimentally popular 
“zombie” and “living death” narratives often attached to mainstream representations of dementia’s 
“non-reality.”99 Instead, the authors I have chosen to highlight are united by a purpose to take the 
realities of persons with dementia as valid and meaningful—having heuristic, epistemic, and 
ontological value. They foreground opportunities for reflective connection and consideration of the 
expressions of insight and joy that can emerge from non-normative orientations to reality. This 
chapter turns to works of genre fiction that deliberately deploy, if not exaggerate, the notion of 
dementia’s alternative realities as essential to their narrative forms, and to elaborate on what I 
                                               
99 See Susan M. Behuniak, “The Living Dead? The Construction of People with Alzheimer’s Disease as Zombies.” 
Ageing & Society 31 (2011): 70-92. 
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identify to be an important trend to note in contemporary representations of dementia; that is, the 
engagement with values lying at the heart of person-centered dementia care. 
Recognizing the realities of people with dementia is a value at the heart of person-centered 
dementia care: a philosophy of care Tom Kitwood, Kathleen Bredin, and others have advocated for 
since the 1990s and is now the core of the 2018 Alzheimer’s Association Dementia Care Practice 
Recommendations.100 Challenging traditional (bio)medical models of care favoring psychotropic 
drugs and behavioral policing, person-centered care stresses the importance of “personal choice and 
autonomy,” its key components being: 
(a) valuing and respecting persons with dementia and those who care for them; (b) treating 
people with dementia as individuals with unique needs; (c) seeing the world from the perspective of 
the person with dementia, so as to understand the person’s behavior and what is being communicated, and 
validating the subjective experience that is being perceived as the reality of the individual; and (d) creating a 
positive social environment in which the person with dementia can experience relative well-
being through care that promotes the building of relationships. (Fazio 12; emphasis mine)101 
 
This shift to the necessity of understanding the “reality of the individual” rejects an earlier approach 
to dementia treatment known as “reality orientation.” Echoing previous chapters’ exploration of 
connections between dementia, trauma, and post-traumatic stress, it is perhaps not surprising that 
reality orientation began as an attempt to help rehabilitate war veterans by presenting them with 
facts and truths related to time, place, and person, the aim being to enforce their understanding of 
their surroundings and selves—their reality—through rote memorization.102 Employing props such 
as clocks, calendars, maps, and weather charts, administrators of reality orientation sought to cure 
“the problems of confused elderly people” through the rehearsal of facts (Folsom 343). Day in and 
                                               
100 See Tom Kitwood and Kathleen Bredin, “Toward a Theory of Dementia Care: Personhood and Well-being” Ageing 
and Society 12 (1992): 269-287.   
101 See Dawn Brooker “What is person centred-care for people with dementia?” Reviews in Clinical Gerontology 13 (2004): 
215-222.  
102 Lucille Taulbee and James Folsom popularized the use of reality orientation for dementia treatment in the 1960s, 
marking the advent of psychological therapy in the care of dementia, which previously had been viewed as a medical 
problem with medical intervention; see Taulbee and Folsom, “Reality Orientation for Geriatric Patients,” Hosp 
Community Psychiatry (1966) 17.5 (1966): 133-5. 
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day out, doctors and staff continually reminded patients of the “correct” reality they were to inhabit. 
Contrastingly, person-centered care is founded on the premise dementia should be understood as a 
neurological impairment with psychosocial factors, and thus seeks to accommodate and affirm the 
fluctuating realities of dementia as integral to personhood through interpersonal approaches 
(Kitwood “The Technical”). Through reminiscence therapy and role playing, for instance, caregivers 
and others can facilitate opportunities for people with dementia to embody and express conflicting 
realities simultaneously, offering them means for expressing “a sense of continuity with the past; and 
hence a ‘narrative,’ a story to present to others” (Kitwood Dementia Reconsidered 83). This emphasis 
on freedom of the imagination over retention of memory is central to the kinds of “creative care” 
projects that, for example, MacArthur award-winning theater artist and educator Anne Davis Basting 
has been developing over the last 15 years.103 With the importance of storytelling to care in mind, 
this chapter examines the nexus between the representation of dementia, realities, and writing that is 
productively (re)imagined through popular genres, which have a profound influence on the societal 
perception of dementia in mainstream culture. 
Practices of person-centered care that stress “seeing the world from the perspective of the 
individual with dementia” can be imaginatively rehearsed through reading literary texts, particularly 
first-person narratives. Since autobiographical accounts written by people with later stages of 
dementia are not common or possible, popular fiction has a monopoly on mainstream perceptions 
of what the realities of dementia are like. In this chapter, I explore two award-winning genre fiction 
novels, Emma Healey’s Elizabeth is Missing and Jo Walton’s My Real Children. Both texts take up the 
notion that people with dementia live in “alternate” or “multiple” realities thematically and at the 
level of narrative form. Each text focalizes their protagonists’ relationship with the past in a way that 
                                               
103 See TimeSlips and The Penelope Project: An Arts-Based Odyssey to Change in Elder Care ed. Anne Basting, Maureen Towey, 
Allie Rose (University of Iowa Press, 2016). 
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is inseparable from their experience of differing realities, as well as their embeddedness in networks 
of care and marginalization. Raising ethical, epistemological, and representational issues, these texts 
play with generic conventions to communicate the subjective experience of dementia differently: 
Elizabeth is Missing is told through first-person narration in the mode of a detective mystery, while My 
Real Children relies on the realism of fictional biography within the frame of speculative fiction. 
Together, they highlight the perspectives of “old women with memory problems,”104 and underscore 
the value in validating alternate realities and foregrounding the voices of aging, vulnerable subjects. 
More than serving a discussion exclusively surrounding dementia, these texts also contribute to 
discussion regarding the material, social, and environmental factors that shape the experience of 
plural, fluctuating realities that all aging and contingent bodies and minds may eventually experience. 
I heed Michael Bérubé’s caution against reading “a literary text in one hand and the DSM-5 
in the other,” recognizing that a disability studies analytic can limit itself unnecessarily “whenever it 
confines itself to determining the disability status of individual characters” (20). My reading moves 
beyond evaluating the diagnostic accuracy of dementia representation and attends to how and why 
authors formally frame their representations to comment on social structures and practices 
surrounding dementia and aging.105 Importantly, I explore how Healey and Walton mobilize 
dementia in the context of the generic “role” their characters assume in the context of the respective 
popular genres they inhabit, offering insights into how these texts ask audiences to read mainstream 
conceptions of dementia differently.106 Indeed, both dementia and popular genres such as detective 
and science fiction present “possibilities for readers to consider profound questions about the nature 
of reality, as well as the potency and limits of human understanding” (Cohran and Cannon 2). In 
                                               
104 Jo Walton, My Real Children 315. Subsequent quotations appear in parenthesis.  
105 For an example of a diagnostic reading of Elizabeth see Chloe Harrison, “Finding Elizabeth: Construing memory in 
Elizabeth is Missing by Emma Healey” Journal of Literary Semantics, 46.2 (2017): 131-151. 
106 Extending the concerns Ria Cheyne writes of in the introduction to the 2012 special issue of Journal of Cultural and 
Literary Disability Studies, “Popular Genres and Disability Representation.”  
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other words, in each text, gender, genre, and dementia are strategically linked, and both Healey and 
Walton play with the conventions of their fictions in order to raise ethical consciousness 
surrounding gendered issues of power, choice, agency, and care.  
Through Healey and Walton’s texts, I highlight the significance of literary representation 
within popular generic frameworks in the context of thinking about issues related to the actual 
experience and public imagination of dementia as a gendered experience that disproportionately 
affects women as both receivers and givers of care.107 Both published in 2014, Healey and Walton’s 
novels dovetail with a slew of public discourses sensationalizing facts and figures that locate women 
at “the epicenter of Alzheimer’s disease” (Geiger qtd. in Alzheimer’s Association 2014). As such, news 
media and medical research headlines from the Telegraph to Alzheimer’s Research have been fervent in 
arraigning the personification of Alzheimer’s and dementia as Britain’s (and other nation’s) “biggest 
killer of women” (“Women and Dementia” 3). In their literature review on women and dementia, 
Katherine Ludwin and Gillian Parker point out, “Women’s voices within the dementia field are 
relatively quiet and we know little about their experiences, in relation to gendered issues such as 
power, control, choice and influence” (n.p.). Healey and Walton’s novels offer audiences an 
imaginative window into these voices and experiences in a way that policy discourse and research 
literature cannot, providing counternarratives to “the endless and systemic negative discourse in the 
public domain…by care partners and others not diagnosed with dementia” that factor into current 
shortcomings to care (Swaffer xii).  
Winner of the 2014 Costa First Book Award—given to works of high literary merit and 
broad appeal—Elizabeth draws on popular genres of psychological thriller, crime fiction, and the 
                                               
107 In a Western context. However, research from the 2015 World Alzheimer Report shows this gendered dimension 
spans across geographic locations and economic differences. On the socioeconomic factors contributing to the 
overrepresentation of women in the population of people with dementia and caregiving see Rosie Erol et al. “Women 
and Dementia: A Global Research Review.” 
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detective novel, and is based on Healey’s experience with her own family members with dementia.108 
In Elizabeth, the trope of living two realities sets the stage for the aging Maud Horsham’s concurrent 
investigations into her missing friend Elizabeth and the unsolved murder of her sister Sukey. 
Dementia enables Maud to recollect, albeit unreliably, buried clues from her childhood in postwar 
Britain and structures an alternating yet porous narrative between past and present. I focus my 
analysis on how the gendered dimensions of Maud’s dementia and her role as detective counter 
masculinist conventions of what Ria Cheyne calls the “cognitively exceptional detective” (185); 
challenge the medical model of dementia and ableism embedded in “aging well”; and ultimately 
requires readers to not only reflect on the logics of crime and clues in the frame of the detective 
novel, but the ethics of care.109 Overall, I show how the interplay between “demented” detection and 
reading in Elizabeth attests to the importance of attending to the reality and perspective of those with 
dementia as a means of forging meaningful encounters and alternate paths to knowledge. 
The second section of this chapter examines Jo Walton’s My Real Children, winner of the 
2014 James Tiptree, Jr. Award for best literary work of science fiction/fantasy that encourages the 
“exploration and expansion of gender” (Tiptree.org). The award, named after the male pseudonym 
Alice B. Sheldon strategically employed during her science fiction career, signals the novel’s 
inventive engagement with the construction of gendered identities. Tracking the two life courses of 
89-year-old Patricia Cowan following her decisions to a marriage ultimatum, the narrative unfolds in 
alternating biographical timelines. The possibility of two lives is also premised on Cowan’s 
experience with dementia, enabling Walton to explore differing outcomes of World War II and the 
                                               
108 As Healey told Frances Atkinson at the Sydney Morning Herald, the inspiration for the novel came from inspiration for 
the novel: “Several members of my family have, or have had, one form of dementia or another…I was in the car with 
my grandmother Nancy who said ‘My friend is missing’.” Her friend wasn't missing, but the remark ignited an idea that 
quickly turned into something more substantial.” 
109 Following Ria Cheyne I am using ‘detective fiction/novel’ as an umbrella term encompassing crime and mystery 
genres. See “Disability in Genre Fiction” The Cambridge Companion to Literature and Disability ed. Clare Barker and Stuart 
Murray. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2018): 185-198. 
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multiple trajectories of feminist politics and motherhood that ensue. The aging female subject with 
dementia is instrumental to the novel’s investment in gendered issues and challenging the 
construction of life as a singular identity through its expansion and exploration of multiple situated 
realities. Crossings into subgenres of biographical fiction and alternate history, the novel puts 
Cowan’s dual lives into a lucid narrative to talk about access, care, and family. Using dementia as its 
speculative framework, My Real Children invites readers to imagine the possibilities to be found in 
recognizing a kind of life history and experience often dismissed as unreliable. 
My juxtaposition of two different genres takes up Rick Carpenter’s injunction that “We must 
recall that genres are not simply conduits by which individuals express themselves; rather, genres 
both shape and reproduce communicative situations and identities” (n.p.). How do the chosen 
genres Healey and Walton write in enable, shape, and limit the realities and social relations of their 
characters in terms of dementia, age, and gender? How do readers’ unexpected encounters with 
them create avenues for change? Read together, Elizabeth and My Real Children co-opt and challenge 
genre-specific conventions of disability and gender representation, suspending readers’ expectations 
of a narrative of dementia as a progressive descent into non-identity. Instead, these texts are invested 
in the ingenuity and validity of the reorienting realities of their characters’ dementia and therefore 
assert the importance of perspectives dementia and aging have to offer imaginative fiction and 
imagined worlds. Both texts amplify the contribution popular literary narrative offers in challenging 
and transforming the cultural discourse of dementia, aging, and thinking about ethics of care. 
 
Gender, Dementia, and Detection in Elizabeth is Missing 
An image of the lower-half of a young woman wearing heels and a knee-length skirt carrying 
a suitcase walks across the 2015 Harper Perennial cover of Elizabeth is Missing. “HOW DO YOU 
SOLVE A MYSTERY WHEN YOU CAN’T REMEMBER THE CLUES?” reads the blurb under 
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the main title, swiftly calling market audiences’ attention to the way memory impairment will supply 
the drama for an unsolved crime. Elizabeth crosses several genres, but also emerges out of a long 
tradition of “cozy mysteries,” a subgenre of detective stories traditionally (though not exclusively) 
dominated by white, female authors and marketed to female audiences (Oleksiw).110 Light in tone 
and defined by an eruption of violence in an apparently tranquil, closed world, the cozy has been 
criticized for taking crime frivolously, but at its best, the form effectively raises questions about 
community (ibid.). Katharina Vester observes that cozy mysteries “usually do not have an explicit 
feminist agenda, although they commonly feature capable, strong, and smart women at their center,” 
pointing out that the female sleuths in these texts typically “solve crimes with skills that are 
stereotyped as feminine, such as relating to other people, listening, gossiping, community-building, 
and networking. Feminine-connoted knowledge…gives the women sleuths an edge over the male 
police detectives…who are depicted as rational and evidence—rather than intuition-driven—thus, 
directly juxtaposing normative masculine and feminine behavior” (33). Vester and other scholars 
have pointed to Agatha Christie’s Miss Marple as the archetypical female sleuth who “utilizes her 
ubiquitous and unobtrusive position in society as a vantage point from which to collect information” 
(Maslin 106). The “ubiquitous and unobtrusive” position in society female sleuths occupy is thus 
achieved through their performance of gendered tasks and, in the case of Miss Marple and Maud 
Horsham, their performance and perception as “old women.” 
Like Miss Marple, Maud is an unassuming, unexpected sleuth due to the societal 
underestimation of elders; as she says, “I am old and nobody is looking at me” (78).111 In the 
following remark about how she is dressed at church, Maud presents her invisible status as an 
                                               
110 The cozy mystery developed from classic English detective stories and dominated the genre of detection throughout 
the 1920s and 30s until thriller and hard-boiled genres rose in the 1940s and 50s. It resurged in popularity in the 1980s 
and continues to be popular today. 
111 Echoing Miss Marple’s remarks about her own sleuthing in Nemesis: “She had no suspicion, I think, that I had any 
wish for the information apart from being well, rather muddle-headed, elderly and very worried” (387). 
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octogenarian as a performance of an unfortunate role: “I only really need glasses for reading, but 
they make you wear them all the time once you reach a certain age. It’s part of the uniform. How 
would they know you were an old duffer otherwise? They want you to have the right props so they 
can tell you apart from people who have the decency to be under seventy. False teeth, hearing aid, 
glasses, I’ve been given them all” (35). Maud’s community, the “you” she addresses, presumes her 
incompetent, and they are often “frightened off” by her “inarticulacy” (80). Maud is unlike her 
“sharp-eyed, sharp-tongued” generic predecessor, Miss Marple (Barnard 96). Critics point out that 
what Christie’s Miss Marple novels “propose is that there is a logic which is structured around the 
minutiae of life which can nevertheless inexorably reach into the very depths of human society and 
the human psyche. And they suggest that women, particularly old women, because they are attuned 
to the trivia of existence, are therefore endowed with logical powers which make them ideal arbiters 
of justice” (Shaw and Vanacker 34). Absent from the critical conversation is how the cozy mystery’s 
archetypical “old woman” detective hinges on cognitive normalcy and exceptionalism as a conduit to 
reasoning through a crime as much as the masculine tradition of hard-boiled detective fiction does. 
Miss Marple’s mental abilities of observation become keener with the experience that comes with 
age and time spent in her village, and she is typically granted social recognition from characters.112 
While Miss Marple eavesdrops on key conversations to garner clues because young people don’t 
think she’s listening, the absence of conversation in Maud’s presence precludes her from listening. 
Maud’s behavior with dementia (i.e. repeatedly asking questions and her difficulties accessing 
language) deters those around her from speaking plainly to her, and thus characters withhold 
information regarding Elizabeth throughout the novel. The female sleuth’s means of detection and 
the dynamics of her social in/visibility must be examined with nuanced attention to gender, age, as 
                                               
112 For example, in What Mrs. McGillicuddy Saw! an inspector notes, “Everybody in St. Mary Mead knew Miss Marple; 
fluffy and dithery in appearance but inwardly, as sharp and shrewd as they make them” (16-17).  
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well as cognitive disability. 
Chronicling Maud’s detection, Elizabeth facilitates critical investigation into the assumptions 
and attitudes surrounding aging women, age-related impairment, and gendered, ableist norms of 
genre that privilege exceptional cognition. These norms buttress Sherlock Holmesian masculine 
values of “observation, rationalism, factuality, [and] logic” (Kestner 2) as well as the “powers of 
shrewd observation and manipulation” typical of “older,” “spinster” female sleuths such as Miss 
Marple (Mezei 104). Agreeing with Casey A. Cothran and Mercy Cannon’s assertion that because the 
detective genre “has taken hold of the public imagination in popular and pleasurable ways, it is 
uniquely positioned to intervene in social ideologies and assumptions,” I begin this chapter with 
how Elizabeth challenges intertwined expectations surrounding dementia, gender, and genre (3).  
Disability as a category of inquiry in detective fiction is an emergent field.113 Critics’ focus on 
the archetype of the “defective detectives” that emerged in popularity the 1930s were of exclusively 
male characters, typically in hard-boiled genres (Hoppenstand and Browne). The representation of 
disability in detective fiction has been limited to the “super crip” narrative, in which the detective is 
physically impaired in some way yet is “remedially endowed with super-human intellect” such as 
John Dickson Carr’s corpulent Doctor Fell (Hafferty and Foster 189). Likewise, cognitive 
impairment has a long-standing place in the detective genre as cognitive exceptionality, as Sonya 
Freeman Loftis points out in her examination of “the stereotype of the detective with autistic traits” 
in Arthur Conan Doyle’s stories (n.p.).114 Stuart Murray and Kathleen McHugh have pointed out 
that some recent contemporary detective fictions have set out to revise these tropes with more 
                                               
113 Susannah B. Mintz’s forthcoming The Disabled Detective: Sleuthing Disability in Contemporary Crime Fiction (2019) published 
by Bloomsbury is the first monograph to explore the topic; also see Irving Kenneth Zola, “Any Distinguishing Features? 
-- the Portrayal of Disability in the Crime-Mystery Genre,” Policy Studies Journal 15.3 (1987): 485-513. 
114 In the last decade, male detectives with dementia have made frequent appearance on popular television, such as in 
Nic Pizzolatto’s True Detective Season 3. On male detectives with dementia in crime drama, see Sadie Wearing, “Troubled 
Men: Ageing, Dementia and Masculinity in Contemporary British Crime Drama,” Journal of British Cinema and Television, 
14.2 (2017): 125-142. Wearing observes how these shows hinge on anxieties surrounding age-related mental impairment 
as they trouble masculine ideals and gendered roles related to self-reliance, power, and authority. 
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nuanced understandings of cognitive difference.115 But more often than not, hard-boiled and cozy 
mysteries alike that feature “unusually minded protagonists” rely on the trope of  “cognitive 
exceptionality” regardless of gender (Cheyne 187). Cozy mysteries may “depict women’s bodies in 
unusual ways,” but female protagonists such as Selma Eicher’s Desiree Shapiro are often endowed 
with “mind[s] as sharp as a Cuisinart” (qtd in Vester 34). The untrained senior citizen detectives in 
Rita Lakin’s Getting Old is Murder (2015) and Linda Stone’s What’s Going on at the Montcliff? (2012) 
likewise show the continuity of mental ability in old age with superficial attention to the realities of 
memory impairment. Miss Marple, too, embodies a privileged societal position within the medical 
model of “successful aging.”116 So even as these texts resist the assumption and stigma of mental 
decline in old age, they corroborate in ageist and ableist models of successful aging associated with 
maintaining youthful lifestyles and one’s cognitive abilities.  
One of my goals is to show how the perspective of the female detective with dementia in 
Elizabeth forcefully contributes to deprivileging the expected qualities of reason, objectivity, and self-
reliance archetypal of male detectives and the able-mindedness accompanying aging female sleuths, 
while positing dementia as a meaningful, complex lived reality inscribed by relational experiences.  
In short, Healey’s creation of an “old duffer” like Maud offers a fresh perspective to discussions in 
gender, disability, and detective fiction. Glenwood Irons’ introduction to Feminism in Women’s 
Detective Fiction explains that female authors “who have chosen to create a woman (and sometimes a 
feminist) detective have altered the male prototype to the extent that their detectives speak from a 
                                               
115 The figure of the “neurotect” in texts such as Jonathan Lethem’s Motherless Brooklyn (2000) and Mark Haddon’s The 
Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-Time (2004), Murray argues, are productively read in the context of neurodiversity; 
see Stuart Murray, “Neurotecs: Detectives, Disability and Cognitive Exceptionality in Contemporary Fiction,” ed. 
Christiana Gregoriou, Constructing Crime: Discourse and Cultural Representation of Crime and “Deviance” (Bastingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012) 177-89; also see Hugh, “The Female Detective, Neurodiversity, and Felt Knowledge in Engrenages and 
Bron/Broen” Television and New Media 19.6: 535-552.  
116  In 1987, John Rowe and Robert Kahn introduced a distinction between “usual” aging and “successful” aging, 
defined as “avoidance of disease and disability, followed by maintenance of cognitive and physical function, which 
should enable social engagement” (Berridge and Martinson 84). I discuss the ableism and ageism inherent in the model 
of “successful aging” in more depth in the next section on My Real Children. 
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woman’s perspective and address the problems which women face in modern society” (13).117 But as 
the essays in the collection show, both critics and writers have tended to either focus on the 
perspectives of youthful, able-bodied/-minded women or take the cognitive abilities of older sleuths 
as givens. Unlike Miss Marple who represents “the intelligence of women and their undeniable 
function in establishing order” Elizabeth’s confused and often disoriented Maud attests to a different 
kind of mental capacity that characters around her are conditioned to overlook (Köseoglu 136). 
Like other texts this dissertation has explored, dementia is deployed in Elizabeth as a trope 
and to drive the narrative. As in A Tale for the Time Being and Dementia Blog, dementia’s temporal 
fluctuation between past and present is used to structure the temporality of the narrative and as a 
trope to reflect the lived perception of violent histories inconceivable as finished. For example, as 
the novel moves between Maud’s narration of the present and her adolescence, two parallel worlds 
emerge in which Maud searches for two important missing women in her life: her friend Elizabeth 
and sister Sukey, who was murdered after World War II. Readers have a sense Elizabeth is not 
actually missing—Maud just can’t remember where she is—but nevertheless Maud is propelled by 
immense concern for both women and the sense that the atmosphere of violence against women 
engendered by the war has never dissipated. These two narrative strands of past and present 
crisscross as objects, smells, sounds, and people in Maud’s environment trigger flashbacks as well as 
flashforwards, such as when Maud’s memory of Sukey’s “Victory Red” lipstick triggers a skip in the 
narrative to Maud’s present-day search for a shade of Victory Red at the department store (and she 
is there, associatively, because of her last memory of “[o]ne of the last times Elizabeth went 
shopping” [34]) (40). Thus, the mystery of two unsolved disappearances are intertwined in Maud’s 
confusions of time and place, and Maud’s obsession with them drives the narrative.  
                                               
117 For a feminist account of crime writing by women that work to destabilize tropes of the heroic male detective see 
Susan Rowland, From Agatha Christie to Ruth Rendell: British Women Writers in Detective and Crime Fiction. (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2001). 
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Critics and reviewers of the novel have tended to focus on how these confusions are 
“symptoms” of dementia contributing to a “haunting depiction of mental illness” (The Observer). In 
these readings, Maud’s dementia is sensationalized as a “harrowing” source of unreliable narration, 
facilitating the novel’s crossings into “psychological thriller” (Sunday Times, BBC, etc.). However, 
these readings overlook the nuance with which Healey approaches Maud’s reality—not just as a 
potent plot driver or trope as I point out above—but also as a means of offering social critique on 
gendered roles and the labels and generic expectations that circumscribe her reality. As Katsura Sako 
similarly argues, the novel avoids “reducing dementia to a biophysical condition that only affects 
individuals with the condition,” and instead 
imagines the experience of living with dementia in the social and interpersonal space. Maud’s 
interactions with others ‒ from a shopkeeper at the corner shop and Elizabeth’s son to her 
GP and a police officer who receives and dismisses Maud’s multiple missing person’s reports 
for Elizabeth -- illustrate encounters in which Maud’s psychological reality is dismissed by 
the normative logic of society. This structure of marginalization is also suggested in the 
parallel drawn in the narrative between Maud and Violet, Douglas’s mentally disturbed 
mother, who knows what has happened to Sukey but is dismissed by the community, 
including Maud, every time she tries to tell what she knows. (322-323) 
 
I would add to Sako’s argument that Maud’s psychological reality is also a commentary on the 
primacy emotion plays in her detection and the gendered nature of emotional labor that goes under 
acknowledged by people around her. From the onset of the novel Maud is exasperated by those 
around her, including her daughter Helen, who refuse to acknowledge her fluctuating realities: 
Helen sighs again. She’s doing a lot of that lately. She won’t listen, won’t take me seriously, 
imagines that I want to live in the past. I know what she’s thinking, that I’ve lost my 
marbles…I forget things—I know that—but I’m not mad. Not yet. And I’m sick of being 
treated as if I am. I’m tired of the sympathetic smiles and the little pats people give you when 
you get things confused, and I’m bloody fed up with everyone deferring to Helen rather than 
listening to what I have to say. (19-20) 
 
Characters Maud encounters not only dismiss her because dementia places her outside of “the 
normative logic of society”—it is also because she challenges gendered expectations of rational 
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production that dominate her world, and the novel is self-reflexive about the masculine conventions 
that structure the generic world in which her character lives.  
Maud emerges as a subversive detective figure not just because she doesn’t think rationally 
or logically due to her memory impairment; it is also because her pull toward investigating the 
missing cases of Elizabeth and Sukey is motivated by her embodied emotional knowledge and what 
reads as an instinctual responsibility to care (both traditionally regarded as feminine performative 
acts). As many scholars have already explored, the dominance of rational, logical thinking in Western 
thought and crime and detective fiction is steeped in the discourse of masculinity (Ross-Smith and 
Kornberger). Consequently, as Bendelow and Williams point out, “emotions have tended to be 
dismissed as private, ‘irrational’, inner sensations that have been tied, historically to women’s 
‘dangerous desires’ and ‘hysterical bodies’…emotions [that] need to be…‘driven out’ by the steady 
hand of (male) reason” (131). Maud, then, embodies a subversion to this image of reason as both 
male and able-bodied/minded. 
Maud’s “irrational” “inner sensations” are dramatized through her impulsive and animalistic 
desire to dig. She constantly “digging a pen and bit of paper” (127) from her handbag to write down 
clues as a route to knowing. But going further, when the prologue introduces Maud’s initial 
discovery of a clue (Sukey’s makeup compact), it does so through a primal image of Maud digging as 
if instinctually for food: “I’ve missed this tiny thing for nearly seventy years. And now the earth, 
made sludgy and chewable with the melting snow, has spat out a relic. Spat it into my hand. But 
where from? That’s what I can’t discover. Where did it lie before it became the gristle in the earth’s 
meal?” (2) Maud’s affective pull to dig in the soil as a means of locating Sukey runs parallel with the 
digging and foraging tendencies of the “mad woman.” As readers learn late in the novel, the mad 
woman, Violet, roams the streets of Maud’s narrative past also mourning and searching for a lost 
loved one: her daughter Dora “run over by a bus, before the war” (270). I will address Violet in 
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more depth later in this chapter, but for now, it’s important to note how both Maud and Violet are 
constructed as “hysterical” social outliers because they figuratively embody, obsessively, the 
extremes of a feminized instinct to care. Unlike the rational male detective, in both narrative strands, 
Maud’s role as detective in locating Elizabeth is also figured in similar terms of emotion over logic. 
When Maud goes to the site of her old house, she expresses her difficulty with reasoning: “I’m not 
sure what to do. I see a light on in the kitchen, but I can’t think how to get there. It all seems so 
familiar, as if it should call up memories, but I can’t reach them. There’s a layer of other people’s 
lives on top…‘Elizabeth is missing!’ I shout…I shout it again and again” (260). Maud is not 
rationally tactful in this scene but rather exercises her will through emotive shouting as a means of 
finding the person she is looking for in the layers of other people’s lives in the house, piled up like 
the soil she often digs through. There is no formal plan underlying Maud’s digging for objects, 
instead, it is a process of emotional excavation. Maud’s safekeeping of found objects or “piles of 
junk” is viewed by characters in the novel to be a pathological sign of dementia and senile behavior, 
as Helen exasperatedly insists to Maud not to “collect old rubbish” (163). However, the novel 
eventually reveals the importance this emotionally-driven act of digging to Maud’s sleuthing.  
This motif of (emotional) “digging” returns at the novel’s end and stages the uncovering of 
the mystery of Sukey’s disappearance. Maud’s emotional pull toward the garden of Elizabeth’s home 
is strengthened by every flashback she has to the past, through which memories of Sukey, the mad 
woman, and others emerge as clues. In the last chapter, Maud’s daughter Helen finally takes her 
repetitive insistence someone is buried in Elizabeth’s garden seriously. Observing Helen dig up the 
garden, Maud notes: “as more dirt is displaced I see it has a missing piece, a crack, a mark of 
violence, hollow and dark against the pallor” (286). At this point readers learn Maud has in fact 
pieced together the mystery and lead us to Sukey’s body, and Helen realizes the value of Maud’s 
perspective. The narrative suggests Sukey’s alcoholic husband Frank was the culprit, ostensibly 
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bringing closure to the seventy-year-old mystery. This happenstance discovery in the context of the 
detective novel, Sako argues, “draws attention to Maud’s cognitive failure, presenting her as an 
incapable detective. The novel, however, re-imagines the self with dementia in the social and 
interpersonal space, in ways that challenge the masculine detective agency and the ableist conception 
of subjectivity” (320). For Sako the discovery of Sukey’s body “doubly subverts the premise of the 
classical model of detection in its coincidental and collaborative nature” while also pointing to “the 
possibility of agency in dementia in the intersubjective space” (324). Importantly this scene’s 
emphasis on Maud’s “irrational,” intersubjective agency disrupts the traditional masculine premises 
of classic crime and detection narratives in which truth is obtained through intuitive logic, 
observation, and inference (what Edgar Allan Poe referred to as “tales of ratiocination”118).  
Elizabeth’s tracing of Maud’s investigative detective work as an emotional rather than 
practical matter makes visible a pattern of how rational investigative logic embodied by the police 
consistently fails to do the missing women in the novel justice and take women’s experiences of 
violence seriously. Law enforcement often functions to confirm or legitimize the intuitive knowledge 
of female detectives, but this convention operates differently in Elizabeth since Maud’s experience of 
reality is multiple, and thus some crimes unresolvable by conventional means. The paradox 
Kimberly Maslin observes to surround Miss Marple offers a useful counterpoint here. Maslin argues 
that although Christie’s novels gesture “toward the establishment of intuition and situational 
knowledge as legitimate ways of knowing,” they still seek “legitimation in traditional sources of 
authority” and “evidence gained through sense perception; objective, detached sources; and 
methodically acquired means” (106). While Miss Marple’s knowledge is often verified by inspectors 
or policemen, Maud’s investigation is always already taken as jest (Maslin 110).  
                                               
118 See The Letters of Edgar Allan Poe, ed. John Ward Ostrom (New York: Gordian Press, 1966), p. 328. 
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The novel comments on how patriarchy intersects with ageism and ableism, and how these 
shape Maud and other women’s experience as well as the response of policemen. When Maud 
reports Elizabeth as missing, the police officer demeaningly dismisses her concern with no empathy 
or interest in understanding her desire to take action in the search for Elizabeth:  
He laughs. “Oh yeah. I’ve got every man on the force out. Sniffer dogs, forensics, flying 
squad. They’re all out there”—he pauses to skim a hand through the air—“looking for your 
friend Elizabeth.” I go hot at his words. My armpits pickle. I can see what he thinks of me 
now, and I feel sick. The tears spill over, finally, and I turn away so he won’t see them…If 
the police won’t take me seriously, what chance is there of ever seeing Elizabeth again?” (85) 
 
Maud’s emotional response to this dismissal prompts her to relive a moment from her childhood 
when a policeman responds to Sukey’s missing person report and arrives at her family’s home. In 
this scene, readers learn Sergeant Needham does not pursue Sukey’s case with urgency—for there 
was “not much of a case” (87)—rationalizing Sukey to be a runaway rather than a targeted victim of 
violence: “The men can’t get used to being back on Civvy Street, or the women can’t get used to 
having their husbands home again, and so they’re off. And we get the poor abandoned folk crying to 
us” (86). Needham’s skepticism reflects a postwar culture that normalizes and minimalizes male 
violence against women, something that haunts Maud’s search for Elizabeth, as she feels Peter, 
Elizabeth’s son, has done something terrible to her. Needham and the officer in the previous scene 
fail Elizabeth, Sukey, and Maud because their inability to think and act outside the patterns of their 
masculine detective roles, underpinned by reason and logic, forecloses further investigation. 
Maud’s drive and ability to solve the crime due to her dementia positions her as a subversive 
figure that challenges masculine detective agency while also commenting on gendered and 
internalized vulnerability. The first line of the first chapter begins with Maud’s carer, Carla, asking 
Maud, “You know there was an old woman murdered around here?…They found her with half her 
face smashed in” (3). This not only sets up concern for what might have potentially happened to 
Elizabeth but is the first of many recurring incidences of violence against women that go unsolved 
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by the police—all of whom are male in the novel, and thus also a symbol of patriarchal crime 
control. In a casually cruel pattern of caregiver abuse, Carla’s question frightens Maud (“I wish Carla 
wouldn’t tell me these things; they leave me with an uneasy feeling long after I’ve forgotten the 
stories themselves” [3]). It also is the first of several references to news headlines about violence to 
women that have permeated Maud’s life since Sukey’s disappearance (i.e. reportage on the 
“Grosvenor Hotel murder” that sends her town into a panic, “worrying that more of their women 
folk had become victims of the vile murderer” [215]). Maud’s response to Carla illustrates how she 
has also internalized these expectations of violence, indoctrinated since childhood, responding with 
a sketchy recital of the quintessential fable of elder violence, “Little Red Riding Hood”: “Once upon 
a time in a deep, dark forest, there lived an old, old woman named Maud. I can’t think what the next 
bit should be” (3). Alluding to the grandmother who will be eaten by the wolf in her home, the 
opening scene of Elizabeth foregrounds women as targets of violence but also signals that Maud will, 
to some degree, try to write her own story. 
The novel most succinctly illustrates Maud’s subversion of gender roles in Chapter 11 when 
Maud, acting on emotion, steps out of the domestic and private domain of the home into the streets 
of the neighborhood in her late husband’s clothing. Fluctuating between her childhood and present-
day reality, she senses: “Something’s happened. I have to get up, get out, get to Sukey. I pull on a 
man’s striped shirt and worn, unfamiliar trousers…I wonder if this is a dream. I don’t think it is…I 
set off toward Frank’s house” (153). Taking the search for Sukey into her own hands, Maud’s 
autonomy challenges the patriarchal structure of the police culture that has both infantilized and 
subordinated her on many occasions. Maud’s detective work is framed as so much of a disruption to 
gendered expectations that she must literally be arrested by a police officer for it. Maud’s arrest—
essentially a criminalization of her wandering—is also told in the terms of an abduction: preceded by 
the appearance of a fox (a classic trickster figure), the police officer is narrated by Maud in a way 
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that suggests he might be a stalker or rapist rather than public protector: “A car stops at the end of 
the road and a man gets out. He wanders toward me, his hands hooked in his belt…I begin to back 
away. ‘Where are you going, love?’ he says…‘Home,’ I call as I turn away, trying to force my legs to 
go faster…I want to leave something behind me, something to tell people I was here…‘Frank,’ I say. 
‘Frank.’” (154-55). That the officer reminds Maud of Frank, Sukey’s presumed murderer, comments 
on Maud’s sense of shared vulnerability with other women in the novel, something I will address 
more later in the chapter.  
What I want to emphasize here is the text’s dramatization of how Maud’s mode of detection 
and status as a detective—in both her world and the generic world of the novel—renders her a 
subject to be policed rather than accommodated or understood. In attending to the gendered 
representation of dementia in the context of the detective genre, I have tried to examine what 
Bérubé refers to as the “systems of sociality” that include “characters who either are or are 
presumed by their fellow characters to be constitutively incapable of understanding or abiding by the 
social systems by which their worlds operate” (21). Maud’s presumed incompetence by the 
characters around her is influenced by intertwined ageist, ableist, and patriarchal norms. 
Transgressing the traditional expectations of “the greater powers of observation and superior mind 
of the [male] detective” (Merriam-Webster 323)—Maud’s emotionally-driven, and at times irrational 
and accidental, detective work makes visible a logic of care and communication whose coherence or 
meaning is not immediately obvious to those around her.  
Elizabeth is thus pertinent to discussions of how the “dementia figure occupies the subject 
position of the other in relationship to dominate realities” (Stirling 150). As Jeannette Stirling asks, 
So when do the ‘right minded’ stop listening in any meaningful way to the dementia speaker? 
When do we start to disassociate the dementia subject from the person who shared our life 
before the metamorphosis began? When does the notion of a shared language, and therefore 
a shared conceptual universe or ‘reality’, become so fractured and dissipated by the sufferer’s 
pathology that we begin to discount statements made and questions asked by them simply 




Exploring the necessity of validating Maud’s subjective experience in solving the novel’s mystery, 
Healey capitalizes on the detective genre’s thematic reliance on the communication of evidence and 
memory to explore these questions. When “right minded” characters refuse to listen to Maud, they 
strip her of her sense of self-esteem and deny themselves of the opportunity to discover more about 
what she is experiencing and make sense of her reality. As the novel’s final lines suggest (“I can see 
they won’t listen, won’t take me seriously. So I must do something. I must, because Elizabeth is 
missing. [301]), the case will always be open for Maud, and so the pressing issue is how to support 
that reality interpersonally. In this way, the novel’s focus on the social reception of Maud’s reality 
productively contributes to discussions surrounding the social construction of dementia.119  
Going further, the novel’s deployment of dementia within the frame of the detective 
genre—and its reliance on tropes of detection, i.e. Maud’s search for clues in her environment—
brings into relief how Maud’s dementia is imbricated in normative expectations of literacy and able-
mindedness. Drawing from material feminist concepts of “misfitting” and “literate misfitting,” in the 
next section I argue the detective frame of Elizabeth draws attention to Maud’s experience of 
dementia as a material, relational arrangement.  
 
“My paper memory”: Reading, Remembering, and Misfitting  
There are bits of paper all over the house, lying in piles or stuck upon different surfaces. 
Scribbled shopping lists and recipes, telephone numbers and appointments, notes about 
things that have already happened. My paper memory. It’s supposed to stop me from 
forgetting things. (14) 
 
 Paper surrounds Maud throughout the novel. From the switch labelled “KETTLE” to the 
“jar marked TEA,” notes left by Maud’s carers are strewn around the house to help her recognize 
                                               
119 Elaborating on the social construction of dementia see Nancy H. Harding and Colin Palfrey, The Social Construction of 
Dementia: Confused Professionals? (Philadelphia: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 1997). 
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things (11). These material reminders are efforts to ground Maud in their reality; after all, the very 
notion of ‘reality’ originates from realis, the ‘relating to things’ (OED).120 Maud also writes down and 
collects reminders and “information”—for her, these “little snippets of news are things to talk 
about” (25). These material traces of writing are not merely extraneous details or familiar markers of 
a household of a person with dementia, but also operate as crucial components of Elizabeth’s 
detective story. The action and central mystery of the novel literally unfolds from Maud’s notes: 
I have this piece of paper tucked into my sleeve: No word from Elizabeth. It has an old date on 
one side. I have a horrible feeling something happened to her. Anything could have. There 
was something on the news yesterday, I think. About an old woman. Something unpleasant. 
And now Elizabeth’s disappeared. What if she’s been mugged and left for dead?…But these 
bits of paper on the table beside my chair, this system for remembering, it’s not perfect. So 
many of the notes are old, no longer relevant, and I get them muddled. And even the new 
ones don’t seem to contain the right information. There’s one here with writing still shiny: 
Haven’t heard from Elizabeth. I run my finger over the words, smudging them slightly. Is that 
true? I must have just written it. I certainly can’t remember having heard from her recently. I 
reach for the phone” (15). 
 
The novel is premised on Maud’s repetitive forgetting of her notes, and in doing it calls attention 
Maud’s act of writing and interpreting her notes as both a means and barrier to find Elizabeth. If, as 
Ellen O’Gorman argues, “the most important feature of the detective novel is not the story of the 
crime but the story of its detection…not the witness or the clue or the crime or the criminal, but the 
questioning, the scrutiny, the process of recovery, and the act of detection” then what is important 
to focus on is the way the processes of reading and writing that Maud experiences in her dementia 
figure into the novel (21). Getting information “muddled,” and “smudging” her notes, Maud points 
to how her embodied skills of reading and writing are now different—the literate practice and 
identity she once had has changed with the processes of age-related dementia. With literacy deeply 
                                               
120 Ruth Ozeki’s All Over Creation (2003) also touches on the discursive construction of reality through things in the scene 
when Phoenix moves around the “lettered signs” his father had made “to trip up his grandma” with dementia: “The 
living room belonged to the kids and Momoko now; one by one, its ties to any external, verifiable reality were being 
severed, and it was developing a demented logic of its own…The living room wall now said BEDROOM. The chair had 
turned into the CEILING. The teapot was a REFRIDGERATOR…As a result Momoko was now sitting on the 
CEILING, at a desk that was a DOORSTOP.” (117) 
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linked to citizenship, social equality, and the very perception of what is quintessentially human (in 
Western, bibliocentric cultures)—Maud’s character asks how those connections might be more 
inclusionary. As Christopher Kliewer and others suggest, the “DSM characterization of literate 
(im)possibility and the dominant worldview it represents may be less a biologically based actuality 
and much more akin to social impositions…the ongoing denial of literate citizenship for people with 
perceived intellectual disabilities…is socially linked to historic practices of general human 
devaluation” (165). Using the framework of detective fiction, which is largely about the act of 
reading itself, Elizabeth expands social understandings of literate practice.121 
The conventions of the detective genre demand Maud’s able-minded engagement with these 
notes-as-clues, which she continually challenges. Maud resides in a generic world in which, as a 
detective, she is expected by readers to meet certain “writerly” expectations and performances: “The 
thing is to be systematic, try to write everything down. Elizabeth is missing and I must do something 
to find out what’s happening. But I’m so muddled…Search for clues. And whatever I find I will 
write it down. I must put pens into my handbag now. The thing is to be systematic. I’ve written that 
down, too.” (24) The story of Maud’s detection is thus about reading and writing “failures,” the 
failure of “system[s] for remembering,” as well as how that failure is scripted by what Elizabeth L. 
Miller calls “literate misfitting”—the conflict between impaired bodies, minds, and normative 
materials, “systematic” practices, and expectations of literacy (38). In this light, we can see how the 
                                               
121 Takayuki Tatsumi has explored how Poe is not only the “father of detective fiction” but also “the discoverer of the 
significance of ‘reading.’ For him, reading seems to be the means by which to discover something true, but what he 
discovered actually is the act of reading as such…it seems more plausible that rereading Poe carries us to the 
historiographical recognition of ‘reading as a literary genre’ from the Foucauldian perspective.” See “Literacy, Literality, 
Literature: The Rise of Cultural Aristocracy in ‘The Murder in the Rue Morgue’ Journal of American and Canadian Studies 12 
(1994): 2. 
Interesting, W.H. Auden writes that for many readers like himself, the pleasure in reading detective fiction actually 
resides in the ease with which one can forget it: “I forget the story as soon as I have finished it, and have no wish to read 
it again. If, as sometimes happens, I start reading one and find after a few pages that I have read it before, I cannot go 
on” (15). See “The Guilty Vicarage” 1948. Detective Fiction: A Collection of Critical Essays. Ed. Robin W. Winks. 




“system[s] for remembering”—not unlike the approaches of reality orientation—fail Maud, and thus 
the novel invites reflection on the importance of support systems for nonnormative ways of writing, 
reading, and communicating. As such, Healey’s emphasis on generic multiplicity and the 
rearrangement of formulaic parameters of the detective novel and cozy mystery aptly explores 
Maud’s processes of reading for clues. Healey’s novel interrogates what it means to interact with 
words in the “right” or “wrong” ways as Maud’s access to language and memory changes, while 
highlighting the need to attend to the unique way Maud reads the world around her.  
 The concept of misfitting emerges from Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s elaboration of a 
materialist feminist understanding of disability which “lodges injustice and discrimination in the 
materiality of the world more than in social attitudes or representational practices, even while it 
recognizes their mutually constituting entanglement” (593). As Garland-Thomson theorizes, 
Fitting occurs when a generic body enters a generic world, a world conceptualized, designed, 
and built in anticipation of bodies considered in the dominant perspective as uniform, 
standard, majority bodies. In contrast, misfitting emphasizes particularity by focusing on the 
specific singularities of shape, size, and function of the person in question. Those 
singularities emerge and gain definition only through their unstable disjunctive encounter 
with an environment. The relational reciprocity between body and world materializes both, 
demanding in the process an attentiveness to the distinctive, dynamic thingness of each as 
they come together in time and space. In one moment and place there is a fit; in another 
moment and place a misfit. One citizen walks into a voting booth; another rolls across a 
curb cut; yet another bumps her wheels against a stair; someone passes fingers across the 
brailled elevator button; somebody else waits with a white cane before a voiceless ATM 
machine; some other blind user retrieves messages with a screen reader. Each meeting 
between subject and environment will be a fit or misfit depending on the choreography that 
plays out. (595) 
 
I make two extensions of Garland-Thomson’s concept here: first, while her use of the word ‘generic’ 
is intended to mean nonspecific, predictable, or general, I ask what it might mean to consider ‘generic’ in 
the context of the generic world of detective fiction.122 Secondly, the examples of “minority forms of 
                                               
122 Krystal Cleary makes a similar interpretive question regarding the genre of reality television in “Misfitting and Hater 




embodiment” that appear in Garland-Thomson’s article are ageless and physical (594). Reading 
Maud as a “literate misfit” extends intersections of misfitting to both aging and cognitive difference.  
Thus, I argue Maud’s “demented” reading practices as a detective serve to amplify and 
materialize the generic conventions of detection as literate and literary practice. Healey’s novel 
shows how aspects of Maud’s dementia, as a communicative disability, is socially distributed across 
the network of people she interacts with as well the textual materials she encounters. The novel self-
reflexively foregrounds the importance of reading, materials of literacy, and the environment in 
which these appear as they intersect with Maud’s dementia in the scene when Maud visits the library 
“looking for something,” as she tells the librarian: 
 “I just can’t recall, you know.” 
 “A book?” 
I say I suppose it must be, and he asks what sort of book it is, but I don’t know. He asks if 
it’s fiction.” 
“Oh no,” I say. “It’s a true story, only no one will believe me…It’s about Elizabeth,” I say. 
“Elizabeth. Could that be the title?” 
I watch as he taps at letters on his computer. 
“There’s something with that name in the crime section,” he says[.] (142) 
 
Maud’s experience of reality is posed as an oscillation between her life and the materials of fiction, as 
she says after going to books in the “CRIME” section: “I don’t think I’m quite up to that. I have 
enough mystery in my life as it is” (142).123 The scene ends with Maud searching for clues in a copy 
of The Mysteries of Udolpho and getting scolded for interacting with it inappropriately: “I put it up, 
weigh it in my hands, and then, holding it by its hard covers, I shake it to see if anything falls 
out…‘Hey! Hey!’ the man at the desk says. ‘What are you doing? You can’t treat books like that’” 
(143). This scene draws attention to how Maud’s behavior and process of detection is tied up with 
her interaction with books, words, and notes throughout the novel, and the scene is as much about 
reading with dementia as much as it is about how “the design of books assume what a reading body 
                                               
123 David Orr reads this scene as an example of how people with dementia actively employ detection in aspects of life on 
a daily basis, offering a counternarrative to the idea that dementia is “an agent of crime itself” (5).  
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can and should do: they must be held open to particular pages, pages that must be turned…built 
into all materials are expectations for what bodies and minds should do” (Miller 41).  
 My analysis of the significance of Maud as a character with dementia draws from Miller’s 
research on the writing practices and identities of people with language disability after stroke and 
other brain injuries.124 Miller builds on Garland-Thomson to coin the term “literate misfit,” 
describing the conflict “between body, mind, and the materials of literacy” which “sheds light on 
how the relationship between the embodied, material, and social aspects of literacy operates on all 
writers, disabled and normatively abled” (34). Maud offers a literary case study for observing how 
dementia undoes the “naturalness” of language, processes of writing and reading. Maud’s barriers to 
these processes appear throughout the text: “Beneath the note is a list of care homes and I feel a 
sudden weight in my chest…One or two of the cross-throughs have ‘NOE’ next to them. What 
does it mean? NOE. It looks like my handwriting…Mill Lane NOE. Or perhaps more like NoE” 
(133). Maud experiences twinned anxieties over being put in a care home and her difficulty with 
reading and recognizing what she has written. Maud’s search for Elizabeth is also framed as a matter 
entangled in word retrieval and spelling, as she muddles through “all the different names there are 
for Elizabeth. Eliza, Lizzie, Liz, Lisa, Betty, Betsy, Bet, Beth, Bess, Bessie…” (197). In addition to 
dramatizing Maud’s difficulty with words and her embeddedness in a society and generic world that 
emphasizes literate practices as a means of ordering reality (and defining what it means to be in 
touch with reality), the novel also shows the importance of Maud’s own unique way of navigating 
clues. In other words, Maud’s experience of literate misfitting generates the knowledge needed to 
                                               
124 Miller draws on case studies with people with aphasia, as she elaborates: “The accounts of literate misfitting and the 
innovative strategies of people with aphasia to address that exclusion show how the imbrication of the social and the 
material aspects of literacy both enable and constrain literate practices and identities. Literate misfitting, then, reveals 
both how people with disabilities are often excluded from normative conceptions of literacy and how their experiences 




enable her to discover the buried body of her sister—her ingenuity (and not deficiency) as a 
detective is rooted in the nonnormative way she interacts with the material words around her. 
As I explored in the previous section, Maud’s processes of detection are driven by emotion 
over reason, and her encounters with written and printed letters are likewise informed by an 
affective pull whose logic is not immediately clear to characters around her. For instance, Maud has 
a haptic connection with the menu at The Olive Grill restaurant: “It’s heavy, the cover leathery; I 
trace the indented letters with a finger, though the name means nothing to me. I pull it on to my lap 
and read the contents out loud” (17). Like the act of smudging the letters on her note about 
Elizabeth, Maud shows how intensely physical reading is for her now—the physicality of interacting 
with text is more important than the comprehension of the text, and just as “real” of a reading 
experience. Helen’s response to Maud reflects the social attitudes that render her a misfit: “She 
[Helen] doesn’t like me reading things out, it causes her to sigh and roll her eyes. Sometimes she 
makes gestures behind my back. I’ve seen her in the mirror, pretending to strangle me” (17). But 
Maud’s affective pull to textual objects and textuality is what ultimately enables her to access the 
embodied memories of her past that will lead to Sukey’s body.  
This scene in the restaurant orients readers to Maud’s perspective of the world which, at 
times, approximates her difficulty with comprehending materials of literacy: “He [the waiter] nods 
and wanders off, still writing, past walls streaked with black paint. The restaurant is like a sheet of 
smudged newsprint, one that’s been scrunched around an apple for the winter, unreadable except 
for the advertisements” (19). Similarly, in a later scene, Maud compares her thoughts to the 
unreadable faces of newspaper-wrapped packages: “I yawn and put a newspaper package on the 
floor next to another…they are strange muffled shapes and I push them away. There is something 
frightening about their facelessness. That must be what my thoughts look like, masked and 
unrecognizable. I search for something else to wrap” (202). The image of newspaper around apples 
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and Maud’s act of wrapping text around objects plays a vital role in her process of detection as a way 
of remembering through the body and making sense of her world.  
In the middle of the novel, the significance of wrapping becomes clearer, as the following 
scene leads to Maud’s flashbacks of key memories that lead to the discovery of Sukey’s body: 
The only paper I can find is a newspaper on the hall table, a Daily Echo, and I’m not sure if it 
will do. The front page comes away as I try to read the headlines, but I take it along to a 
sitting room anyway and settle into a comfy chair spreading the sheets over my knees. 
There’s something narrow and hard lying on the cushion next to me…I wrap it in the paper 
and look for apples, but I can’t see any, so I wrap a pen instead and then I wrap a set of 
keys …“Where are the apples, Helen?” I say. “We’d better put them away, or they won’t last 
till the spring.” (212) 
 
This scene launches readers immediately into Maud’s childhood, in which she recalls she “used to 
like wrapping apples…and can “still recall the sharp smell of the newspaper ink mixed with the 
sharp smell of the fruit” (213). As Maud recalls how her family and lodger scrunched pages of 
newspaper around apples to store, she remembers how Frank fixed up the gardens of the new 
houses in their neighborhood—one in which Sukey’s body is later discovered to be buried. It is also 
interesting to note how Maud also remembers “a headline bunched around the apple’s stalk: 
WOMEN CONTACT YOUR HUSBAND,” alluding to the panic surrounding murdered women 
and a slew of missing women cases due to “hasty war marriages” (215). Seeing this headline launches 
young Maud into “the pile of papers on the table with a new sense of purpose” to find out what 
happened to Sukey (215). The discarded newspapers intentionally call attention to the profusion and 
disposability of the missing lives being reported on, and the rapid temporal succession of days Maud 
struggles to keep up comprehending with in her old age and dementia.125 Importantly, the novel sets 
up a continuity between Maud’s younger self as a reader and detective and her older self.  
                                               
125  Newspapers, according to Miller, are also about “designers’ desire to save space” in which “it is clear that the 
assumptions of a ‘fit’ or ‘normal’ body and mind are also bound up with economic interests and built into the materials 
of literacy. Newspaper producers minimize resources, keeping costs down and pushing on individuals’ bodies to bear the 
labor of literacy…That need slams against the fundamental expectations of neoliberal literate subjects: that they quickly 
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The disability studies lens of literate misfitting makes apparent that the narrative’s focus on 
Maud’s wrapping and her fixation on material texts serves to show how these are embodied 
expressions of an unmet need for justice, an attempt to communicate the memories of her past and 
her concern for the missing women in her life. The scene when Maud is trying to put her own 
missing persons advertisement in the newspaper illustrates how an alternate literate practice is 
needed to make her desires possible. In this scene that form of writing is has to be collaborative and 
interpersonal. Unlike the policeman and shopkeeper Maud encounters, the woman in the 
advertisements office approaches Maud as a communicative partner, rather than discredits her:  
The woman slides me a form with lots of boxes and spaces for writing. I look at it, and I 
must look at it for some time because she leans over and puts her head close to mine. 
“Write what you can. I’ll help if you’re struggling.”  
“Right, I say, lifting my pen and pointing it at the form as if it were a wand and could think 
up the sentences for me.  
… 
“Here,” she says. “Let me.” She spins the paper toward her and rests against the counter.  
…  
“I look at the sheet. It’s a strange jumble of words and lines and I’m not even sure which bit 
I’m supposed to read. But there is a title: “Missing Cat.” “I don’t want this, I say “I don’t 
want this word.” I put my finger over it, trying to lift it off the page.” (226-227) 
 
Although there is miscommunication, the woman eventually helps put in the ad for Maud’s lost “old 
friend” (228). The success of this interaction catalyzes the end of the “mystery” of where Elizabeth 
is (her son, Peter, is furious to see the advertisement, but also recognizes the need to allow Maud to 
visit his mother in the stroke rehabilitation unit of the hospital). And it is coming home from this 
particular visit that Maud and Helen together discover Sukey’s body in Elizabeth’s garden. Sako 
writes that this “accidental nature of the discovery reiterates the danger of negligence in listening and 
attending to the subject with dementia” and Helen’s involvement marks a shift from individual 
authority to “co-operative discovery” characteristic of women’s contemporary detective fiction 
                                               
and efficiently do the work of reading and writing. Conflicting economic interests and ableist views of the body are 




(324). But it is also important to credit this discovery to Maud’s nonnormative engagement with 
clues, that her way of engaging with materials is posited as an inventive means of detection that 
emphasizes interdependence between social and material aspects of communication and experience. 
In this way, Healey attests through fiction how attending to the reality and perspective of those with 
dementia can forge meaningful encounters and make visible alternate paths to knowledge. 
 Elizabeth is a text that reflects on negative social responses to communicative barriers that 
people with dementia may encounter.126 When Maud attempts to converse with her former friends 
at church, she finds herself biting her “lip in humiliation,” observing they are “frightened off” by her 
“inarticulacy” (80). Elizabeth draws attention to the stigma and fear surrounding dementia and aging 
as a slide into the realm of incommunicability. David Orr rightly notes that the novel “encourages 
the reader to reflect on what happens when talk by people with dementia is ignored as fabulation, 
stray and misplaced memories, or foolish ramblings, and to ask what this failure to listen actively 
might cause to be missed” (11). Through the strategic use of crime and detective genres, Healey not 
only trains an imagined reader to become more “like a detective, alert to matters that might seem 
otherwise inconsequential,” but better “readers” of the realities people with dementia may attempt 
to communicate or express, a skill essential to person-centered care (Bradford 121). 
 
Old/Mad/Missing Women: Care and Trauma in Postwar Britain 
From “young women’s hysteria to old women’s senile dementia,” the figures of “mental 
anguish” that haunt Western religion, thought, and medicine have historically been gendered (Cohen 
                                               
126 As Richard Taylor writes in his 2007 memoir, Alzheimer's from the Inside Out: “I have become keenly aware of a 
patterned response from some individuals as soon as they find out I have Alzheimer's disease. They switch their eye 
contact and attention to whomever I am with. It is as if knowledge of the disease immediately cloaks me in invisibility” 
(152). For voices from non-fiction see Marilyn Truscott “Life in the Slow Lane,” Alzheimer's Care Quarterly (2003) 4.1: 






4-5). In his introduction to Thinking about Dementia: Culture, Loss, and the Anthropology of Senility, 
Lawrence Cohen offers a brief history of the oppression of women’s voices, starting with how, 
during the Inquisition, “the problem of the old voice [was] feminized as the witch’s curse” (4). From 
the Reformation onward, physicians’ claims to women’s voices shifted the discourse from “devilry” 
to the “natural process of dotage,” but by the nineteenth-century, interest in “doting old women” 
fell wayside to cultural and biomedical fascinations with “the voice of the hysteric” (5). Cohen 
highlights that although hysteria and senility became increasingly understood as “marked disorders 
of memory” over the course the twentieth century, senility failed to capture the imagination and 
concern of the public and professionals due to what was perceived as a lack of voice: for neurologist 
Jean-Martin Charcot and his successors, for instance, “senility [stood] as a problem of life but not of 
the subject: it no longer speaks” (5, emphasis in the original). As the narrating protagonist, Maud 
gives literary voice to the figure Cohen charts above, a figure marginalized threefold: as a woman, as 
a subject dominated by male-written narratives (i.e. in the realms of medical science, psychiatry, and 
detective fiction), and as a figure imbricated in histories of persecution and institutionalization. 
In this section, I explore how Healey brings together the trope of dementia with that of “the 
mad woman,” building coalition between Maud and the mentally ill female character, Violet, to 
comment on how personal and historical trauma mediates both experiences. My reading elaborates 
on what constitutes the novel’s depiction of what Lucy Burke points out to be a “culture of 
violence” (93). As Burke argues, Elizabeth “does not simply tell a story in which a narrator with 
dementia eventually…dig[s] up a long buried secret from her past, it also tells a story about ways of 
thinking about and living with dementia in a fundamentally inhospitable culture” (96). Burke 
persuasively claims what makes this culture “inhospitable” is the “systemic marginalization and 
stigmatization” of people with mental difference, as Maud and Violet are “articulated in the context 
of a cultural environment in which their ‘madness’ is to be ignored or pathologized and thus 
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explained away” (96). Yet Burke locates the “profound vulnerability” these characters face in 
“events and forces beyond our control”—attributing the death of Violet’s daughter and Violet’s 
experience of trauma to the accidental nature of a traffic accident and Sukey’s murder to the 
random, alcohol-induced violence of her husband—which cuts her analysis of just what constitutes 
the novel’s “cultural environment” short (96-7).  
Elizabeth, I add, is a text that is also about how the protracted violent conflict and aftermath 
of World War II gives rise to the “culture of violence” in which its characters live.127 As the narrative 
alternates between Maud’s childhood preoccupations with postwar rationing and disappearances that 
persist into present day, Elizabeth tunes readers into postwar conditions in which male violence 
against women becomes socially permissible and excusable. As the first section discussed, Sukey’s 
disappearance is dismissed by police as a runaway rather than murder case; the possibility of Frank’s 
domestic violence is overlooked with the emphasis placed on the fault of women who “can’t get 
used to having their husbands home again” (86). The novel’s focus on Frank’s alcohol abuse (as a 
coping mechanism) after the war sets Sukey up as a classic crime fiction victim to the jealous 
husband, but also underlines Healey’s representational preoccupation with war’s destructive effect 
on family life and structure and subsequently, mental health, across gender. As Frank explains to 
young Maud why his bartender’s family lives at the hotel: “Her husband’s an ex-POW. Poor bastard, 
touched, he is. Can’t bear to live at home, so they live here.” (189).  
But my focus here is on the significance of Maud and Violet, and how as both women 
search for loved ones they’ve lost in postwar Britain, the novel dramatizes the affective strength of 
female relations and practices of care as resistance. Staging commonality between Maud and Violet, 
Elizabeth exemplifies what Kathleen Gregory Klein calls an “ethic of responsibility…common 
                                               
127 Healey explained writing Elizabeth involved reading the diaries housewife Nella Last wrote for the Mass Observation 
Archive, hence the strong female perspective on war years (Sydney Morning Herald). 
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among women…where [the detective’s] role is not simply to discover the murderer and restore 
order, but also work with and develop a sense of community with and among many of the 
characters” (qtd in Irons, 15). Critics like Sako and Burke have both pointed out the similarities 
between aged Maud and Violet in terms of their alienation from the community and their odd, 
compulsive behaviors.128 The two women merge formally at the end of the novel when Violet’s 
opaque witness description of Sukey’s murder (“The glass smashed and the birds flew around her 
head”) are mistakenly perceived as Maud’s own by the police officer (291).  
I want to focus on a taken for granted aspect of the thematic dialogue between these two 
characters: they are both shaped by experiences of individual and historical trauma. The traumas of 
bodily hunger and witnessed destruction are woven together throughout the novel, coloring Maud’s 
experience. Maud’s reality and memories surrounding Sukey’s disappearance is littered with 
enumerable postwar memories on war rations as a child—these memories echo out of the anxieties 
she expresses to her carers over food (“there’s no cake left because of the sergeant” [90]), and she 
fears Elizabeth is being abused by her son putting her on “starvation rations” (277). Likewise, 
Maud’s navigation of her present-day world is also colored by the haunting presence of postwar 
Britain’s urban devastation. Walking through town, she notes, her confusion is similar to that of her 
childhood: “The shop isn’t far…and for some reason I keep taking the wrong turn…I feel like I did 
at the end of the war. I often got lost on my way onto town, what with houses bombed to rubble, 
and sudden open spaces, and roads blocked by bricks and masonry and broken furniture” (7).  
                                               
128 Drawing on the “medieval figuration of wisdom in folly” Michel Foucault discusses in Madness in Civilization, Burke 
argues readers’ perspectives of Maud and the mad woman “indicates the degree to which we remain culturally attached 
to historically and intellectually residual forms of symbolism and meaning-making alongside contemporary 
epistemologies of selfhood. However, it is also significant that this fundamentally ethical figuration of both women as 
agents of truth -- almost as the embodiment of a will or drive to truth -- insatiable, furious and relentless (‘it’s dark out 
here’ says Maud … ‘and I must finish this’ [Healey, 2014, p. 62]) is articulated in the context of a cultural environment in 
which their madness is to be ignored or pathologized and this explained a way. The story…traces one failure to listen 
and attend to Maud after another in tandem with the increasing frequency of her ‘symptoms’--moments of confusion, 
lapses in short term memory, aphasia, disinhibition, anger and perseveration” (“Missing Pieces” 96). 
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Similarly, Violet’s search for Dora and “madness” is triggered by her experience in the war, 
as her son Douglas reveals at the end of the novel:  
‘Dora was run over by a bus, before the war…And then my dad went to France in 1940 and 
never came home again. That’s when she got a lot worse…we’d only moved in a few weeks 
before those bombs were dropped. I thought she’d gone in the raid. I’m ashamed to say I 
almost found it a relief, but then it turned out she was living in the wreck of the house. I 
tried to help her, but she was so difficult. You couldn’t make her see sense. She only wanted 
to stay in the house, bombed as it was, because Dora’s dolls and her Woolworth’s handbag 
and her Rupert annuals were still inside somewhere.’ (270).  
 
In the aftermath of her husband’s death and traumatizing air raids, Violet’s obsession with Dora’s 
objects is what leads her to wander the streets. Like Maud, Violet’s affective pull to objects of her 
absent loved one are perceived by the community as pathological, warranting institutionalization, as 
Douglas tells young Maud: “She [Sukey] told me I should send my mother away somewhere, to an 
institution. But I couldn’t do that. It was bad enough the old house had been gone, and then my 
sister’s things were buried beneath the rubble of the new house. I couldn’t lock Mother away, too. 
All she ever wanted was to go home, to touch the things my sister had touched” (272). The 
sublimation of Violet’s suffering as insanity in the community she inhabits and throughout the 
narrative structurally reflects the ignored and untreated experiences of women’s trauma on the home 
front. More than “demented” or “mad,” both Maud and Violet are arguably traumatized subjects, 
enriching the reading of Elizabeth as a novel that explores unmapped connections between historical 
trauma, post-traumatic stress, and dementia.129 This casual web of connections serves to undermine 
the notion that there is a ‘given’ nature of Maud’s dementia to be uncovered—there is no direct 
                                               
129 “How does historical trauma experienced by specific cultural groups mediate the dementia experience?” is a question 
Stern and Hulko ask, calling for research that helps understand how dementia “can be shaped and embodied over the 
life course and within a specific socio-cultural historic context” and applied to adults who have face historical traumas 
such as the Holocaust, wars, and persecution due to sexual orientation and religion. See “Historical Trauma, PTSD, And 




cause or definitive cure, no diagnosis that ‘solves’ the text—turning readers’ attention outward to 
broader social and historical contexts.  
Highlighting sources of violence and fragmentation in the aftermath of World War II that 
carry into the present day, the fragmentation of the narrative into Maud’s two realities reflects not 
only the cognitive processes of dementia, but perhaps also the manifestations of historical trauma—
a possibility many authors in this dissertation have similarly grappled with. The social meanings and 
lived reality of Maud’s dementia (and Violet’s mental illness) in the novel need to be expanded to 
histories of modern warfare that scar the environmental landscapes and domestic relations in which 
these characters live. Cathy Caruth, writing about post-traumatic stress in Trauma: Explorations in 
Memory, provocatively suggests that “if PTSD must be understood as a pathological symptom, then 
it is not so much a symptom of the unconscious, as it is a symptom of history. The traumatized, we 
might say, carry an impossible history within them, or they become themselves the symptom of 
history that they cannot entirely possess” (5). What might it mean to read Maud as embodying “a 
symptom of history” without ignoring her lived reality? For Caruth “the impact it [trauma, or PTSD] 
has on the lives of those who live it, [is] intimately bound up with the question of truth. The 
problem arises not only in regard to those who listen to the traumatized, not knowing how to 
establish the reality of their hallucinations and dreams; it occurs rather and most disturbingly often 
within the very knowledge and experience of the traumatized themselves (5). Caruth’s identification 
of a “crisis of truth” extends beyond “the question of individual cure” to how others can access “a 
history…whose truth there is no simple access” is perhaps productively approached through the 
values of person-centered dementia care, in which the reality of the person must simply be validated 
and listened to, not excavated for truths (6). But as the narrating protagonist of the novel, Maud 
emerges not as a passive “symptom of history”; her reconstruction of the past into the present in 
her detective work enables her to write herself into history as an active subject. Read this way, 
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Elizabeth emerges as a work that complicatedly layers tropes of the detective story and dementia to 
consider issues of agency both within and without the worlds of fiction. 
Overall, Maud and Violet attest to the importance of marginalized voices and nonnormative 
and feminine modes of knowing. Violet’s cryptic attempts to tell young Maud how she witnessed 
Sukey’s assault initially go ignored, but ultimately help Maud piece together the mystery. What also 
emerges as important in the novel are the importance of care and support systems through the 
affective strength of female care relations, dramatized between Helen and Maud, Maud and Sukey, 
and Maud and Elizabeth. Violet’s stalking of following of Sukey and Maud, which is misunderstood 
by the community as insanity, is as Douglas points out merely out of a maternal desire to see her 
daughter again: “I think she wanted to be near Sukey. You see, she looked a bit like my sister…So 
do you, Maud” (271). The uncanny linkages between Sukey, Maud, and Dora, as well as old Maud 
and Violet, speak to novel’s stress on the importance of relational identification and community 
between women. This is particularly important when considering the novel’s centering of gendered 
dimensions of dementia and dementia care (Maud’s son Tom is completely absent from care roles, 
the role of caretaking falling to Helen). When Helen jokes about having “[e]arly onset” dementia and 
Maud calls Helen’s daughter “mad” in jest in the same scene, the novel points toward the ubiquity of 
stigma associated with mental illness and its gendering (218). How one’s social networks will 
respond and care for each other in the future is one of the novel’s questions. This concern that 
drives the novel is also intensely personal, as Healey told the Sydney Morning Herald, “Several 
members of my family have, or have had, one form of dementia or another. I really wanted to 
explore what it might like in fiction but I didn’t know how to start…I was in the car with my 
grandmother Nancy who said ‘My friend is missing’. Her friend wasn’t missing, but the remark 
ignited an idea.” A grounding commonality of nearly all the texts this dissertation explores is the 
writer’s personal investment in dementia as family rather than individual matter. Elizabeth’s 
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exploration of the networks of social support that do or do not surround Maud and Violet stress 
how selfhood is sustained by one’s environment and embedded practices of care.  
~ 
 The epilogue of the novel is set at Elizabeth’s funeral, but the final words, spoken by Maud, 
suggest the case is still open: “I can see they won’t listen, won’t take me seriously. So I must do 
something, I must, because Elizabeth is missing” (301). Despite discovering Sukey’s body and 
attending Elizabeth’s funeral, Maud is not done; her version of history is interminable, the trauma is 
ongoing. This conclusion confronts readers with a different way of understanding Maud’s repeated 
phrase: who or what is ‘missing’ is now no longer only understood in the genre of the detective 
novel, but in the elegiac mode of a history telling. Maud’s utterance emerges not so much as a sign 
of her forgetting, but a valid statement of her reality: as long as Maud yearns for them, Elizabeth and 
Sukey are missing—not just dead. Haunted by actual and imagined lost lives, the fixity of this reality 
speaks to the broader unresolvable crimes in the novel, perhaps the indeterminate long reaching 
effects of war on civilians. Yet what also persists is Maud’s unwavering concern, her searching as an 
expression of care against rational thought.   
 The importance of care that Elizabeth addresses raises a question posed by anthropologist 
Janelle S. Taylor: “If someone cannot recognize you, can they still care about you?” (313). Writing 
about her mother with progressive dementia, Taylor delves into how care ties into broader questions 
about social and political recognition. Her article pivots on a staggering moment in which she reads 
her mother’s shaky handwriting in the header of an old letter, listing the names of her children: 
“Please try to keep cares together! We will try to keep Diana, Janelle, Mike and Pat. Will try to keep 
the cares together” (331). Observing the letter to have been written “quite far along her path of 
progressive dementia,” Taylor reflects on her mother’s “literate misfitting”: 
Mom can no longer write. If I were to show her this note today, she would not be able to 
read it, nor would she recognize the words as her own…At some point—struggling to order 
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her thoughts and her life—my mother named us, her children, as “the cares,” and exhorted 
herself to “try to keep the cares together!” and promised to do so…Why then should a 
person be cast out and abandoned, condemned to social death, and denied recognition as a 
friend, a person, a fellow human being, just because she shows signs of succumbing to the 
same forces that we know will eventually claim each one of us?…Rather than make an 
individual’s claim to social and political “recognition” contingent on the narrowly cognitive 
ability to “recognize” people, words, and things, we would do well to emulate this humble, 
ailing individual woman’s effort to hold fast to “the cares”—what she has cared about, who 
she has cared for and taken care of. Let us strive to hold on to “care” as something that 
makes life worthwhile. (332-33) 
 
Taylor’s account of her mother’s “effort to hold fast to ‘the cares’” of her life resonates with Maud’s 
recursive longing for and seeking out of the missing women in her life—her refusal to close the case 
on Elizabeth, and by extension, Sukey. The novel concludes tasking readers to reflect on the value 
and meaning in the “mystery” that animates the novel and Maud’s reality, one that keeps her search 
in motion and world alive. 
 
Aging Futures: Feminism and Dementia in Jo Walton’s Speculative Biography 
 In the previous section I explored how conventional generic frameworks of the detective 
novel and cozy mystery demand the maintenance of normative cognitive function well into the old 
age of their protagonists. Healey’s strategic use of genre puts into relief how Maud’s demented 
detection amplifies and challenges the gendered ableist and ageist expectations of sleuths that have 
preceded her. Important to Maud’s success as the detective is not the end result of closing the case, 
but the ability to actualize the yearning she feels in her multiple realities, and the eventual social 
recognition received from others like Helen. As such, the life that Elizabeth paints of Maud is not 
only about the ableism, ageism, and sexism she encounters—it is also about her determination for 
self-worth and purpose, her drive for justice and resistance to established authority, and the relations 
of care and compassion that can (and need to) exist between women across time. Elizabeth brings to 
the cultural imagination of dementia a different perspective on what is valuable in life, such as the 
opportunity to express, share, and exercise one’s desires and realities defined on one’s own terms.  
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 Building on the dialogue that Elizabeth opens up between feminist and disability studies 
through my analysis of dementia and genre, I turn to Jo Walton’s My Real Children to elaborate on 
the ableism and ageism embedded in the notion of “aging well,” or what I referred to in the 
introduction as “successful aging.” Presenting readers with two alternate biographies of Patricia 
Cowan, My Real Children interrogates gendered definitions of success and happiness in aging 
attendant on networks of care. That the narrative of both lives is framed by Cowan’s residence in a 
nursing home is also significant, as the novel problematizes the implication of choice in successful 
aging discourses and insists on the priority of care needs in society’s visions of the future. Indeed, 
My Real Children is less about entertaining the cultural paranoia that dementia is an inevitable part of 
growing old than it is about inevitable dependency and how to accommodate it.130 Finally I explore 
how through the mode of speculative (biographical) fiction, Walton paradoxically validates and 
empowers Cowan’s sense of two alternate histories as real possibilities (not unlike the speculations 
of many-worlds in quantum mechanics). Reframing the culture of care surrounding dementia, the 
novel suggests, involves thinking outside of established criteria and imaginaries of what constitutes 
(un)successful biographies of aging.  
 Before delving into the novel, I want to elaborate on some of the critical intersections in 
feminist studies as well as aging studies that the discussion of My Real Children brings together, given 
the recognition it garnered with the James Tiptree, Jr. Award, named after feminist science fiction 
writer Alice B. Sheldon’s male pseudonym.131 Furthermore, my aim in this section is to show how 
                                               
130 My use of the phrase “inevitable dependency” acknowledges dependency as the sine qua non of human experience, 
drawing from Eva Feder Kittay’s “The Ethics of Care, Dependence, and Disability” and Martha Albertson Fineman’s 
The Autonomy Myth: A Theory Of Dependency. 
131 James Tiptree, Jr. emerged as a major figure in the male-dominated science fiction scene in the late 1960s. Tiptree 
won numerous coveted awards and was often likened in style to Hemingway (Silverberg xv). For over a decade, Tiptree 
carried on intimate correspondences in letters with well-known science fiction writers like Philip K. Dick and Ursula K. 
Le Guin, but never spoke to them on the telephone—his private and reclusive habits made him an object of curiosity. 
Shattering all readers’ assumptions in 1977, Tiptree came out as “a nice old lady in McLean,” Virginia—a 61-year-old 
woman named Alice Bradley Sheldon (“Contemporary” 351). 
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bringing a disability studies lens to these intersections can lend nuance to reading the narrative’s 
exploration of a gendered consciousness and experience of aging with dementia. 
At the 1985 National Women’s Studies Association convention Barbara Macdonald, a 
pioneer in feminist aging studies, tasked her audience when she asked: “Has it never occurred to you 
as you build feminist theory that ageism is a central feminist issue?” (21). In the following decades 
Macdonald’s query gained traction, evidenced by edited volumes such as Kathleen Woodward’s 
Figuring Age: Women, Bodies, and Generations (1999) and Toni M. Calasanti and Kathleen Slevin’s Age 
Matters: Realigning Feminist Thinking (2006). In the introduction to Feminist Formation’s 2006 special 
issue on aging and ageism, Leni Marshall observed that examining the “prescriptive and negative 
constructs of old age” has become an important part of the feminist cultural studies agenda, but not 
without “serious theoretical flaws” (ix). Marshall notes that revising the concept of aging as positive 
has relied on youthful “values [of] doing over being,” that there has still been little done to challenge 
“the negative valuations of advanced aging” (ibid.). This critical hurdle is owed to the ubiquitous and 
privileged cultural position “successful aging” has assumed as the only way to age well.  
Developed by John Rowe and Robert Kahn, the conceptual framework of successful aging 
in their words, “encompass[es] three distinct domains: avoidance of disease and disability, 
maintenance of high physical and cognitive function, and sustained engagement in social and 
productive activities” (“Successful Aging” 439).132 Care in this context emphasizes the promotion of 
“active and productive” lifestyles and maximizing “high cognitive and physical function” (ibid. 438, 
434). I agree with Clara W. Berridge and Marty Martinson that the criteria for “success” in aging 
“based primarily on the avoidance of disease, disability, and functional loss sets up the vast majority 
                                               
132 The term “successful aging” first appeared in Robert Havighurst’s 1961 article in The Gerontologist, intended to 
challenge the dominant narrative of old age as loss, decline, and illness. Since the 1980s, owing to Rowe and Kahn’s 
MacArthur Foundation-funded study on aging and subsequent landmark book Successful Aging (1998), successful aging 
has persisted as the dominant paradigm in gerontological research (See “Introduction” Lamb et al.); on gerontology and 
feminism see J. Dianne Garner, “Feminism and Feminist Gerontology,” Journal of Women & Aging 11.2-3 (1999) 3-12. 
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of the older adult population for failure—a majority of whom are women, and in particular, women 
of color” (85). Needless to say, Rowe and Kahn’s popular model of aging has received ample 
critique from scholars in aging studies and feminist studies for constructing a binary between the 
“ill-derly” and “well-derly,” for being “expressions of the same ageist culture…two sides of the same 
judgmental coin…signifying that it is not okay to be old” (Lamb et al. 13). Though many have 
critiqued the successful aging model as ageist due to its emphasis on maintaining lifestyles and 
activities associated with youth and ability instead of other possibilities and goals, the intersection 
between ageism, gender, and ableism is still an emergent intersection of critical exploration.133  
The medical model of successful aging, after all, presents growing old “successfully” and 
becoming disabled as (mutually exclusive) choices, as Rowe and Kahn proclaim in their book: 
“successful aging is dependent on individual choices and behaviors. It can be attained through 
individual choice and effort” (37).134 Hailee Yoshizaki-Gibbons rejects this model with insights from 
disability and queer theory, coining the term “compulsory youthfulness,” which 
highlights the ways in which ableism and ageism intersect within successful aging discourses 
to falsely present both being old and being disabled as choices, rather than the result of 
biological changes and cultural, political, economic, and social structures. As a result, old 
disabled people are labeled as failures for aging “unsuccessfully” and perceived as 
responsible for their own vulnerability. (2)135 
 
                                               
133 See Clemens Tesch-Römer, Hans-Werner Wahl, “Toward a More Comprehensive Concept of Successful Aging: 
Disability and Care Needs,” The Journals of Gerontology: Series B, Volume 72.2 2017: 310–318 and Christine Overall “Old 
Age and Ageism, Impairment and Ableism: Exploring the Conceptual and Material Connections.” NWSA Journal 18.1, 
2006: 126-137.   
134 As they elaborate, “Our concept of success connotes more than a happy outcome; it implies achievement rather than 
mere good luck…To succeed in something requires more than falling into it; it means having desired it, planned it, 
worked for it. All these factors are critical to our view of aging, which, even in this era of human genetics, we regard as 
largely under the control of the individual.” (37) 
135 Gibbons elaborates, “Successful aging and compulsory youthfulness place the onus on the individual by framing old 
age and disability as choices and preventable states of being. Thus, if people cannot age while ‘avoiding disease and 
disability,’ ‘maintaining high physical and cognitive function’ and having ‘active engagement with life,’ it is the result of 
their own lack of effort and poor choices they have made. This ideology reflects the neoliberal campaign to ‘limit the 
state’s responsibility to provide social and other supports for elders and people with disabilities’ (Martinson & Berridge, 
2015, p. 63). Hence, the movement to lessen government spending and eradicate state support for old and disabled 
people is tied to the belief that becoming old and disabled is the result of individual (in)action. Consequently, 
compulsory youthfulness creates a structural and societal context in which old and disabled individuals are blamed for 
their failure to age without disease or disability and their subsequent dependence on the welfare state” (12). 
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My Real Children is poised at the intersection of these discussions, exploring the limits of 
successful aging as an individual responsibility by framing Cowan’s life “choices” as culminating in 
her dementia. The novel raises the question of how dementia intervenes in conversations about 
valuing old age without leveraging ableism (Berridge and Martinson). It is also a literary exploration 
of how a more inclusive concept of successful aging is required—one that stresses supportive 
structures for aging with rather than against disability and care needs—to promote more desirable 
aging futures (Clemens and Wahl). As a work of speculative fiction My Real Children is aptly poised to 
investigate these possibilities—as the narrative suspends the cultural “rules of reality” (Schalk 62), 
creating space for imagining the alternate realities of aging with dementia as both loss and processes 
of self-discovery and affirmation.  
The narrative of My Real Children begins and ends in a nursing home, and like in Elizabeth, 
89-year-old Cowan is surrounded by paper—notes written by nurses defining her state of existence, 
at any given time, along a spectrum of confusion and literate capacity:  
“Confused. Less confused. Very confused.” That last was written frequently, sometimes 
abbreviated by the nurses to just “VC”…Her name was on the notes too—just her first 
name, Patricia, as if in old age she were demoted to childhood and denied both the dignity of 
surname and title and the familiarity of the form of her name she preferred. The notes 
reminded her of a school report with the little boxes and fixed categories into which it was 
so difficult to express the real complexity of any situation. “Spelling atrocious.” (9) 
 
Similar to Maud in Healey’s narrative, the primacy of Cowan’s dementia is established in very first 
page as a doing by others—enacted through daily sociomaterial and ordering practices.136 Reflecting 
                                               
136 My claim that dementia is enacted in care and diagnostic practices stems from Annemarie Mol’s concept of “multiple 
ontologies” in which she argues disease is not a singular or stable entity but a series of enactments of “doings” from 
various actors—from medical instruments to doctor-patient interviews—through which the apparent unity of a disease 
as an object comes into being. See The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002). 
For scholars who have applied Mol to thinking about Alzheimer’s and dementia see Cecilia Åsberg and Jennifer Lum, 
“Picturizing the scattered ontologies of Alzheimer’s disease: Towards a materialist feminist approach to visual 
technoscience studies” European Journal of Women’s Studies 17(4) 2010: 323-345 and Ingunn Moser, “Dementia and the 
Limits to Life: Anthropological Sensibilities, STS Interferences, and Possibilities for Action in Care” Science, Technology, & 





on her past from the dubious vantage point of living with senile dementia, Cowan senses she has 
perhaps lived two disparate lives:  
 If there were two worlds.  
If there were two worlds, then what caused her to slide between them?…She had four 
 children, or three…She could remember things that couldn’t simultaneously be true. She 
 remembered Kennedy being assassinated and she remembered him declining to run again 
 after the Cuban missile exchange. They couldn’t both have happened, yet she 
 remembered them both happening. Had she made a choice that could have gone two 
 ways and thereafter had two lives? Two lives that both began in Twickenham in 1926 and 
 both ended here in this nursing home in 2014 or 2015, whichever it was? (17) 
 
Framed by the nursing home, the dual biography of Cowan’s two lives unfolds in alternating 
chapters, beginning at the moment she either accepts or refuses her marriage proposal from Mark, a 
failing scholar at Oxford. The Cowan who marries becomes “Trish” and lives an unfulfilled family 
and professional life restricted by patriarchal ideologies of white female domesticity and 
motherhood; although hers is a life that bears witness to progressive social change and an era of 
world peace. In contrast, the other Cowan flourishes as “Pat,” finding purpose, happiness, and 
refuge in her same-sex partnership with Bee even as global political conflict and nuclear warfare 
continues to transpire after Hiroshima and Nagasaki. While the two narratives explore liberating 
visions of gender and sexuality, the oppression of patriarchy and imperial policies (of war, 
occupation, and assassination) through the “choice” of saying yes or no to a marriage, that freedom 
and fantasy of choice feels circumscribed by the fate of Cowan’s dementia: “She had made choices. 
Thinking about that she felt the strange doubling, the contradictory memories, as if she had two 
histories that both led her to this point, this nursing home” (14). 
Dramatizing two worlds arising out of Cowan’s dementia, My Real Children echoes a 
reminder posed by science fiction scholar, writer, and activist adrienne maree brown: “We hold so 
many worlds inside us. So many futures. It is our radical responsibility to share these worlds, to plant 
them in the soil of our society as seeds for the type of justice we want and need” (279). I thus dwell 
on the importance of Cowan’s experience of multiple worlds with dementia as the focal point of 
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Walton’s social critique. While Walton uses the marriage ultimatum as the narrative’s pivot point to 
explore the conditions and consequences of choice as they relate to gender norms, I want to draw 
attention to how dementia operates as an essential motive force in enabling, if not deepening, the 
text’s critique of those norms. Structuring the form and premise of the novel, Cowan’s dementia 
must also be read within the context of the hybrid genre that deploys it. Similar to previous authors’ 
work I have examined, the use of dementia in Walton’s narrative opens up to different social and 
relational possibilities, pathways through time and space, and bends genre and established tropes. As 
I explore more in the later section, science and fantasy fiction are genres rife with “deviant and 
impaired bodies,” although those depictions have not always been fair or positive (Allan 7). All too 
often the escapism of fantasy and the promise of science’s miracles bait writers into the trap of 
showcasing a “magical cure,” as Jane Stemp argues, “science fiction writers, however willing to cast a 
satirical eye on earlier notions of ‘progress’, seem reluctant to abandon the hope that a perfected 
medical system will yet cure all the ills of the world” (n.p.). As such, novels rely on the character 
with dementia as “narrative prosthesis”—to further a dystopian or apocalyptic plot based on the 
search for or fantasy of a cure (Mitchell and Snyder). Examples of characters include “Alzheimer’s 
survivor” Robert Gu in Vernor Vinge’s Rainbows End (2006) and the first dementia “returnee” or 
person to be cured in Karen Kaplan’s Curiosity Seekers (2017). And as Susan Schultz notes in 
“Alzheimer’s, Aliens, and the Cure of the Avant-garde,” “[s]cience fiction is often scary, terrifying. 
What is more horrifying than memory loss, identity diffusion?” (n.p.). It is no surprise dementia has 
become a popular, over-determined subject in contemporary speculative fiction “as an 
unmanageable and unsustainable burden intrinsic to the nature of the condition itself rather than to 
the ways in which we might manage care, organise our lives, conceive of our communitarian 
  
 193 
responsibilities to each other or even embrace the possibility of living and dying well with an 
impairment” (Burke “Imagining” 3).137  
But even as My Real Children grapples frankly with the Western fear of aging in contemporary 
culture it surprisingly neither engages with the possibility of nor the desire for dementia’s cure. It is 
this absence of a hypothetical cure that is perhaps Walton’s most subversive point of all. Indeed, the 
novel does not use dementia as a marker of an apocalyptic or horrific fate. Instead, the novel affirms 
the validity of Cowan’s confusion as a convention of mental time travel, translating her dual lives 
into a lucid chronological narrative through a realist tone (matter-of-fact third-person reporting) and 
crossings into subgenres of biographical fiction and alternate history. That Publisher’s Weekly praised 
Walton for keeping Cowan’s character “deeply and recognizably herself” is significant here, for it 
reveals how genres help make certain experiences and identities legible, as well as how dementia in 
fiction can motivate certain generic maneuvers that expand the discourse surrounding it (Grossman).  
Ultimately, the novel’s chosen narrative framework and thematic handling of dementia 
deserves particular attention because it is integral to Walton’s exploration of the aging female body 
within (hetero)reproductive temporalities and domestic and institutional spaces. My Real Children 
explores the limits of successful aging as choice through its presentation of the intertwined, 
gendered, heteronormative, and able-bodied expectations that structure both of Cowan’s lives 
differently. As in Elizabeth, the protagonist with dementia inhabits time differently, and for Cowan, 
that provides the possibilities for resistance and happiness. 
 
 
                                               
137 Lucy Burke’s article, “Imagining A Future Without Dementia: Fictions of Regeneration and the Crises of Work and 
Sustainability” focuses on “popular genre texts” (science fiction) that are specifically invested in the promise of 
dementia’s cure. Burke argues, “Read against the grain, these fictional narratives reveal the systemic violence, 
contradictions and pressures that underpin the kind of economic and political arguments that ask us to imagine that a 
future without dementia is the answer to the social and economic challenges presented by an ageing population” (2). 
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The Queer, Crip Time of Aging with Dementia 
 
   The future-with-dementia looms in My Real Children as a multigenerational issue that is 
specifically maternal, as both versions of Cowan (Trish and Pat) fear ending up like their mother 
(“She watched her mother’s decline and knew what lay ahead” [11]). But in both narratives, Cowan’s 
mother dies due to a chill and not dementia, avoiding a storyline that would reinforce the militaristic 
notion of dementia as her fateful “killer.” The greater scourge in the text turns out to be the violence 
of patriarchy and normative expectations of motherhood that uphold it. Trish and Pat conform and 
deviate, respectively, from the ideal mother traditionally envisioned as “repronormatively” 
heterosexual, selflessly homebound, and financially reliant on a husband (who is also the father of 
the children).138 But the onset of senile dementia disrupts both women’s reliability to meet another 
crucial part of the ideal: a mother “always has a connection with her children” (Green 127). As in A 
Tale and Dementia Blog, relational “connection” becomes redefined in My Real Children, and the text’s 
exploration of the meaning of children, gender norms, and dementia are intertwined in the process.  
 The two narratives of My Real Children set readers up to make an interpretive choice: as a 
woman, which is the life best (read: happiest) lived? Reviewers typically approach the novel with 
rhetorical questions such as, “Would you rather have a slightly sad life in a happy world, or a happy 
life in a world on the brink of disaster?” (Newitz). The Guardian reviewer Gwyneth Jones posed a 
similar question specific to the challenges surrounding feminism: “Are women who grasp at 
personal happiness betraying the cause [of feminism]? Was it somehow right for Trish to say yes, 
and endure that horrible marriage? Are women who evade the struggle for gender equality letting the 
world go to hell?” Walton’s novel raises more questions than it answers, and I want to focus on how 
the dual life history Walton tells through the two worlds of Cowan’s dementia is central to the 
                                               
138 Katherine Franke’s term “repronormativity” refers to the ways women are incentivized to bear and raise children and 
the naturalized treatment of these activities as inevitable. See “Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and 
Desire,” Columbia Law Review 101.1 (2001): 181-208. 
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question of happiness underlining My Real Children. 
  Happiness, Sara Ahmed argues, is contingent upon how well one aligns with the prescriptive 
timetable of a heteronormative life course: 
Happiness scripts could be understood as straightening devices, ways of aligning bodies with 
what is already lined up…The “whole world,” it might seem, depends on subjects being 
directed in the right way, toward the right kind of things. To deviate is always to risk a world 
even if you don’t always lose the world you risk. Queer and feminist histories are the 
histories of those who are willing to risk the consequences of deviation. (91) 
 
Dementia manifests as two life trajectories in the pursuit of happiness, and it also places both of 
Cowan’s worlds (which includes the relationships with and the memory of her children) at risk. In 
short, to read Walton’s exploration of gendered scripts of happiness one has to consider the queer, 
crip time of aging with dementia. Readers are forced to consider the place dementia has in the 
conception of a happy future, and how dementia is used to critique deviations from “happiness 
scripts” and gender norms in productive ways.  
 Building on Ahmed, Linn Sanberg and Barbara Marshall’s work in “Queering Aging 
Futures” is instructive here. Their analysis of news media and pharmaceutical advertisements 
highlights how ill health and disability become markers for the tragic end of relationships, 
particularly when images of successful aging and life are positioned in relation to “the imagery of 
reproductive success with happy older adults consistently positioned in relation to children and 
happy intimacies with grandchildren, pointing to (hetero)kinship as that which makes later life 
meaningful and positive” (3). To queer aging futures, Sanberg and Marshall insist there must also be 
“a simultaneous cripping of aging futures, constantly interrogating the role disability plays in the 
production of ‘failed’ aging futures” (5). As the title of Walton’s novel suggests, the narrative 
foregrounds Cowan’s cognitive impairment as an inability to recognize who her “real” children and 
grandchildren are, which in turn produces the notion of a failed, unsuccessful, unhappy future. 
Indeed, for Sanberg and Marshall, the threat of disability “to successful aging futures figures most 
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clearly in the case of dementia”: 
 Parallel to the monstrosity of the older gay man’s disjoint with futurity, the person with 
 dementia emerges as monstrous partly because of her lack of—or disruption of—futures. 
 If the success of hetero-aging futures lies partly in its links to generativity, then 
 dementia—through loss of memory—threatens to disrupt that generativity and represents 
 as such a form of queer crip temporality. Thinking of the term ‘familiar’ as connoting 
 both family and the well-known and expected, dementia disrupts the familiar both in the 
 sense of disorientation, in that we do not know where we will end up, and a troubling of 
 generativity in the heteronormative life course. The specter of dementia is fearful because 
 it proposes an unknown and muddy future as well as a lost past, and this also threatens 
 hetero-reproductive temporalities. (5) 
 
Dementia in My Real Children similarly disrupts these two meanings of the “familiar.” 
Dementia operates thematically and structurally, splitting the narrative to enable Walton to explore 
the contingency of not knowing “where we will end up” through an illusion of two definitive 
choices to make. But Cowan’s opportunity to choose is bound by the fact that the identities she has 
to choose from must revolve around the life course of having children. And dementia also threatens 
the notion of generativity as it disrupts the “happy intimacies” between Cowan and her children. In 
fact, the novel begins with the unhappy premise that children are the source of Cowan’s confusion.  
 It was when she thought of her children that she was most truly confused. Sometimes she 
 knew with solid certainty that she had four children, and five more stillbirths…At other 
 times she knew equally well that she has two children, both by caesarean section late in 
 her life after she had given up hope…She recognized them and felt that mother’s ache. 
 She was not yet as confused as her own mother had been at last when she had not known 
 her, had wept and fled from her and accused her of terrible crimes. (10-11) 
 
Cowan’s relationship to her two worlds and her sense of identity is restricted within a generational 
narrative as well as a narrative of reproduction. The passage points less to the fatalism of dementia 
than it does to how few choices Cowan had that did not involve children. The promise of happiness 
through children constitutes a powerful narrative in My Real Children, one that organizes both Trish 
and Pat’s understandings of what a good life and aging future should be. But the two-story structure 
of the novel that Cowan’s dementia facilitates makes visible how (un)happiness is shaped less by her 
disability and more by the constraints of gender roles and patriarchal expectations of conjugality, 
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sacrifice, and childbearing. In fact, it is only in the moment of Cowan’s dementing memory that the 
idea of two lives and the freedom of options appears real.139 
 The narrative strand of Trish’s world explores the myth of marital happiness based on 
heterosexual expectations of reproduction. Her children are born out of non-consensual sex. Almost 
immediately after the birth of Trish and Mark’s first child, Mark uses the dictatorial ‘we’ to tell Trish, 
in an autocratic manner, “We want more children,” to which Trish replies, “We do” with her “heart 
sinking” (79). For Trish, “It was not the birth she dreaded but the conception” (79). Trish’s 
responses to Mark’s advances are unsettling (“Please, no, she said when he came in” [80]), giving 
readers a picture of motherhood that is built on forced intimacy and the pressures of bearing 
children at all costs (Trish is told over and over she must forego her teaching career in order to rear 
children). Bearing children is also a literal threat to Trish’s life that Mark ignores: “The doctor told 
Mark that he was endangering Tricia’s life by insisting on more children. All the same time he 
persisted [to have sex with her], and she had another stillbirth” (98). Furthermore, Trish contradicts 
the expectations of the “ideal” mother’s unconditional love, expressing a certain disconnect from 
her children from the very onset of the novel: “Even now when she saw their faces, impossibly 
middle-aged, she felt that same burden of unconditional loving tugging at her, their needs and 
problems, and her inability to keep them safe and give them what they need” (11). This disconnect is 
circled back to at the end of the novel as she reflects on not knowing her children again: “although 
she’d never been away from them except when she was in the hospital giving birth, she found it 
difficult to understand how she had come to be in this position” (110).  
                                               
139 Speculative fiction writer Amal El-Mohtar’s NPR review gestures toward the importance of literature’s imaginings of 
such possibilities. Reflecting on her grandmother’s experience with Alzheimer’s, she comments on My Real Children: “I 
won’t say it’s [Cowan’s experience] comforting per se, but it is, perhaps, a support of a kind, to think that in her last days 
my grandmother too might have reflected on more than one personal history — at least one in a different, happier, 
easier world — and that she, too, might have hovered on the cusp of a choice of which one to keep.” To imagine the 
later stages of another’s life as imbued with meaning and possibility is an important step in challenging the cultural 
equation of aging—with and without dementia—with social death. 
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 In Trish’s narrative, patriarchal ideals foreclose her opportunities to pursue satisfaction 
through her own career and the expectations of “reproductive success” come at the expense of her 
health and happiness. The deployment of dementia, though, provides readers with an alternate 
world. Dementia offers Cowan a means to live in a counterpoint world to the life of Trish. In this 
life Pat and Bee each bear the children of their friend Michael and raise them together, inherently 
challenging the heterosexual nuclear family, while the process of conceiving and legally adopting 
each other’s children pose a challenge to the heteronormative status quo. As Laura Mamo reminds 
us in her work, while relationships like Pat and Bee’s may reinforce the traditional family form in 
some ways, it nonetheless “trouble[s] the normal” (6).  
 Pat’s subversively happy life also troubles the notion that dementia is solely a source of 
unhappiness in an aging life. As Pat’s life unfolds over the backdrop of “yet another assassination of 
the president in the US,” a war between Uruguay and Brazil that is “threatened to go nuclear” and 
widespread military injustice around the globe, the forgetting of dementia becomes almost a pardon 
for Pat (273). As Pat’s son Philip puts it, when Pat can’t remember the news, “That’s your memory 
being merciful” (304). And in response to having to leave Florence for the last time toward the end 
of Bee’s life with cancer, Pat admits, “I hope I forget” (293).  
 Using dementia as part of a speculative dual world making, Walton leaves readers with no 
easy choice as to which one is better, no definitive answer of what a successful aging future looks 
like. But it does give us a vision that dementia is not a non-future, but a present made up of futures 
past. Similar to Elizabeth, My Real Children speculates on dementia as an opening into ways of living 
otherwise, outside of the notion of a singular reality. It is a vision that recalls Andrew Hostetler’s 
definition of a queer vision, one that is “not beholden to specific narratives of the past,” but gestures 
toward an “always provisional imagined future informed by the multiplicity of present lived realities” 
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(419). Narrating the queer, crip time of Cowan’s dementia and her two realities creates a multilogue 
that rewrites the past in multiple ways, a past that centers the perspectives and possibilities of aging. 
 
Real-izing Alternate and Accessible Worlds 
 
My Real Children comments on the realities of aging and dementia care through the 
affordances of speculative fiction, namely its conventions of rationality and reasonableness—what 
Patrick Brantlinger refers to as the genre’s commitment to the “realism of the future” (30). By 
framing of Cowan’s sense of two worlds through speculative fiction, the novel paradoxically 
rationalizes, even legitimizes, the ostensibly “unreal” nature of dementia’s alternate worlds. Such is 
the power of genre, building on a point Sami Schalk makes in Bodyminds Reimagined: (Dis)ability, Race, 
and Gender in Black Women’s Speculative Fiction: “Since speculative fiction includes stories in the future, 
other worlds, altered pasts, and altered present periods, this genre can shift, challenge, and play on 
what readers expect of bodyminds and reveal how such expectations shape definitions of (dis)ability, 
race, and gender” (18). Schalk addresses how black women’s speculative fiction in particular 
challenges the “rules of reality—particularly the assumption that there is only a single reality” to 
deconstruct able-mindedness, noting that “people who experience realities considered dramatically 
unlike the realities of the majority are labeled and treated differently, depending on their race, 
gender, and (dis)ability statuses” (62). Though Walton’s novel is focused on the experiences of a 
white, lower-middle class character, it does point to how age is also a key intersectional category. 
Cowan’s experience of multiple realities is read by nurses as symptomatic of pathology because she 
is “old.” The novel helps readers resist this interpretive trap, however, because the tropes of 
speculative fiction work to normalize and make credible Cowan’s perception of two lives, carrying 
ethical implications. I do not mean to say Walton’s novel implies there is something inherently 
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science fictional about having age-related dementia, but rather, the novel serves to disarm the 
incredulity of readers, and hence may serve to alter societal perceptions.   
Rather than choose one or the other, the end of the novel affirms Cowan’s experience of 
multiple realities as a decidedly real possibility: “How many worlds were there? One? Two? An 
infinite number? Was there a world where she could have both happiness and peace?…Now or 
never, Trish or Pat, peace or war, loneliness or love? She wouldn’t have been the person her life had 
made her if she could have made any other answer” (316-7). This sense of realism is accomplished 
through what critics have pointed out to be the trope of many-worlds or multiverses inspired by 
quantum theory, as Lev Grossman writes: 
“My Real Children is a bit like a novel written from the point of view of Schrödinger’s cat, 
except that instead of a cat we have a smart, sympathetic Englishwoman named Patricia, and 
she’s not alive and dead, she’s alive twice—she lives two parallel lives, in two distinct worlds, 
both of which are apparently equally real. While the premise of My Real Children is science 
fictional, its tone is that of literary realism.” (Publisher’s Weekly) 
 
The crossover between literary imaginings of memory impairment and quantum mechanics by way 
of Schrödinger’s cat also takes place in the epilogue to A Tale for the Time Being, in which Ruth 
ruminates on the “mutually unknowable, web of many worlds”—and how “not-knowing keeps all 
the possibilities open. It keeps all the worlds alive” (415, 402).140  The foundational uncertainty of 
quantum mechanics’ conjectures works aptly alongside Walton’s exploration of Cowan’s experience 
of two realities to achieve the sense of “realism” Grossman points out. 
Probing the “literary realism” Grossman attributes to the novel further, I want to highlight 
that elements of the biographical novel are also working within the alternate history framework and 
genre of science fiction/fantasy, manifesting in a hybrid literary expression: a “speculative 
biography” of dementia. The biographical lends the novel a sense of the referential, enhancing the 
                                               
140 Ozeki writes in A Tale for the Time Being, “you are plural. You can’t inexact and talk to your other yous, or even know 
about your other existences in other worlds, because you can’t remember…Could this explain her lousy memory?” (398) 
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authenticity and plausibility of Cowan’s experience. This is held in conscious tension with Hayden 
White’s consideration of historical narratives as “verbal fictions, the contents of which are as much 
invented as found and the forms of which have more in common with their counterparts in literature 
than they have with those in the sciences” (82). Cowan’s speculative biography underlines how all 
historical and biographical narratives are essentially ‘fictional’; for Cowan, “real life” and fiction is 
interchangeable, an irresolvable ambiguity that captures the constructed nature of all life stories.  
The realist mode of the biographical Walton employs on one hand rehabilitates Cowan, 
privileging a rational voice that tells a narrative in a recognizably coherent and linear manner. In this 
way the novel reinforces “societal expectations regarding the dementia patient’s performance and 
productivity [that] impose successful narrative articulation as central to the perception of identity, 
social assertion and self.” (Zimmerman 21). On the other hand, the legibility it bestows Cowan’s 
perception of two lives does the work of destigmatizing dementia as each world becomes “real” to 
the reader as a viable reality. That the “cure” for dementia is not sought is striking for a novel in 
which the cures for AIDS and leukemia have been found. Instead, dementia remains at both the 
beginning and the end—the frame narrative performs to readers that aging and forgetting are 
inevitable parts of the human condition—and the stories we tell—and so are the disabilities that may 
come with it. My Real Children thus shifts the priority of discussion away from cure and toward 
access and ethical obligations of care. As Pat says comfortingly, “Life always comes down to 
bedpans…But it doesn’t matter when there’s love as well” (304). 
 The narratives of either Cowan are not intent on finding the cure for dementia or 
romanticizing it as an epistemological perspective. Instead, they tend to the realities of aging, and by 
doing so Walton mobilizes a critique of aging individuals’ lack of autonomy in institutionalized 
settings. Both Trish and Pat grapple with the ideas and impairments of getting old. Trish “didn’t like 
to think of herself as old, still less old and senile” (279). Pat “became deaf and needed hearing aids, 
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which were one more barrier to communication and one more thing for her to constantly lose” 
(309). But for how often both narratives emphasize “[o]ld age is terrifying” and “senility is the worst 
of all” (160), the novel avoids any turns toward promises of immortality (i.e. longevity and freedom 
from aging), one of science fiction’s most conventional motifs (Clute and Nicholls). Instead, Walton 
keeps a realist eye on how Trish and Pat’s anxieties of aging are caused and exacerbated by the lack 
of resources and loss of agency in the nursing home environment. In other words, My Real Children 
provides a glimpse into the institutional and structural production of vulnerability as a part of aging.  
As Trish and Pat “come of age” (defined by their proximity to nursing home care), Walton 
concludes the novel on how the physiological realities of aging and age-related impairment are made 
worse by insufficient regard for assistive technology in institutionalized settings. The aged Trish for 
example relies on a Macintosh computer to “make up for not being able to remember,” using the 
Google application that helps her “fill the holes” of her memory (300). As this dialogue with one of 
her daughters shows, this important part of her daily life is bound to be taken away: 
The worse thing about going into the home was they wouldn’t let her take the Mac. “I need 
it, I need it more than anything else,” she said…“It helps me remember things,” she begged. 
“My pills, I’ll never remembering my blood pressure pills without the Mac.” (298)…“You 
won’t be able to go online. You won’t be able to use Google or email. What did you use 
Google for anyway?”…“To remember things.” Trish said with all the dignity she could 
manage, though she was starting to cry. (300) 
  
These simple, seemingly inconsequential exchanges between Trish and her daughters capture how 
Walton subverts the science fiction/fantasy trope of immortality by instead focusing on some of the 
very real vulnerabilities nursing home residents in Cowan’s world face. While the invocation of 
Google may sound far from futuristic for a contemporary audience, “Google was what Trish had 
wanted for years, the ability to search for something she had forgotten” (280). Google is integral to 
Trish’s sense of well-being, a technology that is not a “cure” for dementia but an essential 
nonmedical assistive technology. That Google will be taken away from Trish is an understated 
example of a socially disabling practice experienced in institutionalized settings. 
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This concern with access is paralleled in Pat’s narrative after Bee loses her legs during a city 
bombing and begins to “[devour] everything she could find on assisted technology for the 
handicapped” (215). Trish’s preoccupation with Google and Bee’s observations of the inaccessible 
landscape of Florence (“No ramps. All those cobbles. No toilets” [217]) accrue in the novel perhaps 
as banal details to readers in a work of science fiction/fantasy. However, together they present 
readers not with any magical cure but a realistic, achievable vision of foregrounding accessibility as a 
means for how societies can hold space for aging and disabled populations. 
What does it mean, then, that ultimately both women end up with the same fate: in an 
inadequate assisted living facility, lacking accessible technology, and empathic care? In the end, “she 
was just an old woman with memory problems. Or maybe two old women with memory problems” 
(315). Does the structure of the novel merely reinforce the patroiophobia surrounding dementia, 
reinscribing Cowan as the inevitable victim, in which the futurity of having children is possibly the 
only redemption? This is indeed one of the criticisms leveled at My Real Children. One reviewer from 
The Guardian lamented, “Our heroine can only conclude, it seems, that the state of the world doesn’t 
really matter to women – having children makes up for everything.” This critique that the novel 
reinforces a script of happiness that privileges reproduction might be complicated by taking into 
consideration that the reliable existence of Cowan’s children is destabilized by her own dementia and 
the subsequent split narrative. Walton keeps ambiguous who Cowan’s “real children” are—“Then 
she thought about her children. Which were her real children?…Only one set of them could 
possibly be real, but which? She loved them all, and there was no real difference in the quality of her 
love for them” (314). Rather than stress the objective fact of who her biological children are, the 
novel speaks to the creation of life as narrative, or multiple narratives, as that which gives meaning 
to life based on imagination; narrative offers Cowan an ‘escape,’ not unlike the ends of creative 
storytelling in person-centered care. Through the suspension of disbelief that fantasy/science fiction 
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requires, the novel deemphasizes ties of biological kinship, instead privileging a relationship rooted 
in feeling in the present similar to what authors like Healey and Schultz have also addressed. Just as 
Elizabeth concludes with Elizabeth still missing, My Real Children ends on the openness of both 
worlds: “whichever way she chose she’d break her heart to lose her children. All of them were her 
real children” (316). Cowan’s consolation in the end is perhaps not actual children per se, but the 
freedom of imagination accompanying the narrative choices made possible by her dementia. 
~ 
Keeping with the previous texts this dissertation has explored, My Real Children resists the 
mainstream discourse of dementia as the defining crisis of the contemporary era. Instead, My Real 
Children focuses on the crises of environmental desecration, resource exhaustion, and nuclear and 
military violence that both produce disability and affect populations as they age. These crises 
constitute the backdrop of the novel, particularly Pat’s life. As Bee expresses to Pat, 
 If you like I’ll say we’re totally doomed—I’m dying and you’re going senile, and I think 
 I have the best of it. But what good does that do? Might as well live while we can…I’m 
 not angry with you. I’m angry with the cancer, with the stupid Americans who had to 
 retaliate with an H-bomb and no thought about the winds and who they were hurting, 
 with the equally stupid Russians who thought they could get respect by taking out Miami, 
 and with the Indians and the Chinese…We’ve only got one habitable planet and it’s so 
 fragile, and we keep on screwing it up. Dropping nukes and burning oil. That’s what makes  
me angry, not your infirmity. (289-290) 
 
The inexhaustible violence and turmoil Cowan lives through serves to highlight the illusory nature of 
choice in unrelentingly precarious worlds. My Real Children untethers readers from the discourse of 
dementia as societal threat and pulls them into contemplating the shared, pressing realities of 
military, environmental, and global violence. Cowan is a subject of “profound vulnerability” 
produced by circumstances out of her control similar to characters in Elizabeth, and both novels 
stress the importance of recognizing the humanity and perspectives of their characters, the necessity 
of listening to their realities, and engaging issues of access and care. But also, one must consider the 
power relations of gender, race, and class that play out in the worlds characters like Cowan and 
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Maud inhabit. What would have happened to Maud, on the night of her arrest wandering through 
the streets, if she were not a white woman of the British middle-class? Or Cowan were she not ever 
given the privileges of nursing home care? How might these worlds have been shaped differently?  
Overall, by using dementia as its speculative framework, My Real Children invites readers to 
imagine the possibility of a kind of life history often cast aside as unreliable, one that is multiple and 
fundamentally unknowable. Systematically traversing the two worlds that arise from Cowan’s senile 
dementia, Walton’s narrative is less about capturing an apocalyptic vision of the chaos and confusion 
of memory loss and aging than it is normalizing that experience by using it to produce two 
believable, readable versions of the 20th century. The novel stages listening to and recognizing 
Cowan’s two lives as its ethical crux, for we all live identities that are in some ways plural. Using 
Trish/Pat to reflect back on readers, the novel echoes an insistence Simone de Beauvoir makes in 
The Coming of Age, that “[w]e must stop cheating: the whole meaning of our life is in question in the 
future that is waiting for us. If we do not know what we are going to be, we cannot know what we 
are: let us recognize ourselves in this old man or in that old woman” (5). Walton’s novel offers an 














 It’s the 1950s and 60s and a Seaburg jukebox plays in a diner with Formica tables. Portraits 
of Fifties screen stars like James Dean and Audrey Hepburn decorate the walls, while a 1959 Ford 
Thunderbird sits outside. This is Glenner Town Square: an 8,500 square foot indoor community 
with 12 storefronts and 24 buildings, rotary telephones and black and white televisions. Built in 
collaboration with the San Diego Opera Scenic studio, Glenner Town Square is the U.S.’s first large-
scale “dementia village” (Kragen).141 The $3 million nursing home alternative is also the largest U.S. 
investment in reminiscence therapy: a multi-sensorial approach to care that involves triggering the 
positive, typically intact, long-term memories of people with dementia with the aid of props and 
cues from the past—designs that are anticipated to be updated with each coming generation. 
 Reminiscence therapy’s emphasis on the sharing of stories is less about soliciting historically 
accurate accounts of the past than it is about the process of facilitating communication, an approach 
that stands in radical contrast to “reality orientation” discussed in Chapter 4. With this historical 
context in mind, the premise of facilities like Glenner—the pairing of reminiscence therapy with the 
creation of an “actual” historical environment—indexes a promising shift in societal attitudes and 
accommodations that recognize and validate the lived, plural realities that people with dementia may 
inhabit.  
                                               
141 Designed after Hogewek, a 24/7 residential care town in the Netherlands. Many U.S. and U.K. memory-care units 
and nursing homes are making nostalgic environments or “nostalgia rooms” designed to look like they’re from its 
residents’ childhoods, e.g. Ohio’s Chagrin Valley. 
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But places like Glenner are not panaceas, as these privately-owned “dementia villages” are 
financially unaffordable to a vast majority of families. They are also heavy-handedly Anglo-Western-
centric, making them potentially ill-equipped to accommodate racial and ethnic disparities or 
incompatible with non-Western values and practices (my grandfather would certainly have not felt 
“at home” in Glenner). Reconciling reminiscence therapy with different cultures of caring remains a 
project under construction. Nevertheless, the premise behind investment in these worlds and their 
“inhabitants” (rather than ‘patients’) offers a counternarrative to unmercifully negative mainstream 
media portrayals of dementia and Alzheimer’s “alternative reality,” which is construed as no reality 
at all. One journalist notes that places like Glenner are imaginative models for aging-friendly cities, 
spaces “adapted for a vulnerable population,” built around life rather than death, operating as a kind 
of “simulacrum of an inclusive space” (Hurley). Places like Glenner also highlight how built 
environments are never neutral but typically designed privileging able-bodied and -minded subjects. 
Operating as “real-life time capsules” (Inside Edition), these fictitious spaces attempt to align the 
incongruency between the person with dementia’s sense of reality and the physical present-day 
reality as is normatively perceived.  
As in all the texts Entangled Stories has explored, “alternative reality villages” rely on the 
creation of generic worlds, as one Atlantic journalist calls attention to in their description of 
“dementia villages” as “Truman Show-style nursing homes,” referring to the science fictional feel of 
staged realities. But Glenner and the works I’ve discussed also speak to the way genre and generic 
arrangements (material and literary) reproduce and enact our realities—not only facilitating 
communication and interactions and constituting the “scene of action,” but the actors themselves 
(Carpenter n.p.). Borrowing terms from material feminism, the world-making of Glenner is 
premised on a type of care that is attentive to the world as shifting intra-actions of becoming 
(Barad); in other words, dementia is not a fixed diagnosis but enacted through its entanglements 
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with human and non-human actors, technologies, and material surroundings. This approach shifts 
the “afflictive dimensions of dementia” away from the individual and to “effects of configurations 
shaping everyday life…the collective in which they take part” (Lotherington). As this last chapter’s 
particular focus on genre fiction has shown, literature can raise these relational dynamics to critical 
consciousness, making them more apparent to readers by breaking and playing with the constraints 
of the generic world in which their characters with dementia reside. In this way they speak to the 
assertions Charles Bazerman, building on Carolyn Miller, makes on the promise of genre: “Genres 
are not just forms. Genres are forms of life, ways of being. They are frames for social action. They 
are environments for learning. They are locations within which meaning is constructed. Genres 
shape the thoughts we form and the communications by which we interact” (19). For this reason, 
critical attention to dementia representation in the context of genre and form remains important for 
contesting the interlocking socio-cultural norms of disability, aging, and gender, and urging more 
humanizing and diverse perspectives and practices in our shared worlds.  
More than serving a discussion exclusively surrounding dementia, Entangled Stories 
contributes to discussion regarding the material, social, and environmental factors that shape the 
experience of plural, fluctuating realities that all aging and contingent bodies and minds may 
eventually experience. It broadens the purview of (literary) disability studies to include the discussion 
of dementia and aging. Furthermore, as many of the chapters have demonstrated, representing 
dementia is deployed toward putting forth an anti-imperialist stance, recognizing the lingering 
temporalities of injustice, and invoking often unheard voices. Thus, these revisionary narratives of 
dementia have carryover importance for thinking about inclusive and just futures in the broadest 
sense. 
 As temporal possibilities multiply in contemporary culture, the conventional sense of linear 
chronology imposed on bodies and minds becomes more apparently inadequate in its exclusion of a 
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wide range of experiences felt by disabled and other minoritized groups. Taking seriously radically 
different notions and experiences of embodied time is an urgent task in activism and critical inquiry. 
Exploring the subjectivity of dementia, the works herein perform this work; they take readers to 
previously unimaginable juxtapositions of time and space in order to look productively at and from 
unjust pasts to alternative and inclusive futures. Putting pressure on our assumptions about the 
body, time, and what narrative should look like, revisionary narratives use disability to imagine 
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